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Abstract
The political events that unfolded on September 11 200 I, marked a turning point in world
history. The attacks on the United States brought into sharp focus, the very complex issue
of political violence being perpetrated by elements from within the Muslim world, and
the project of what is commonly referred to as Political Islam. These events have
subsequently led to an intensification of scrutiny of Muslims globally, by the Western
world, as well as the establishment of heightened security measures by many
governments, with Muslims being subjected to increasing levels of suspicion and the
curtailment of civil liberties. Accompanying this scrutiny of Muslims, has been the
United States led "War on Terror," which has further fuelled anger and resentment within
the Muslim world, and inspired the carrying out of further attacks of political violence
against Western targets such as Britain and Spain, by Muslim militants.
This thesis attempts to locate the unfolding of these acts of political violence, within the
broad framework of an examination of what constitutes the arena of Political Islam
(which is seen as the interface between the Islamic faith and political activity by
Muslims), and to interrogate two streams of political expression within Political Islam.
These are Militant Islam and Progressive Islam. This interrogation will attempt to take
into account the historical development of political thought and action within the Muslim
world, and Islam's encounter with the projects of colonialism, empire and orientalism, in
order to understand and offer some analysis around the possible reasons for the
phenomenon of contemporary political violence emanating from the Muslim world. The
study will also argue that progressive expressions of Islam are more representative of the
essence of Quranic teachings and that militancy, while sometimes necessary, is not an
ideal way for Muslims to engage politics. The case study within which the broader
theoretical argument unfolds, is the post-apartheid South African Muslim context. This
case study examines how SA Muslims are expressing themselves politically in a
democratic dispensation, and whether they are inclined towards militant or progressive
expressions, as a faith based community engaging politics. The thesis concludes by
offering suggestions for how SA Muslims can advance a peaceful progressive political




The horrifying increase in the rise of terrorism in the past few years and
incidences such as September 11 2001, the Bali bombings, London bombings, ongoing
suicide bombings in the Middle East, together with the "War on Terror," has many
people questioning whether the "Western" world can co-exist with the world ofIslam and
Muslims, which appears to be the central denominator in all of these terrorist acts. This
has created an urgent need to interrogate more closely, the relationship between Islam
and politics, commonly referred to as Political Islam.
The state of contemporary global politics, in particular the increased focus on the
political dynamics emerging from within the Muslim world, obliges us to develop a
deeper theoretical and contextual understanding of Islam as an ideological framework,
considered by many as informing and shaping events in the contemporary epoch. Many
incidences of political violence globally are characterized as the hallmark of Muslim
extremists who believe they are engaging in "holy war," or jihad, against the evils of the
"West." It has become common for perpetrators of militant acts, which often target
civilians, to quote religious scripture as inspiration for their actions and to locate their
militancy within the political theology of Islam. This theological interpretation of the
political sphere of Islam is commonly referred to as "Political Islam." It constitutes a
variety of sub-discourses that have attempted to interpret and explain Quranic terms such
as ''jihad,'' sometimes referred to within broad intellectual discourse as "holy war,"
appropriate forms of government within Islam, national identity, relationship between
religion and politics, and so on. l
I Political Islam is a fairly new term introduced into Islamic discourse during the past half century by
intellectuals like A.A. Mawdudi, S. Qutb, O. Roy, J. Esposito, Z. Sardar, and G. Kepel. Whilst political
issues have been central to Islamic thought since the seventh century, the discourse of political Islam has
evolved within a predominantly contemporary context. See J.L. Esposito, Political Islam. Revolution,
Radicalism, or Reform? (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).
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The notion of what constitutes "holy war," for example, is intensely contested and
vigorously debated within the global Muslim world. The emerging consensus among
many Muslim activists and intellectuals, particularly outside the Middle East, is that the
idea of jihad as a process of struggle (which can be emotional, psychological, physical,
spiritual, etc), has essentially been usurped by a network of militants who subscribe to a
brand of Islamic extremism that is out of synch with a 21 sI century "progressive"
understanding of Islam. Militants are perceived as distorting Quranic text to justify their
particular political agendas. 2 Militants and armed "liberation movements," in turn,
contest this view. They argue that militancy is an appropriate and legitimate response to
the imperialist nature of political engagement by western regimes, particularly the United
States, and that their actions should therefore not be referred to as "terrorism" but as
"resistance." 3
In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States,
considered to have been inspired by Islamic "extremism," the nature of global politics
and international relations has clearly shifted, in terms of security considerations. Many
governments have as a result of these attacks on the US, put into place harsh measures to
deal with militant groups, and allegedly militant groups, whom they label "terrorist.,,4
These events have dominated recent international relations and are effectively changing
the nature of engagement between state and non-state actors. Increasingly, individual
freedoms are being severely compromised as governments seek to address violence
2 See o. Safi, Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003);
R. Bonney, Jihad: From Quran to Bin Laden (London: Palgrave, 2004) and Z. Sardar, What Do Muslims
Believe? (London: Granta Books, 2006).
3 Militant groupings such as AI- Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah, who are
engaged in militant activity in their respective geographic regions, have argued vociferously that civic and
political engagement has been futile, and that militancy is the only option of exercising dissent and
resistance to accomplish their goals. See J. Corbin, The Base: In search ofAl-Qaeda ~ The Terror Network
that Shook the World (London: Simon and Schuster, 2002) and M. Bishara, Palestine / Israel: Peace or
Apartheid (London: Zed Books, 2002).
4 All of the planes that were part of the co-ordinated attack on the US were allegedly hijacked by Muslim /
Arab individuals, primarily of Saudi origin. Investigations revealed that all those who had planned and / or
carried out the operation were in some way connected to AI-Qaeda or some militant movement that based
its ideologies on Islamic religious rhetoric. In most instances this rhetoric was considered extremist by the
broader international community.
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through draconian legislation which clamps down on civilliberties.5 The implications for
the stability of the world order is grave, especially given that many Muslim minorities in
the West are now subject to extreme pressures, increased vigilance, and indeed outright
intimidation as a result of the actions of Muslim militants elsewhere.6
The discourse of Political Islam has come under greater scrutiny as governments,
security personnel, and policy analysts attempt to understand how the links between
Islam as a religion and the political ideology of the faith might be inciting political
violence.7 While there have been attempts by the non-Muslim world to understand the
discourse of both political Islam and the religion as a whole through engagement with
Muslim communities, the assumptions that conflate Islamic political theology with
political violence remain deep-seated in many minds. The notion that Islam is anti-
modem, archaic, and incites hatred of non-Muslims has seemingly taken root in large
sectors of the Western world.8 Such views are reinforced through western intellectual
discourses, such as those advanced by Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, who argue
that Islamic culture is on an inevitable collision course with western civilization because
of its inability to conform to modernity, notwithstanding 1400 years of sophisticated
political thought within Islam, which has shown itself to be highly adaptive as a discourse
and intellectual framework without losing the essence of its core theological
foundations. 9
Contemporary tensions, it can be argued, are not endemic to the faith but emerged
when the predominantly egalitarian ethos of political Islam was confronted with the
5 The United States and its coalition partners have been waging a "War on Terror", arguing that terrorism is
the major threat facing the international community today. The term terrorism has, however, also been used
to describe militant acts carried out, arguably, in self-defense against state military apparatus, such as is the
case in Israel / Palestine. Given that most perpetrators of "terrorism" are emerging from within the Muslim
world, there has been a greater focus on the faith and its ideologies by the international community. See O.
Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst and Company, 2004) and J.L.
Esposito, Political Islam. Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).
6 See T. Ali, The Clash ofFundamentalisms : Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 2002).
7 See G. Kepel, Jihad : The Trail ofPolitical Islam (London: IB Tauris, 2004).
8 See C. Benard, Civil Democratic Islam : Partners, Resources, Strategies (Santa Monica : The Rand
Corporation, 2003).
9 See S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996) and B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988).
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reality of militancy which articulated itself throughout the globe as a peculiar
manifestation of post-colonial Islamic political movements resisting imperialist and
colonial domination. 10 This study is primarily about the ideological contestation between
those who claim that militancy and political violence is a necessary tactic within Islam to
respond to contemporary political realities (such as the invasion and occupation of
Muslim lands) and those who argue that Islam is not about violence, and can engage
politics, but within a progressive paradigm. This thesis aims to understand how this
contestation locates itself within the South African Muslim context, and whether either
ideology has any significant following within this community.
Tendencies within Militant Islam
The scholarship of political Islam in the 19th century has documented Islamic
movements (religious and political) that emerged as a response to the imperialist project
of the western world. l ! It essentially traces the development of nationalist resistance
struggles to overthrow colonial regimes which had caused political and socio-economic
fragmentation in the Muslim and Arab worlds. Some movements that originated as
primarily religious, political, or nationalist groupings subsequently evolved into militant
factions, using religious scripture to rationalize their violent activism. 12
Two predominantly religiously inspired ideological movements, Wahabbism and
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) stand out in particular, as they are seen as
having spawned various contemporary militant groups. They fall under the broad
ideological framework of what Olivier Roy articulates as Neo-fundamentalism, a school
of thought that encapsulates a variety of religiously conservative modes of belief. 13
10 See J. Beinin and J. Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from The Middle East Report ( London: I B
Tauris and Co, 1997).
11 Beinin and Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essaysfrom Middle East Report.
12 Mahmood Mamdani argues that the rise in militancy is a consequence of Cold War dynamics that
resulted in some of political movements evolving into armed militant groups taking on liberation struggles
because of the failure of political processes to resolve territorial and other disputes. See M. Mamdani, Good
Muslim, Bad Muslim (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004). See also, Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a
New Ummah.
13 See Roy, G10balised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, 232 - 247.
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Wahabbism, which has its roots in the peculiar legacy of Saudi political history and
religious fundamentalism, has been identified as having inspired extremist militant
groups such as AI-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah. 14 The Muslim Brotherhood, which has
its origins in Egyptian worker and nationalist struggles, gave rise to militant groupings
such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. ls In South
Africa, Qibla, which emerged in the 1980s as a response to the political oppression of
Apartheid, was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, while People Against Gangsterism
and Drugs (PAGAD) emerged in the post-apartheid period as an expression of political
militancy within the South African Muslim community. PAGAD however did not
necessarily have any direct links to either ideological movement.
A third movement has also influenced the broader global Muslim community in
terms of militant rhetoric but its influence has been largely localized. This is the Iranian
regime that emerged out of the Revolution of 1979. 16 While the revolution inspired many
Muslims ideologically, it has not given rise to extreme militant factions globally,
although Iran is often accused of supporting militant groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon,
which have a Shiite identity. The regime consolidated itself as a religious based authority,
with Mul1ahs regulating the national life of Iranians. The Iranian religious leadership is
primarily Shiite-based, whereas much contemporary violent militant activity is emerging
out of Sunni groupings inspired by Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood. 17 This does
not however make Iranian politics any less militant. The latest trajectory of the Iranian
ideological revolution has manifested itself in a political dispute with the American
14 The idea of religious fundamentalism articulated here is that which would constitute an orthodox
understanding of Islam within Saudi Arabia. It does not necessarily imply that religious orthodoxy is
inherently connected to militancy. See Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah.
15 See Roy, Globalised Islam: The Searchfor a New Ummah.
16 See D. Westerlund, ed., Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in
Politics (London: Hurst and Company, 1996).
17 The Islamic tradition has two distinct theological sects / groups that manifest themselves as Sunni and
Shia. The points of divergence have historically emerged as a result of differences over succession of
leadership. Shiites insist that the true leadership of Islam must emerge from within the bloodline of the
Prophet Muhammed (saw), while Sunnis subscribe to the idea of electing leadership from those deemed
most capable and religiously competent. There is a debate around the degree of militancy that exists in both
Sunni and Shiite camps. Shiites have historically refrained from engaging in the level of militancy that
Sunni groups have resorted to. The current political impasse in Iraq is a clear indicator of these historical
disputes, and has begun to manifest itself as religious sectarian tensions. See Chapter Two of this thesis for
more detailed discussion on the Sunni / Shiite distinction.
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administration over the development of nuclear technology. While the Iranian political
space has arguably not generated violent militancy, it does nevertheless reflect degrees of
organised political resistance and will be referred to in this thesis, when necessary.
Progressive Ideology in Islam
The global Islamic political landscape is not a homogenous space with any single
ideological movement enjoying hegemony. While militancy appears dominant for now, a
new movement has been emerging over the past few decades in response to the changing
face of global Islam. This movement emerged in response to militant ideologies and is
challenging violent modes of political engagement by some in the Muslim world. This
movement refers to itself as "Progressive Islam" and in many respects fashions itself as
an egalitarian, democratic ideological space concerned with social justice and opposed to
violence. 18 The tag "Progressive Islam" is however, value-laden. For the purposes of this
study it refers to Muslims who "oppose fundamentalism and militant religion; people
who are open, flexible and want to rework their age-old beliefs to engage with the
modern world. They are also critical of modernity and the West from their faith
perspective but crucially, seek to live peacefully within their communities ...with the aim
of averting a new round of energy-sapping hostilities between peoples." 19
Progressive Islam is itself a contested ideological terrain, with serious differences
around what constitutes the core principles of this emerging movement and how we are to
define notions of "progressive" and "religious" as mutually compatible, given that there
are differing understandings of progressive thought. This nascent movement has
manifested itself in various contexts ranging from civic groupings that have a
predominantly Muslim identity to those that are geared towards organizing and creating a
space for engagement for Muslims living in predominantly secular societies. South
African examples include the Muslim Youth Movement and Taking Islam to the People.
18 See O. Safi, Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism.
19 See G. Doogue and P. Kirkwood, Tomorrow's Islam: Uniting age-old beliejS and a modern world
(Sydney: ABC books, 2005), 2.
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South African Context
South Africa as a nation has been subject to a violent and tumultuous history, but
has since 1994 become a model for constructive engagement and conflict resolution in
many quarters, despite occasional incidences of political violence during the past decade.
The country's relevance to this project as a case-study is ideal because its Muslim
community has been involved at various levels of national political life, from
participating in the anti-apartheid struggle to being part of the global anti-war movement
post-2000?O The nature of political engagement by South African Muslims is extremely
fascinating given that it reflects both a militant and a progressive rhetoric, and has
expressed these in various ways. This thesis will document and analyse various forms of
political expression in an effort to interrogate the hypothesis of this study, viz,
"Progressive Islam, as an ideology within Political Islam inspired by Quranic
text and Islamic political thought, represents an ideological alternative to
militant post-colonial Islamic movements and provides a viable model for
political engagement within a 2F1 century context. "
Muslims constitute less than 2.5 per cent of South Africa's population of 45
million but have been in the public eye since South Africa achieved its freedom. Initially,
it was because of the militant activities of the anti-drug group, People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs (pAGAD) in the mid-to-Iate 1990s, which had an overtly
"Islamic" identity. This was followed by ongoing debates among Muslims about
participating in the democratic process, protests over Palestine, Muslim reaction to the
post-2001 global "War on Terror," invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; the cartoon
controversy in later 2005; and deportation of Pakistani national Rashid Khalidi in
October 2005 in connivance, allegedly, with the British, amongst other incidences, such
as the global anger in response to comments made by the Pope and British MP Jack
20 See A. Tayob, Islam in South Africa,. Mosques, Imams and Sermons (Gainesville : University Press of
Florida, 1999).
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Straw, in relation to Islam and Muslims. This has been accompanied by serious debates
amongst Muslims over the nature of their religious beliefs and practices. The tendency
however among some in "western" circles, to see Muslim reaction to these events as
homogeneous, masks important nuances. This is reflected in the manner in which
Muslims have been taking advantage of spaces in the post-apartheid landscape.
If we throw into the mix the quite remarkable fact that the war in Iraq could not
mobilise as many people as the cartoon issue, emerging spiritual tendencies within Islam,
the changing nature of identity, the "toenadering" (close association) with the ANC
government by some Muslims, the rapid spread of Muslim schools, the (re)turn to the
beard and the veil in recent times, the shunning of the beard by some, popularity of
Muslim "souks" (flea markets), growth in listener-ship of Islamic radio stations, the
emergence of "Gift of the Givers" as a major national charitable organisation, and
different trajectories of Islam in the Cape, Durban and Johannesburg, then all this makes
for a vibrant political space among Muslims, but a divided one with multiple voices.21
The Study
This thesis engages in a historical analysis of Political Islam and provides a
framework for understanding this discourse in a 21 st century context. It examines
competing ideological movements that have inspired specific modes of political
engagement, historically and in the contemporary period, in order to find answers to the
many new questions that seem to be emerging. Has Political Islam historically served to
advance notions of egalitarianism or is it predominantly an ideological space that inspires
violence and militancy? Does Political Islam incite violence and advocate the killing of
civilians, or does it seek to promote social justice, based on principles ofhumaneness and
dignity? Is there systematic engagement between progressive Muslims and mainstream
Western audiences? Why do Western audiences only know of Muslims who are
21 See G. Vahed and S. Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in Post-Apartheid South Africa," in State
ofthe Nation: South Africa, 2004 - 2005, ed. J. Daniel and others, 252 - 286 (Cape Town: HSRC Press,
2005).
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perceived to be hostile and aggressive? Does Progressive Islam provide answers to
whether Muslims and non-Muslims can live in long-term harmony? Are militant modes
of contemporary Muslim resistance against Western domination effective in achieving
their objectives? Is political violence a viable alternative to democratic and progressive
engagement around these issues? The study locates these key questions within the South
African Muslim context.
The primary hypothesis locates itself within the argument that contemporary
Progressive Islam is a dynamic space which, while having contesting and competing
internal theological paradigms, essentially provides a model for constructive politics and
engagement that complements modem democracy, and that extremist militant modes of
engagement are essentially political tools external to the core theological foundation of
Islam as a religion, which means peace and submission to a higher power. There is a
context for Muslim rage and militancy. However, this must be located within the
framework of international relations and global politics, as opposed to being reduced to
simply, inspiration from the Quranic text. While the phenomenon of religious extremism
is often couched in religious terms, arguably it has nothing to do with "authentic" Islam.
The study has attempted to achieve the following six primary objectives;
a) Provide a historical and contextual background to the development
of Political Islam as an intellectual space, examining the relationship between
cultural and religious discourse and the framework of secular modernity;
b) Locate Political Islam within the framework of contemporary
global politics and analyze the links being articulated between modem
political militancy and the discourse of political Islam;
c) Provide an alternative understanding of Political Islam that
challenges mainstream western misconceptions of the discourse, located in
Orientalist and "Islamophobic" rhetoric;
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d) Interrogate contemporary groupmgs m South Africa that are
political, civic, and religious in nature, and locate their activism within certain
forms of ideological rhetoric, which are either militant or progressive;
e) Engage in qualitative and quantitative analysis of the multiple
ways in which Political Islam and forms of political expression manifest
themselves within the South African Muslim community, through structured
interviews and analysis of archival material;
f) Conclude by assessing the degree to which Progressive Islamic
ideology provides a model for a politics of engagement that is complimentary
to modem democracy within a 2 I5t century context, as opposed to militant
modes of engagement.
The study has also posed the foIlowing five basic research questions:
i) What are the core ideological assumptions of historical and contemporary
Political Islam, located within various movements that emerged since the late
nineteenth century, and how do these provide a framework for political
engagement in a 21 5t century context?
ii) How have the discourses of culture, colonialism, and modernity shaped and
transformed political Islam over the past century?
iii) Why is Political Islam linked with contemporary political violence and how
should we seek to re-examine the connections between the theoretical I
theological paradigm of Islam and expressions of religious militancy?
iv) What forms of political expression are being articulated within the South African
Muslim community in the post-apartheid period? How are South Africa's
Muslims embracing political spaces which have opened up as a consequence of
15
fundamental political, social, and economic changes that came with the demise of
apartheid, which was roughly cotenninous with globalization?
v) In what ways does Progressive Islam as a modem movement provide alternatives
for political engagement within a trans-national framework? Is it compatible with
democracy in the 21 st century?
Below are the chapter summaries, which give a brief overview of how the study
has been divided into various sections.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter One: Political Islam - Origins, history, and transformation
This chapter contains a description of the current political status of the contemporary
Muslim world and traces the development of the discourse of Political Islam, its
intellectual influences as well as its various manifestations globally, from the early 20th
century to the 1970s, to the current period. It also engages in a critical evaluation of the
evolution of both Militant and Progressive Islam.
Chapter Two: Empire, Colonialism, Orientalism
This chapter articulates the evolution of Orientalist thought and Western Empire in
relation to the development of Political Islam, and traces the impact of Western political
projects such as Colonialism, and modem day military invasions and occupations of
Muslim territories and discrimination towards Muslim minority communities, which has
shaped particular forms of responses by Muslims towards such projects. It also examines
latter day fonns of Orientalist discourse, manifesting itself as "Islamophobia."
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Chapter Three: The Context: Islam in South Africa: lvIl/lriple communities
Chapter Three focuses on describing South African Muslims and their origins and
development into a contemporary minority community. There is an emphasis on the
various regional dynamics, based on province and race, which have shaped particular
expressions of Muslim identity and practice. There is also a brief description of the broad
political landscape which SA Muslims inhabit.
Chapter Four: Methodology Review and Summary of Qualitative Data: South African
Muslims and Political Participation
This chapter outlines the methodology used in this study and some of the constraints
faced in the research process. Chapter Four also summarises the main trends of thought
and popular opinion within the South African Muslim community as expressed by the
various interviewees. It delineates the broad spectrum of political views and practice that
shape the contemporary experience of SA Muslims. It also profiles a variety of Muslim
organizations that function within the Muslim and broader community space, and
assesses the impact that these organizations have had on developing either a conservative
(even militant) or progressive (moderate / liberal) worldview amongst SA Muslims, and
further evaluates how these perspectives have impacted on how they express themselves
politically.
Chapter Five: Post-Apartheid Period - Insular or participating citizens?
Chapter Five evaluates the degree to which SA Muslims have become isolated or
engaged, in relation to the key political issues of the day, through an analysis of archival
material which documents their political participation since 1994. In particular it
highlights the political achievements of SA Muslims in a post-apartheid context, who
have sought to engage within the framework of their religious beliefs, but arguably do so
within the context of a progressive Islamic paradigm, and through primarily civic modes
ofparticipation.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions - In pursuit ofa way forward
This chapter summarises the discussion and findings of the previous five chapters and
attempts to locate the broader study within the hypothetical paradigm which the thesis
began with,
"Progressive Islam, as an ideology within Political Islam inspired by Quranic
text and Islamic political thought, represents an ideological alternative to
militant post-colonial Islamic movements and provides a viable model for
political engagement within a 2Ft century context. "
In the final analysis, the hypothesis is affirmed as being applicable in the South
African context. This chapter also outlines a vision for a sustainable way forward for
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Introduction
The post Cold War international relations terrain has been increasingly redefined
by an emerging contestation within the Muslim world, between what we can broadly
refer to as liberal and secular forms of political engagement on the one hand, and those
forms of political expression that are rooted in more rigid and conservative Islamic
theological tradition.23 This contestation is the subject of this study which is located
within the broad overarching framework of an interrogation into the form, nature and
substance of the contested spaces, taking into account the factors, history and
contemporary dynamics which shape these debates?4
While some intellectuals may regard these debates as part of the evolving
character of a religion that is just over fourteen centuries old, the tensions that have
emerged from the contestations over the past decade, such as increased militancy and
political violence against Western targets in particular, have led to an increased scrutiny
of Islam, especially by Western politicians, intelligence agencies, and scholars, in a
22 For more detailed discussion on issues referred to in this chapter, see A. Hourani, Arab Thought in the
Liberal Age 1798 -1939 (CUP, 1983), H. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (London: Macmillan
Press, 1988) and I. Boullata, Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought (SUNY, 1990).
23 The term liberal is used in this thesis to refer to a set of ideas that reflect a particular political ideology,
viz, Liberalism, as espoused by Western philosophical thinkers such as John Locke (reflected in essays
such as A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689), and John Stuart Mill (J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other
Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1859, 1989). The phrase liberal is usually used to
denote individual/s or actions that are inspired by liberalism as an ideology. The notions most central to
liberalism are liberty, equality and humanism, all being articulated by Locke as 'god-given / natural rights'.
The phrase Secular / secularist is used in this thesis to refer to a conceptual separation between religion and
state/ politics, but can also be used interchangeably to refer to a person / idea that is inspired by liberal
ideologies. The term conservative / conservatism in this thesis, is used to refer to the ideas as espoused by
Western thinkers such as Edmund Burke (late 1700s). The notions considered most centrel to conservative
thought are tradition, pragmatism, human imperfection, organicism, hierarchy, authority and property. A.
Heywood, Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). While these concepts have emerged as part of
a Western intellectual tradition, they are used frequently in all societies to frame arguments and discourses.
Their use in this study therefore is to provide a conceptual backdrop to the main arguments of this thesis.
24 See J. L. Esposito, "Introduction," in Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, ed. J.L.
Esposito, I - 14 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). Esposito argues that Islam in a political context (political
Islam) is regarded by some as a multifaceted and diverse phenomenon and by others as a "clear and present
danger to be consistently and persistently repressed".
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manner and on a scale that is perhaps unprecedented either in Islamic or modem political
history?5 This scrutiny has resulted in the proliferation of numerous reports, and
"studies", many "commissioned" by a variety of western think tank spaces, in an effort to
understand what has led to the emergence of these competing forces and to also examine
how these contestations are impacting on interactions among Muslims, and between
Muslims and the non-Muslim world.
In a 2006 study conducted on the perceived impact that Islamist thought as an
ideology has had on the Arab, and to a lesser extent the broader Muslim world, from the
turn of the twentieth century, N. J. Brown, A. Hamzawy and M. Ottaway identify six
"grey" areas viz; Islamic law, violence, pluralism, civil and political rights, women's
rights, and religious minorities, as the source of much of the political contention among
Muslims, both in Muslim majority countries as well as in the "western" world, where
substantial Muslim minorities live. 26
A 2003 analysis of Islam titled Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources,
Strategies, but popularly referred to as the'Rand Report on Islam', sought to "diagnose"
the problems within the Muslim world and its relation to the broader international
community.27 The report was underpinned by the assumption that two components
constituted the contemporary "crisis" in Islam: i) a failure to thrive and ii) a loss of
connection to the global mainstream. The report argues:
2S Samuel Huntington in his seminal work, The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of World Order
(New York: Touchstone, 1996), explores the notion of contemporary contestation between historical
civilizations, and in particular the idea of Islam being a force, which is in many ways, incompatible with
other "western" ideologies. He emphasizes that "fault line conflicts are particularly prevalent between
Muslims and non-Muslims, 208 - 218. In many ways this idea and his general thesis have been used to
legitimate the increased global scrutiny of Muslims by Western state forces, by posing the argument -that
there is some theoretical basis for the monitoring ofMuslims, given their so called "inherent" inclination to
be antagonistic to "democracy" etc. Such practices have become even more prevalent, particularly since
the events of 11 September 200 I.
26 N.l. Brown, A. Hamzawy and M. Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab
World: Exploring the Grey Zones (Washington: Camegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 4.
27 The RAND Corporation (Research and Development is a nonprofit global policy think tank first formed
to offer research and analysis to the US armed forces. Present and past members of the board of trustees has
included Francis Fukuyama; Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director of the CIA from 1978-81; Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defence under Gerald Ford and George Bush, and United States Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice.
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"The Islamic world has been marked by a long period of backwardness and
comparative powerlessness; many different solutions, such as nationalism, pan-Arabism,
Arab socialism, and Islamic revolution have been attempted without success, and this has
led to frustration and anger. At the same time, the Islamic world has fallen out of step
with contemporary global culture, an uncomfortable situation for both sides." 28
This, it increasingly appears, has come to reflect the sentiments of large numbers
of scholars and even ordinary citizens within Western society, if one observes the nature
of public discourse in the mainstream media around issues such as the wearing of the
headscarf (hijab) by Muslim women and their public role, Islamic Law (shariah) ,
democracy, human rights, the issue of Islam's relationship to popular culture, best
epitomized by the furor displayed globally by Muslims in the aftermath of the publication
of cartoons in Denmark in 2005, which were contemptuous of the Prophet Muhammed
(Pbuh) in the Western press, and so on.29 Much of the public sentiment, however, is being
shaped by discursive engagements taking place between certain scholars, and their
rhetoric has very often been uncritically consumed by western media and masses, as
representing an accurate and unbiased perspective on the developments unfolding within
the Muslim world, with sometimes disastrous consequences.30
The author of the RAND report, Cheryl Benard, claims to "objectively analyse"
the core reasons for the current "chaos" manifesting itself both within the Muslim world
and between Islamic and Western worlds. While aspects of her analysis may ring true
when the levels of socio-political and economic development in some regions of the
Muslim world are compared to those in the Western or "developed" world, her broad
argument is questionable as she implies that these problems may be attributed to an
28 C. Benard, Civil Democratic Islam : Partners, Resources. Strategies (Santa Monica : The
Rand Corporation, 2003), ix.
29 PHUH, which is an abbreviation for 'Peace Be Upon Him', is generally invoked by Muslims when the
name of the Prophet of Islam is mentioned as a sign of reverence and respect. However, for academic
purposes, this thesis will omit to do so in further references to the Prophet, which is not intended as a mark
of disrespect, rather it is in the interest of observing clinical scholarly practice. Muslim readers can invoke
this blessing when reference is made to the Prophet. When reference is made to 'Prophet' it refers
srecifically to the Prophet ofIslam.
3 American news channels such as Fox and ABC, have become notorious for the "spin" they tend to put on
stories related to Islam and the Middle East.
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inherent flaw within Islam and the Muslim world.3l In so doing, Benard fails to take into
account the historical reasons for the "crisis" and "failure" that she alludes to, which have
as intellectuals like Mahmood Mamdani point out, been alternatively contextualized as
part of broader post World War Two politics rooted in the paradigm of Cold War rhetoric
and practice, primarily shaped by American hegemonic forces. 32 Hence her analysis ends
up as a one-dimensional critique of Islam, devoid of history and context.
Even more worrying is Benard's classification of the global Muslim population
into four "types," and providing suggestions on how the United States in particular and
the West in general, should relate to each. The categories that she articulates are
"Fundamentalist," "Traditionalist," "Modernist," and "Secularist." Fundamentalists,
according to Bernard, reject democratic values and contemporary Western culture. They
want an authoritarian, puritanical state that will implement their extreme view of Islamic
law and morality. They are willing to use modern technology to achieve that goal.
Traditionalists, on the other hand, are suspicious of modernity, innovation, and change
and want a conservative society. Modernists want the Islamic world to become part of
global modernity, and to this end want to reform Islam to bring it in line with the
contemporary age in every respect. Secularists want the Islamic world to accept a
division of church and state in the manner of Western industrial democracies, with
religion relegated to the private sphere. 33
On closer inspection, these "categories" inevitably raise certain questions about
their usefulness in terms of "documenting" Muslims. What they do actually manage to
accomplish, is to essentialise Muslims, without taking into account the multiple and
nuanced dynamics present in Muslim societies, which cannot simply be neatly contained
into four broad descriptive "types.,,34 However this kind of "analysis" is precisely what
31 The argument may be made that Benard engages in essentialising Muslims into particular categories.
However some extremist Muslim groups also use language which may fall into "essentialist" categories,
such as 'infidel.'
32 M. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004).
33 Benard, Civil Democratic Islam, x.
34 See I.M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), who provides an expansive analysis of the rich and multiple dynamics which makes up the global
Muslim community.
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has been surfacing within some western intellectual circles, over the last few years,
leading to a rethinking by western governments of how to respond to the Muslim
typologies that are articulated in many of these reports, within the framework of
international relations and foreign policy agendas.
In unpacking the nature of the discourses that many of these "commissioned"
studies are utilizing, this thesis intends to argue very strongly, that the kind of intellectual
rhetoric that Benard and others are engaging in, has to be "exposed" as
"anthropologically constructed" and "orientalist" in its articulation, servicing primarily a
range of political agendas which are being shaped and defined by a range of imperialist
global forces. 35 Some of these stand to gain economically and militarily from being the
architects of division and fear of the "other" (which has historically been regarded as
anathema, to western interests) and, in other instances, benefit politically from shifting
the historical paradigm of what Francis Fukuyama referred to as the "end of history,"
which celebrated the victory of western liberalism, to one framed by the discourse of the
now infamous "clash of civilizations" thesis postulated by Samuel Huntington and
supported by other latter day Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis.36
35 See for example, T. Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms : Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London :
Verso, 2002). Ali makes reference to the broad imperialist project which the United States and its allies
have been engaging in, for many decades, which has led to the current political impasse in the Middle East
and chaos in the broader Muslim world. See also R. Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints
andAmerica's Perilious Path in the Middle East (London: IB Tauris, 2004), who engages in a similar anti-
imperialist discourse. The disclaimer here though is that not all "western" think tank studies of Muslims are
orientalist in nature.
36 Orientalist thought has been a historical feature of European colonial expansion since the 1600s. It is
effectively a mode and practice developed by Western explorers and writers to observe and document the
sociological and cultural identities of the various non-Western societies (particularly from the geographic
east) which they encountered in their travels, during the period of colonial domination. The debate on
"anthropological" constructions of persons of Eastern origin by Orientalists in an attempt to conquer,
occupy and oppress such peoples, has been addressed comprehensively by Edward Said in E. Said,
Orientalism : Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1978) and Z. Sardar, Orientalism
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999). The Orientalist paradigm and its framing of the main thesis
in this dissertation will be expounded upon in greater detail in Chapter 2. See also S. Huntington, The
Clash ofCivilizations : The Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996); F. Fukuyama, The
End ofHistory and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992) and B. Lewis, The Political Language ofIslam
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). On the architecture of chaos, see L. Nadvi, "Islam and
Politics in the 21't Century", in Islam in the 21st Century, ed. H Solomon, (pretoria: Centre for
International Politics, 2005).
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It is important to point out however that terms like Fundamentalist, Traditionalist,
Modernist, and Secularist, as labels to describe certain modes of thinking, are not
necessarily problematic per se, when viewed from a social science lens. It is the purpose
for which they are ultimately employed, that is problematic. When they are used to
"categorise" Muslims, they tend to conjure up images of hordes of people from the Orient
who can be defined in an "essentialist" manner and neatly placed into boxes for
containing, managing and consuming. While some of these categories are occasionally
used by Muslims to describe themselves in a contemporary context or even by scholars of
Islam such as Olivier Roy, they inevitably end up, as the ensuing discussion will
illustrate, becoming political frameworks which are used to legitimate unethical practices
and violations of human rights, such as the contemporary practice of imposing limits on
civil liberties, racial and ethnic profiling, and extraordinary renditions executed by
American and other Western state agencies.37
While this thesis also uses broad categories to describe Muslims, the contention
here is that the "branding" and stereotyping of Muslims by New Orientalist Western
scholars is responsible for, or at least exacerbates, tensions both within the Muslim world,
and that which some parts of the Muslim world directs towards the rest of the global
community through militant engagement. "Good Muslim" / "Bad Muslim", "with us" /
"against us," are some of the manifestations of this thinking. According to Mamdani, the
attempt to engage with contemporary Muslim society by the "West" has in many cases
become more of an exercise in anthropological practice reminiscent of nineteenth-century
"orientalist" discourse rather than a genuine effort to begin to understand the roots of the
contestations, which arguably lie, he contends, in the remnant effects of colonialism and
the post-Cold War era. 38 The United States, as articulated by the RAND Report, sees
itself involved in a battle of ideas as much as a battle of arms. There is a conflict of ideas
within the Muslim world and the United States sees its task as being an agent which can
intervene, in order to influence the outcome. The role of the United States government in
37 O. Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst and Company, 2004).
38 Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 32, 11.
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impacting upon and shaping the debates within the Muslim world is well documented.
39
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for example, funds radio and television shows,
Muslim Think Tanks, Islamic schools, the curriculums of these schools, and political
workshops in an effort to promote "moderate" Islam, one that it feels is more in line with
its worldview.
The use to which the RAND Report's categorisation of Muslims is put, arguably
reinforces the idea shared by many Muslim and non-Muslim sectarians that there are
monolithic and hostile groups, one Western and the other Oriental, that coexist in
separatist isolation and where one, the inferior Muslim group, should assimilate into the
other. Under circumstances where some Muslims feel that they are presumed guilty until
proven innocent, there is a likelihood of further withdrawing into the identity which such
discourse is constructing for them. Perceiving relations between Muslims and the West as
essentially hostile also masks the multiple links between the West and Islam as well as
differences among Muslims themselves.
The position which this thesis advances, in challenging orientalist discourses, is
by no means a novel one; however, what will constitute an original contribution to the
existing scholarship is the application of this idea to understanding how these categories
are manifesting themselves in the context of political expression within the South African
Muslim community in the post-apartheid period, and particularly the ways in which they
lend themselves to explaining the kinds of positions that South African Muslims are
taking around the key issues identified by Brown and others, at the beginning of this
chapter, namely, the place of shariah in contemporary society, the role of violence as a
political solution, pluralism, civil and political rights, women's rights, and the rights of
religious minorities.
A key approach of this study is to focus on the various ways in which certain
ideological categories, some of which have been self-defined by some Muslims
39 The US government has attempted to promote more moderate forms ofIslamic practice, such as Sufism,
by funding groups which prescribe to these ideas.
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themselves, such as "Progressive Islam", and others like "Militant Islam" which were
coined by Western scholars and policy planners to describe an ideology that is motivating
some Muslims to engage in militant modes of articulation, are providing impetus and
inspiration to South African Muslims, and their expressions of political rhetoric and
practice.4o Central to this project is examining the broader discursive space within which
these modes of ideological articulation are evolving and the manner in which this space,
which will be referred to broadly as Political Islam, is constituted. Political Islam may
generally be understood as an area of engagement within Islamic thought that has gained
greater currency in the twenty-first century context, primarily because it is the core area
of engagement foregrounding contestations within the Muslim world and between
Muslims and the West.41
Prefixes like militant, progressive, radical, and fundamentalist indicate how
elusive it is to define Political Islam. In its simplest form, according to Knudsen, it refers
to "Islam used to a political end.,,42 The term is accepted widely, though it has several
shortcomings. These include the fact that Islam fuses religion and politics, which the term
does not capture completely; it leads to a conflating of legitimate political and democratic
protest with militancy, potentially making all forms of social protest illegitimate; and
finally, according to Hirshkind, it tends to imply "an illegitimate extension of the Islamic
tradition outside of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied.,,43 Olivier
Roy, Giles Kepel and John Esposito, amongst others, have attempted to provide an
intellectual framework for the discourse of Political Islam and to contextualize what is
40 See O. Safi, Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications,
2003).
41 See J. Esposito, Political Islam. Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1997); G. Kepel, Jihad : The Trail ofPolitical Islam (London: IB Tauris, 2004); O. Roy, The Failure of
Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996).
42 R Knudsen, 'Political Islam in the Middle East,' Chr Michelson Institute. Development Studies and
Human Rights (2003) : 3, http://www.cmi.no/public/public.htm. See also C. Hirschkind, 'What is Political
Islam?' Middle East Report, October-December: 12-14 (1997).
43 Knudsen, 'Political Islam,' 10.
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currently unfolding within the broader Muslim world, within mainstream political and
international relations discourse and scholarship.44
Origins
There is vigorous debate around exactly when Political Islam first emerged as a
distinct area of discursive thought and intellectual engagement. Anthony Black has
suggested that political thought in Islam has existed virtually from the time of the
Quranic revelations to the Prophet Muhammed in the seventh century. Indeed, Black
argues, Islamic political thought forms a significant part of the intellectual history of
homo sapiens. 45 He further contends that while Western political thought may claim to
be the history of all political thought, it is not possible to "understand the history of ideas
even in any single culture without some awareness of what was going on in other
cultures." 46
To this end, it is important that one reflects on the emergence of Islamic political
thought as having been central to not only the faith of Islam and Islamic civilization but
significant to an understanding of how other cultures, particularly the currently
predominant culture of Western civilization, has evolved. While chapter Two deals in
greater depth with the history of Islamic thought and the Orientalist response, and the
resultant contested spaces, this chapter makes brief reference to salient points on the
nature of Islamic thought, which will frame the discussion on the emergence of Political
Islam as a discursive space.
To fully appreciate the principles which underpin Political Islam, a brief
explication of the theological framework within which it takes form is necessary. The
three important components of Islamic thought are Tawheed (monotheism), Risalah
44 O. Roy, The Failure ofPolitical Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996); G. Kepel, Jihad : The
Trail of Political Islam (London : ill Tauris, 2004) and J.L. Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution,
Radicalism, or Reform? (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).
45 A. Black, The History ofIslamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2001), 1.
46 Black, The History ofIslamic Political Thought, 2.
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(Prophethood), and Khilafah, which refers to the responsibility that humankind assumes
as vice-regents of the Sovereign God on earth. Islamic thought is based on the idea that
all sovereignty resides in a single God who is the supreme authority on all matters.
Muslims submit totally to the will of God, who has no partners or associates.47 The notion
of Tawheed (monotheism) is a central defining facet of both the faith and the existing
bodies of thought and canons that constitute the substantive set of ideas and beliefs that
are identifiable as Islam the religion, as well as its constituent parts, such as socio-
economic, political and cultural thought. Monotheism also underpins the political notions
which have historically informed all aspects of Islamic activity. In other words, all the
deeds and thoughts of Muslims must be informed by the idea that it is this one God
("Almighty") to whom they are ultimately accountable. Quranic revelations concretely
describe how Muslims, as followers of Islam, should conduct their day-to-day activities
in order to reflect and give substance to the idea of Tawheed.48 These verses have been
codified into a form of law (Shariah) that effectively constitutes the moral and penal
framework that legislates the actions of Muslims.49
The idea of Risalah (Prophethood) is another central component of Islamic
thought. Given that the revelations that form the basis of Islam were made known to the
Prophet, his ideas and teachings, and the way he lived, are extremely important to
Muslims. His way of life is often referred to as Sunnah and Seerah, which refer to the
example that he left to his congregation, which came to be known as the Ummah. It is this
example, and in particular the political dimension, which provides a guiding beacon for
the Ummah to deal with contemporary challenges for all times and ages. 50
The third dimension of Islamic thought is the idea of Khilafah or the
representation and moral responsibility that humankind assumes as the vice-regent of the
Sovereign God. The concept of the Caliphate, which is commonly also referred to as the
47 C.E. Farah, Islam 7th ed (New York: Barrons, 2003), 3.
48 C.E. Farah , Islam, 79 - 103.
49 A.R.I. Doi, Shariah : The Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1984). See also S.H.H. Nadvi,
Islamic Legal Philosophy and the Quranic Origins of The Islamic Law : A Legal Historic Approach
(Durban: Academia, 1989).
50 K. Armstrong, Muhammad: Prophet for our Time (London: Harper Perennial, 2007).
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Islamic state, refers to a political system that is the substantive manifestation of Khilafah.
It is the divinely ordained political and socio-economic system within which Muslims are
meant to reside and conduct their daily affairs. The Caliphate has evolved numerous
times since the seventh century. The last major Caliphate was the Ottoman Empire which
was dismantled after four centuries of continuous rule at the end of the First World War
following the defeat of the Central Powers. The contestation unfolding in the Muslim
world today revolves to some extent around the idea of establishing a modem-day
Caliphate, a project that Islamic movements such as Hizb ut Tahrir are intent on
pursuing,51 using militant means if necessary. Other Muslims believe that the realities of
contemporary international relations make the establishment of a Caliphate unrealistic.
This includes the changing nature of Muslim populations globally, including the fact that
Muslim minority communities scattered across the globe seem content to live in a secular
context where they are able to enjoy various rights and privileges that such societies
afford them.52 In attempting to unpack the complex nature of political expression in a
Muslim minority context in South Africa, the notion of Khilafah will constitute a
substantive theological basis of the study.
These components of Islamic thought are important for this study, which
examines how Muslims in a particular political and socio-economic milieu, viz, South
Africa, are expressing themselves politically in relation to their religious beliefs, and
which forms the foundation for understanding what drives contesting and competing
theoretical and ideological frameworks such as Progressive and Militant Islam, which are
central to this thesis. These concepts and their relationship to the central questions of this
study will be further expounded upon in later chapters.
:~ Roy, Globalised Islam: The Sear~hfor a New Islam, 17!, 198,238,275,288.
K. Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (London: Phoemx Press, 2000). See also Roy, Globalised Islam.
The Search for a New Islam and Kepel, Jihad : The Trail ofPolitical Islam.
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History and Evolution of Political Islam
Contemporary Political Islam as a discernible discursive space is generally
assumed to have first emerged in the early 1970s, following the defeat of Arab forces by
Israel in 1967, which put an end to pan-Arabism and marked the beginning of an Islamic
revival.53 loel Beinin and loe Stork trace the ideological roots of modem political
thought in Islam to the nineteenth-century scholarship of Sayyid lamal aI-Din al-Afghani
(1839-97), Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905), and Abduh's student Rashid Rida (1865 -
1935), who are credited with laying the foundation for modem political ideology which
inspired various political movements in the late twentieth century. Movements of reform
usually occur in periods of political turmoil and cultural challenges and these ideologues
were responding to the challenges posed by the decline of the Ottoman Empire and rapid
expansion of Western colonialism.
Rida, in particular, promoted the idea of the Salafiyya movement which was
regarded as "a 'neo-traditionalist' orientation that restricted what was to be regarded as
'correct' in Islam to the Quran and hadith reports of the period of the Prophet's life and
the reign of the first four 'rightly guided' Caliphs in the Sunni tradition: Abu Bakr, Umar,
Uthman and Ali.,,54 This should however not be seen as a defence of tradition. As
McDonald points out, AI-Afghani by returning to the original sources to find the "correct
interpretation" of Islam, ensured that Muslims would find that there was no contradiction
between Islam and science and rational thought.55 The "fundamentalisation" of Islam was
seen as a pre-requisite to its modernization.56 The Salafiyya movement, known as
Salafism, was a particularly influential ideological space as it had a huge impact on Sunni
political thought in the twentieth century.57
53 J. Beinin and J. Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (London: I B Tauris and
Co, 1997), 5.
54 Beinin and Stork, Political Islam, 5 -6.
55 K. McDonald, "Globalization, Civil Imagination and Islamic Movements," in Muslim Modernities:
Expressions ofthe Civil Imagination, ed. A. B. Sajoo, 192 (London: LB. Taurus, 2008).
56 McDonald, "Globalisation", 191.
57 Roy, Globalised Islam: The Searchfor a New Islam, 233.
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While Salafism did not aim at overturning the political order, several scholars and
activists in the twentieth century did advocate just that. Hasan al-Banna (1906 - 49), an
Egyptian schoolteacher heavily influenced by Rida's ideas, established the Society of
Muslim Brothers (Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in 1928, commonly referred to as
the Muslim Brotherhood, which is considered as having been the largest and most
influential "Islamist" organization in the Sunni Arab world. 58 The Muslim Brotherhood
established branches in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Sudan. The "Islamist" tradition
which the Brotherhood embraced as a central ideological force will be dealt with In
greater detail in later chapters.
The Muslim Brotherhood, in turn, influenced and shaped a number of other
leading intellectuals of modern Islamic political thought. One of the most prominent was
Syed Qutb (1906-1966), a Western educated Egyptian school teacher and political
activist who was eventually executed by the Egyptian government in August 1966 on
charges of trying to overthrow the regime. Qutb was arguably the most significant Arab
Sunni thinker of the twentieth century in that he transformed prior discourses "in the
direction of revolutionary jihadism.,,59 It was Qutb who, drawing on Lenin and the
Bolshevik model, theorized the role of the vanguard. Reinbold regards Qutb as the "Arab
world's first important theoretician of the radical Islamist cause.,,60 Qutb influenced an
entire generation of activists from the 1970s who have been involved in grassroots
liberation movements such as Hamas (Palestine) and Hezbollah (Lebanon) which
emerged largely as a response to the creation of Israel in 1948 and subsequent usurpation
of Palestinian land. While much of the Muslim world would consider these groupings as
liberation movements fighting to free 'occupied' territories, and see them as militarily
resisting the oppression of Muslims, they are conversely regarded by many in the non-
Muslim world as 'terrorist' groupings.61 This contestation between what constitutes a
liberation movement and what comprises a terrorist organization is reflected quite
58 Beinin and Stork, Political Islam, 6.
59 J. Reinbold, 'The "Humanity" of Radical Jihad', in ISIM Review 18 (Autumn 2006): 14-15, 14.
60 J. Reinbold, 'The "Humanity" of Radical Jihad', in ISIM Review 18 (Autumn 2006): 15.
61 See for example, L. Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London:
John Murray, 2006).
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significantly in the contemporary discourse of Political Islam as well as the emerging
tensions between Islam and the Western world.
Another key thinker of Political Islam in the twentieth-century was Sayyid Abul
A'ia Mawdudi (1903-1979), (sometimes also spelt as Maududi or Maudoodi) who
followed a parallel intellectual trajectory to Rida, AI-Banna, and Qutb, on the Asian
subcontinent.62 He is famous for his principle of Iqamat-i-Deen, literally meaning "the
establishment of religion", which held that society and state were subordinate to the
authority of Islamic law as revealed in the Qur'an and practiced by the Prophet. In
Mawdudi's worldview, Islam was the basic form of organising all aspects of human life,
from the religious to the political to the social, and the Shariah was to be the central law
that governed these aspects. He founded the Jamaa-e-Islaami in India in 1941 but
inspired Islamist movements globally because of the universal potency of his message
that Islam was the central force for uniting all divided Muslim populations.
The Jamaat's (Jamaa-e-Islaami) Constitution described its goal as the
establishment of hukumat-e-ilahiya, or "Islamic State." For Mawdudi, Islam was
synonymous with the state, which in the modern era was playing an interventionist role in
the daily lives of Muslims. To be a Muslim meant worshipping Allah (God) alone, both
on a metaphysical level as well as in political life. Since God was Ruler, one who claimed
to be the ruler of a country was thus "claiming to be God on the metaphysical plane."
Rulers therefore had no option but to implement God's laws. Every action of Muslims,
including rituals like prayer and fasting, trained them to acquire "just power." Muslims
could not worship God in their metaphysical life but ignore Him in their politicallife.63
Mawdudi's ideas galvanised in particular the notion of a Pan-Islamist revolution
and Islamic revivalism, as ignited by al-Afghani a century earlier. Some of the
consequences however, of how his ideas have been interpreted, it may be argued, were
different to the outcomes envisaged by early Islamists. An example would be the
62 See for example, S. A. Mawdudi. Towards Understanding the Quran (New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba
Islamic Publishers, 1998).
63 See 1. Ahmad, "The State in Islamist Thought" in ISIM Review. 18 (August 2006), 12-13.
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movement of Al-Qaeda ("The Base" in Arabic) which emerged in the 1990s as one face
of this pan-Islamist idea.64 While hailed as true ''jihadi'' ('one who struggles,' or
alternatively 'fighters') forces struggling in the path of Islam in some Islamic quarters,
they have also been criticised by many Muslims as not representing their views or not
acting on their behalf when they engage in militant violence.65
Events within the Muslim world since the 1970's set the stage for contemporary
Political Islam to emerge as a discourse that provides space for a range of contested ideas
and beliefs around the issues alluded to at the beginning of this chapter. As Benard
argues, "many different solutions, such as nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, and
Islamic revolution, have been attempted without success, and this has led to frustration
and anger.,,66 While Benard rightly points to some of the challenges facing the Muslim
world, her assumption that Muslim solutions have failed because "the Islamic world has
fallen out of step with contemporary global culture, an uncomfortable situation for both
sides," is questionable.67 Benard assumes that the primary issue is religion and culture,
being virtually dismissive of politics and the policy frameworks of both Muslim and
Western governments, within the context of a predominantly unequal set of power
relations within the global international relations system.68
Benard fails to substantively address the complicity of the very same
"contemporary global culture" in ensuring the so-called "failure" of the Muslim world,
64 See the literature on the rise of movements such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. A.B. Atwan, The Secret
History of Al-Qa 'ida (London: Abacus, 2006); J. Burke, Al-Qaeda - The True Story of Radical Islam
(London: Penguin, 2003); J. Corbin, The Base: In search ofAl-Qaeda - The Terror Network that Shook
the World (London: Simon and Schuster, 2002); J. Gray, Al-Qaeda and what it means to be modern
(London: Faber and Faber, 2003); P Marsden, The Taliban : War and Religion in Afghanistan (London:
Zed Books, 2002); N. Nojumi, The Rise ofthe Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and
the Future ofthe Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
65See for example, O. Safi, ed., Progressive Muslims : On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford :
Oneworld, 2003).
66 Benard, Civil Democratic Islam, ix.
67 Benard, Civil Democratic Islam, ix.
68 Academics such as Samir Amin, Patrick Bond and Naomi Klein and journalists like John Pilger, have
written extensively on the negative effects of imperialist and neo-liberal economic policy in a contemporary
context. See S. Amin, Maldevelopment : Anatomy of a Global Failure (Tokyo : UN University Press,
1990); P. Bond, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (Scottsville : UKZN Press, 2006); N.
Klein, The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2007) and J. Pilger,
Freedom Next Time (London: Bantam Press, 2006).
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through its various machinations of political and foreign policy that have led to the
inability of the Muslim and Arab world, either through a lack of capacity or failure of
leadership, to ensure that the "frustration and anger" that she refers to, can be kept in
check. She provides, instead, a blueprint of how the United States and other Western
countries can both "manage" the unruly elements within the Muslim world as well as
encourage "friendly" elements. Benard' s approach will be unpacked to some degree in
the next chapter which interrogates Orientalist thinking and methodology.
Since the 1970s, the global spotlight has focused firmly on events unfolding in the
Muslim and Arab world. Much of this, it may be argued, was driven by American and
European foreign policy which was shaped by the politics of crude oil, which was fast
becoming the centre of global commerce and which flowed in abundance in the Middle
Eastern region, especially in Saudi Arabia. This was compounded by the rise of
"Islamist" politics which aimed to establish an Islamic State / Caliphate, and resistance
against Israel by Arab nations. 69 Together, these developments led to a highly unstable
political climate in the region.
In sum, it may be argued that the factors that provided the context for the
emergence of Political Islam included the shift in foreign policy focus by the US and
Europe towards the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran; the emergence
of oil politics or "Petro Islam";7o Cold War politics and the emergence of proxy wars; 71
resistance against Israel by Arab nations; contestations between Islamic nations; and
internal civil strife caused by religious and sectarian tensions.72 While these factors
clearly do not constitute an exhaustive list, they represent the key components of the
elements that foreground Political Islam as a significant space of engagement, and those
areas within global Islam which are currently under increased scrutiny by the
international community.
69 B. Utik, 'Islamism. Digesting modernity the Islamic way,' Forum for Development Studies 2 (1993),
197-210.
70 Beinin and Stork, Political Islam,. 8.
71 See Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.
72 See Esposito, Political Islam : Revolution, Radicalism or Reform.
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Contextualizing Political Islam
It is important to contextualize the emergence of Political Islam within the
broader framework of interrogating how it is that various theologically inspired forces
within the Middle East were impacting on the politics of the region during the 1970s.
There was a shift in focus from Sunni Islamist politics to Shiite Revolutionary politics
following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which effectively overthrew the secular regime
of the Shah and brought into power religious forces centered in the figure of Ayatollah
Khomeini. This marked an interesting development in the relationship between Sunni and
Shiite forces. While some suggested that the Iranian Revolution was similar to the
Islamist notions advanced by Sunni Muslims, namely, the establishment of a Caliphate,
but utilizing the concept of Velayat - I Faqih, the equivalent of the Emir / Caliph
(Ruler),73 Sunnis and Shiites have been ideological rivals throughout Islamic history. This
rivalry was clearly manifest in the post-revolutionary period which witnessed the war
between Iraq and Iran during the 1980s, and more recently in the internal sectarian
conflict within Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States and
its allies in March 2003. Notwithstanding this, the establishment of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and the romanticism of the idea of an Islamic regime, has to some degree
enamored Iranians to many in the Sunni Muslim world, who may not necessarily embrace
the Shiite ideologies that informed the revolution. 74
Central to contestation within Islam since the 1970s is the tension between
secularist and religious thought. The rise of Islamist thinking was, in fact, a reaction to
secularist tendencies within the Muslim and Arab world. Beinin and Stork argue that
Islamist elements, particularly within Saudi society, funded the Muslim Brothers so that
they could spread their brand of Islamist ideology widely and in this way contain
secularism.75 Political Islam more broadly, can therefore, be considered a space wherein
contestation for supremacy of the religious vied for popularity with secular or "moderate"
(progressive) spaces. The ideological struggle between religiously conservative elements
13 Roy, Globalised Islam: The Searchfor a New Ummah, 83 - 88.
74 Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, 83 - 88.
75 Beinin and Stork, Political Islam, 8.
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and secular I progressive forces IS the central theoretical paradigm which this thesis
attempts to engage with.
However it is important to also contextualize the emergence of Islamist thought
and Political Islam as a phenomenon, in relation to multiple dynamics rather than simply
being a response to the rise of secularism. Beinin and Stork remind us that we need to
"examine the local circumstances and historical particularities of each (ideological)
movement, which often turns out to be more substantial than a simple conception of
"Islam" in opposition to secular politics.,,76 In documenting and explaining the
emergence of these political spaces, we need to understand the various differing contexts
of the Middle East region, particularly in the twentieth century, where a number of
factors impacted on the evolution of what we are broadly referring to as Political Islam.77
Nevertheless, in perusmg the literature on Political Islam, and through
sociological observation and analyzing media reports, it becomes clear that one of the
ways in which conservative Islamist elements throughout the Muslim world, have been
contesting for political power, either by choice or because they are forced by
circumstances, is through engaging in militant modes of expression.78 This does not
however mean that progressive spaces (leftist organizations engaging in political
liberation struggles) do not utilize militant modes. Hence this study does make a
distinction between militancy as a mode for progressive political expression and the
militancy exercised by movements which Oliver Roy refers to as neo-fundamentalist, an
expression that is largely inspired by a conservative set of ideas.79 The question that this
76 Beinin and Stork, Political Islam, 7
77 Benard refers to the rise of Arab nationalism as a factor in shaping the complex political dynamics within
the Muslim world, and there are other factors, such as petro politics which have been identified earlier in
this chapter as also contributing to the rise of the contemporary Islamist movement. See pages 17 -19.
78 Roy, Globalised Islam, 290 - 307. There has also been a great deal written about the history of the
militant trajectory within Islam. See for example, A.B. Atwan, The Secret History ofAl-Qa 'ida (London:
Abacus, 2006); 1. Burke, Al-Qaeda - The True Story ofRadical Islam (London: Penguin, 2003); J. Corbin,
The Base: In search of Al-Qaeda - The Terror Network that Shook the World (London: Simon and
Schuster, 2002); J. Gray, Al-Qaeda and what it means to be modern (London: Faber and Faber, 2003); P
Marsden, The Taliban : War and Religion in Afghanistan (London: Zed Books, 2002); N. Nojumi, The
Rise ofthe Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future ofthe Region (New York
: Palgrave, 2002).
79 Roy, Globalised Islam, 232 - 287.
36
study seeks to answer though, is which of these ideological paradigms, progressive or
militant (inspired by neo-fundamentalism) Islam, is the predominant framework shaping
current political discourse among South African Muslims, and whether there is much
purchase in creating such a dichotomy, or whether there are in fact, other ideologies or
approaches that are determining their attitudes and behaviour.
Transformation
In a seminal study, The Failure of Political Islam, Olivier Roy argued that
Political Islam has failed to deliver on its objectives.8o The most compelling period of
Political Islam was around 1970-82, with the movement peaking with the revolution in
Iran (1977-78). By equating Islamism with Political Islam, Roy was suggesting that
Islamist thought had effectively failed, and that Islamist movements "had reached a
crossroads; they could either opt for political normalization within the framework of the
modem nation-state or evolve towards neo-fundamentalism, a closed, scripturalist and
conservative view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension in favor of the
Ummah, based on Sharia."Sl Roy further argued that the move towards neo-
fundamentalism had indeed been the option of the Islamists of the 1970s and 1980s, a
phase he calls post-Islamism.82 Further, Roy argues, the political violence once associated
with Islamists had become the preserve ofneo-fundamentalist groups such as AI-Qaeeda,
Jemaah Islamiyah and the Taliban whose militant actions were not directly related to the
idea of an Islamic Revolution. They had no clear state agenda and were targeting the
West and its symbols very generally.s3
Random political violence, it may be argued, should not be seen in a vacuum but
within the context of the invasion and occupation of many parts of the Muslim world, and
especially the creation of the state ofIsrael in 1948, and militant resistance to this, as well
as the collapse of the State across much of Africa, Asia and the Middle East where many
80 O. Roy, The Failure ofPolitical Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996).
81 Roy, Globalised Islam, 1.
82 Roy, Globalised Islam, 58.
83 Roy, Globalised Islam, 290.
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are living in anarchy or semi-anarchy. The groups that Roy brands 'militant' are not static
and insular but have multiple tendencies that vary from country to country. Their shape
and form depends on political and economic conditions within states, as well as the
wider, regional and international geopolitical environment. As Lia and Skj0lberg point
out, explanations for political violence and terrorism are complex, and must take into
account psychological (pathology, deprivation), societal (economy, governance) and state
(sponsorship, hegemony, failed states) explanations.84 The most common explanations of
'Islamic terrorism,' according to Knudsen, combine these explanations: "it is argued that
fundamentalist beliefs make adherents psychologically predisposed to use violence and
surrender their lives, that abysmal social conditions and frustration promote extremism
and that authoritarianism and secularism as well as political persecution have spurred a
violent backlash from Islamist movements".85
We find here a contradiction between explanations which consider the use of
violence a result of internalizing Islamist beliefs and those that locate them in external
socio-political conditions.86 The question here is whether resorting to violence to achieve
certain goals is inherent in the Islamist project, which some Islamists understand as a
divine mandate to implement shari 'a which ultimately sanctions the use of force against
dissenters, or whether it is contingent, in that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the
political arena has driven them to arms, best expressed by Franl(ois Burgat's contention
that any Western political party could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if
subjected to the same repression that Islamists had endured, and looms large in this
debate.87
84 B. Lia and K. Skj0lberg, Why Terrorism Occurs - A Survey ofTheories and Hypotheses on the Causes of
Terrorism, FFl-Report - 2000/02769 (Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Est, 2000).
85 M. Taylor and J. Horgan, "The psychological and behavioural bases of Islamic fundamentalism",
Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (2001), 37-71 and L. Andoni, "Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide
Bombers," Journal ofPalestine Studies 26 (1997), 33-45.
86 v. Langohr, "OfIslamists and ballot boxes: Rethinking the relationship between Islamisms and electoral
politics," International Journal ofMiddle East Studies 33 (2001), 591-610.
87 F. Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam (London: I B Tauris, 1999).
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Progressive Islam
A broader and more significant question however, is whether this militant
expression is the only substantive form of engagement within the space of Political Islam,
as is often portrayed within the discourse of Western political thought? Some scholars
and activists in the Muslim world, such as Omid Safi, Assistant Professor of Islamic
Studies at Colgate University, in Hamilton, New York, and South African academics
Farid Esack and Ebrahim Moosa, contest the notion that Political Islam is primarily about
Islamists or neo-fundamentalists dominating the discursive spaces within the "house of
Islam", and suggest that there are other constructive ways of framing discursive and
political engagement within Islam, such as Progressive Islam.88 The concept of
Progressive Islam, which constitutes an important component of this study, is examined
below. In sketching this typology, this study is by no means suggesting that anyone
version is the "authentic" interpretation of Islam while others have nothing to do with
'true Islam', nor is it implying that "Progressive" Islam itself is a homogeneous doctrine.
Moosa, in fact, argues that progressive Islam is a work-in-progress.
[It] is not a "carefully calibrated theory or interpretation ofIslamic law, theology,
ethics, and politics. Neither is it a school of thought.. .. [It] is a wish-list, a desire .... , and,
if at all something, then it is literally, accumulated action, as the word "progress" in the
phrase "a work-in-progress suggests. At best it is a practice. Another way of putting it is
to say that progressive Islam is a posture: an attitude.,,89
It is important to state though that this study employs the term "progressive" with
caution. This discomfort is due partly to the "ambivalence of progress,,90 and partly to the
88 Safi, Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism.
89 See E. Moosa, "Transitions in the 'Progress' ofCivilization: Theorizing History, Practice, and Tradition"
in Voices ofChange, ed. Omid Safi. General editor, V. J. Comell, Voices ofIslam, 5, 115-130 (Westport &
London: Praeger, 2007).
90 See Z. Bauman, "Holocaust," in Modernity and the Holocaust (Cornell University: Comell University
Press, 1989), 19 and J. Gray, Black Mass, Apocalyptic Religion and the Death ofUtopia (London: Penguin
Books, 2007), who question the Hegelian worldview that that history is moving towards some concrete end
and that all change along the way constitutes "progress". Gray (2007: 288) writes that "over the past two
centuries the dominant story line has been one of human progress, but it has also included a tale of a world
besieged by dark forces and destined for destruction. The two plots were interwoven - as when Marx and
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flawed argument that those who do not employ the methodology of progressive Islam are
"by default adhering to a retrograde agenda.,,91
"Progressive" Islam as a form of political expression within the Muslim world,
has emerged over the past two decades. According to Farid Esack, the term was first
popularized in 1983 by Suroosh Irfani in his Revolutionary Islam in Iran - Popular
Liberation or Religious Dictatorship?92 "Prior to that," he writes, it "had a few sporadic
appearances in some articles where it was really employed as a synonym for modernist or
liberal Islam.,,93 Esack also draws comparisons between the works of Suroosh Irfani94
and Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati (1933-1975) who influenced him, and earlier Islamic
scholars like Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-98) and lamal aI-Din AI-Afghani (1838-97)
whom he regards as "quintessential representatives" of early expressions of liberal and
progressive Islam. Irfani, however, was the first to use the concept in the way that it is
now used in leftist ideological circles, according to Esack.95
Muslim activists and scholars from many parts of the world, concerned at trends
10 the Islamic world towards conservative moralism and radicalism, began seeking
alternative forms of Islamic practice in the 1990s. They participated in discussions around
Progressive Islam on the internet under the banner of the Progressive Muslim Network
(PMN) and reached consensus on a broad working definition of "Progressive Islam" in
1998.96 Both Esack and Moosa concede that Progressive Islam has a "contingent nature."
his followers believed that humanity advanced through a series of catastrophic revolutions and the Nazis,
that demonic powers were conspiring against the Volk and its ascension to a state of semi-divine immortal
harmony. In a different idiom, liberal humanists talk of humanity advancing inch by inch, in a gradual
process of improvement. In all these accounts, history is told as a coherent narrative and nothing is more
threatening than the idea that it is a meandering flux without purpose or direction."
91 Moosa, "Transitions", 118.
92 S. Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran :Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? (London: Pluto
Press, 1983).
93 F. Esack, "In Search of Progressive Islam Beyond 9/11" in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender
and Pluralism, ed. 0 Safi, 79 (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003).
94 S. Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran :Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship?
95 Esack, "In Search ofProgressive Islam Beyond 9111", 79.
96 "Progressive Islam is that understanding of Islam and its sources that comes from and is shaped within a
commitment to transform society from an unjust one where people are mere objects of exploitation by
governments, socio-economic institutions and unequal relations. The new society will be a just one where
people are the subjects of history, the shapers of their own destiny, in the full awareness that all of
humankind is in a state ofretuming to God and that the universe was created as a sign of God's presence."
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Plurality, in fact, plays an intrinsic role in the praxis of Progressive Islam. Moosa, in fact,
concedes that even those associated with what is a progressive understanding of Islam,
"propose different practices and accompanying methodologies to verify and justify the
content of ethical propositions, philosophical visions, and contestations of history they
hold." He welcomes this;
"What would certainly signal the death-knell for progressive Muslim thought is if
there were to emerge a single voice, a unifying institution, an exclusive guild or
association of scholars and practitioners who monopolized the epithet 'progressive' and
dictated its operations, debated its values and determined its content, like an orthodoxy....
Once one advocates a specific content for progressive Islam, then it becomes an
institution with ideological interests that will cauterize its dynamism.,,97
It is important to reiterate the idea, that the notion of plurality is anathema to those
who subscribe to either a conservative or militant understanding of Islam, who generally
demand homogeneity of thought and action. Hence progressive forms of Islam would be
severely frowned upon by the kinds of neo-fundamentalist groupings referred to earlier,
as described by Olivier Roy.98
Notwithstanding this contingency, Esack points to several key beliefs that
underpin its perspective, and do ground the thinking within a common framework. The
"locus of Progressive Islam," he stresses, "is the struggle for justice - or praxis - rather
than the arenas of critical thinking for its own sake." The primary subjects of progressive
Islam are those who find themselves pushed to the edges of society to live in conditions
of social, political and economic oppression. Progressive Islamists claim to be opposed
to American imperialism, the promotion of corporate culture and consumerism, racism,
sexism, homophobia and all other forms of socio-economic injustices both within and
Cited in F. Esack "In Search of Progressive Islam beyond 9111," 80. From the Progressive Muslim Network
website, http://www.progressivemuslims.cOln/index2html / htto://www.progressivemuslims.com/?404=Y
97 Moosa, "Transitions", 116, 126.
98 Roy refers to these rigid definitions of Islam, which eschew notions of pluralism, as 'neo-
fundamentalism'. Roy, Globalised Islam: The Searchfor a New Ummah, 233 - 289.
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outside of Muslim societies and communities.99 Progressive Islamists are attempting to
understand Islam "through the eyes of the marginalized ... [and] cultivate new kinds of
values, such as compassion and non-judgmentalism." Differences between Progressive
and Liberal Islam will become clearer when we discuss reactions to the events of
September 11. 100
According to Moosa, an important difference between progressive Islam and
Islamists / conservatives 101 is that "the latter are either wedded to dated methodologies or
committed to doctrines and interpretations that have lost their rationales and relevance
over time.,,102 Like those Muslims who are broadly regarded as conservative or those who
advocate militancy, progressive Muslims also sustain their position by reference to texts.
As Abdulkader Tayob, head of the Centre for Contemporary Islam at the University of
Cape Town, has pointed out, since the nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals have used
texts to argue Islam's compatibility with modernization and nation-building by both left-
wing activists and Islamists. "More recently", he adds, "support for violence faces a
similar contradiction that sees the meaning of Islam thrown from one side of the political
fence to another.,,103 For Tayob, the principle position of most Muslims is not a value but
the selection of texts as a "tool of legitimization," a means to prop up particular
worldviews and present them as "authentic." 104
There is a key difference in the way in which Progressive and Islamist / conservative
Muslims approach Quranic text. According to Ebrahim Moosa, quoted by Bremer :
99 F Esack "In Search of Progressive Islam beyond 9111" 80. This is cited from the declaration ofan online
discussion list, called Network of Progressive Muslims
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NPMuslims/?yguid=127854211.
100 See Moosa, "Transitions in the 'Progress' of Civilization: Theorizing History, Practice, and Tradition",
115-130.
101 As Esack, Moosa, Tayob, and others emphasize, what constitutes "conservative" Islam is not uniform
and should not be essentialised. In fact, some who are characterized as conservative may identify with
aspects of the progressive methodology. However, some essentialism is necessary for this study and, with
Moosa, this is done for the "purposes of characterization, but not defamation." See Moosa, "Transitions,"
117.
102 Moosa, "Transitions", 116.
103 A. Tayob, "Liberal Islam: Between Texts and its Modem Condition," in ISIM Review, 18 (August
2006): 18-19.
104 A. Tayob, "Liberal Islam: Between Texts and its Modem Condition," in ISIM Review, 18 (August
2006): 18-19.
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"For centuries Muslims did not follow the literal word of the Koran. The Koran
was combined with the prophetic traditions and an understanding of the world at large to
create an interpretive platform. Today's Muslim fundamentalists want to reduce Islam to
the Koranic text, without any consideration of history - and this is exactly what
progressive Muslims are fighting against."lo5
Moosa considers it critical to, "study the different communities of the Quran.
Without that voice of the communities engaged with their scripture, we can hardly make
sense of revelation and the various communities of revelation.,,106 While the idea of
Islam was inspired by non historical forces (prophecy and revelation), Islam's subsequent
development is rooted in history and its interpretation and practice should consequently
be "context- driven" and "informed by people's historical experiences."lo7
According to Safi, the ideology of Progressive Islam has, in important ways, been
shaped by the works of intellectuals like Leonardo Boff, Gustavo Gutierrez, and Rebecca
S. Chopp, as well as the secular humanism of Edward Said and Noam Chomsky.lo8
These sources of inspiration are non-Islamic, and constitute a body of western secular
thought that has impacted on a movement that claims to be both Islamic and politically
grounded in Humanism, which can be extrapolated from Muslim thought over the past
fourteen centuries. This study will engage Humanism in more detail in later chapters
which focus on how political expression within the Muslim community can best be
served by engaging in praxis inspired by humanist ideas.
Progressive Islam as a body of thought is a fairly recent evolution within the
corpus of Islamic writing and scholarship. Its early roots date to roughly the mid to late
105 K. Bremer, "In God's Name: Muslim Scholar Ebrahim Moosa On Freedom, Fundamentalism, And
The Spirit Of Islam", The Sun Interview April 2006 I issue 364 Accessed at
http://www.thesunmagazine.org/issues/364/in_gods_name?page=.Itis important to note that the spelling
of the word that refers to the holy book ofIslam, differs throughout the thesis depending on whether it is
from a quote or the researcher's own spelling. The preferred spelling by the researcher is Quran /
Quranic.
106 E. Moosa, "The Debts and Burdens of Critical Islam" in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and
Pluralism, ed. 0 Safi, 125 (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003).
107 Moosa, "Transitions", 127.
108 Safi, "What is Progressive Islam", 48.
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nineteenth century, while its contemporary linkages are more clearly established within
the context of the post World War Two period. The fact that some commonalities can be
drawn between the writings of AI-Afghani, Ahmed Khan, Ali Shariati, and Suroosh Irfani
is indicative of the notion that the ideas were being framed as a broad political school of
thought, rather than being part of a religion with doctrinal and theological teachings.
Shariati, for example, is well known for his writings on social justice while AI-Afghani
popularized the idea of Muslim unity against British imperialism as well as Pan-
Islamism, both of which were revolutionary political concepts of the time. 109 This
effectively makes their writings inherently political, rather than primarily theological;
they were shaped by the imperialist milieu in which they lived and conceptualized their
ideas. The same can also be said of Abduh, Rida, al-Banna, Maududi, and Qutb as
thinkers who inspired a more militant approach to political engagement, and who also
wrote primarily in response to the social circumstances that molded their political
activism.
Contemporary proponents of Progressive Islam, such as Farid Esack, Ebrahim
Moosa, Amina Wadud, Farish Noor, and Omid Safi, amongst others, are also responding
to present-day developments. 110 In comparison to the period which followed the
immediate aftermath of World War Two and the onset of Cold War politics, the present
era is arguably marked by even greater differences within Islam. The extremes of this
contestation are marked, on the one hand, by increasing political violence as more and
more Muslims are prepared to sacrifice their lives in the name of Islam while others
strongly oppose violent modes of resistance, seeking instead to engage in vigorous protest
and rejection of imperialist agendas through involvement in civic organizations and
peaceful methods of political expression.
109 Black, The History ofIslamic Political Thought, 325 - 328. See also, A. Shariati, What is to be done:
The Enlightened Thinkers and the Islamic Renaissance (Houston : Islamic Publications International,
1986).
110 See for example, F. Esack, On Being a Muslim: Finding a Religious Path in the World Today (Oxford:
Oneworld, 2002) and E. Moosa, Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination ( Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
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A cursory glance at the scholarship which constitutes the core writings of
contemporary Political Islam, makes clear the very real similarity and overlap between
the writings that have inspired Militant Islam and that which give impetus to Progressive
Islam. Both streams of thought are shaped by the political realities of the contemporary
period, both reject in nuanced ways the vilification and domination of Islam by external
forces, and yet each contests for ideological space and hegemony. This contestation has
effectively come to define the space that is Political Islam in the current epoch. What is
very different, however, is the modus operandi and forms of engagement that they
employ. It is these forms of engagement that this thesis will concern itself with, through
attempting a quantitative and qualitative assessment of political Islam in the South
African context and the deeper schisms that have become the hallmark of contemporary
political praxis within this particular Muslim community.
Proponents of progressive thinking in Islam, such as Esack and Moosa are rare
among South African Muslims in that their paths began in traditional/conservative
circles and eventually crossed into Progressive Islam. Farid Esack was born in Cape
Town in 1959. He joined the revivalist Tablighi Jamaat movement at a young age and in
1974 at the age of fifteen proceeded to Pakistan to do a course in Islamic Studies. He
spent eight years in Karachi, completing the traditional "Dars-i-Nizami" program of
Islamic studies and qualifying as a "mawlana". He wrote in the introduction to his book
On Being a Muslim, that some of his fellow students later joined the Taliban in
Afghanistan. He too could have followed this path. But having grown up in Cape Town,
where he lived side-by-side with Christians, coupled with his own political activism
against apartheid, he became critical of attitudes towards Christians and other religious
minorities in Pakistan. When he returned to South Africa, Esack was drawn to the
Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa. In 1983 he helped form an anti-apartheid
group "Muslims Against Oppression", which later became the Call of Islam, an affiliate
of the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front. Esack formed ties with inter-faith
opponents of apartheid, and became involved in the World Conference on Religion and
Peace. In 1990, Esack continued his theological studies at the University of Birmingham,
England, where he completed a Ph.D, and undertook postdoctoral studies in Biblical
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hermeneutics at the Sank! Georgen Graduate School of Philosophy and Theology in
Frankfurt, Germany. He was appointed by Nelson Mandela as a gender equity
commissioner in 1996, was involved in the organisation Positive Muslims, which was
dedicated to helping HIV-positive Muslims in Africa, and is currently the Prince Al-
Waleed Bin Talal Visiting Professor of Islamic Studies at Harvard Divinity School. His
publications include The Struggle (1988); Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic
Perspective ofInterreligious Solidarity Against Oppression (1997); On Being a Muslim:
Finding a Religious Path in the World Today (1999); and The Qur'an: A Short
Introduction (2002).
Ebrahim Moosa was also born in Cape Town in the 1950s. He too was drawn to
the Tablighi Jamaat movement and between 1975 and 1981 studied at the Indian
seminaries of Deoband and Nadwa, qualifying as a "mawlana". It during his stay in India
that he began to question his chosen path:
"After three years in India I started asking questions about the relevance of the
texts and how to apply their insights in the modem world and, especially, in South
Africa. By now I had become acutely aware of the political challenges of my home
country: racism, and the intransigence of the Muslim clergy there to speak out against
the evil of apartheid. Reading the uncensored Indian press and following political
developments at home through the literature of Nelson Mandela's banned African
National Congress, all impressed upon me the challenges I would face in South Africa.
My restlessness drove me to read widely and independently---especially literature
written by more contemporary authors. One such author was Mawlana Abul Ala
Mawdudi, whom most teachers in Deoband reviled and for whom only the bravest
expressed guarded admiration. Mawdudi was the gadfly among clerics who pushed for
what is called "political Islam."... I thus discovered an interpretation of Islam outside
the walls of the madrasa where I could find inspiration and guidance for building
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society from an Islamic platform. The ancient texts I was studying suddenly seemed
musty and stale". III
Moosa taught at the University of Cape Town's Department of Religious Studies
from 1989-1998. He left South Africa after his house was bombed, and taught in the
Department of Religious Studies at Stanford University from 1998 to 2001. He is at
present a Professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University. His numerous publications
include Ghazali and the Poetics ofImagination (2006) and Revival and Reform: A Study
in Islamic Fundamentalism (1999). He is currently working on a book called Inside
Madrasahs.
The histories of both Esack and Moosa as articulated above, are important in
locating the development of the global progressive Islam movement. They are some of
the key individuals who have traversed a unique path in shaping this space, and have
played a very significant role in impacting on the development of this movement. The
fact that they are also South Africans, enables a particular worldview which they bring to
the space, which is rooted in both their own journeys as Muslims, as well as that of the
historical context from which they have emerged.
There are certain concerns with Progressive Islam however, which are significant
to note at this point. It is important to point out that Progressive Islam has come under
criticism from some quarters as has militant Islam, as both approaches have their
respective detractors within the scholarship as well as within broader civil society.Il2
While these criticisms are not central to this study, reference will however be made to
some of the key objections as they have been articulated by various authors, throughout
this thesis. It should also be noted that many who participated on the global Network of
Progressive Muslims' online discussion list dissociated themselves from the Progressive
Muslim Union (North America) which was launched in 2004 by Omid Safi and Ahmed
Nassef, because individuals such as Seeme and Malik Hassan, founders of "Muslims for
III E. Moosa, "Inside Madrasa. A Personal History," Boston Review, January/February 2007.
http://www.bostonreview.netIBR32.1/moosa.php.
112 G. E. Fuller, The Future ofPolitical Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 194 - 198.
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Bush" who raised around a million dollars for the Bush presidential campaign of 2004
and referred to him as 'The Muslim World Savior'; Farid Zakaria of Newsweek who
supported the Iraq war, and who wrote, "Done right, an invasion (of Iraq) would be the
single best path to reform the Arab world"; and Nawaal al-Sadawi who campaigned for
the ban on the hijab (head scarf) in French public schools, were appointed as advisors to
the PMUNA. 113
A member of the Advisory Board, Muqtedar Khan, resigned in July 2005, and in
an "Open Letter" to Safi, stated that in the PMUNA, those "who believe in the teachings
of the Quran are ridiculed and those who express ambivalence about it, even about the
existence of God are celebrated." This thesis is not about PMUNA, and will not engage
with that organisation's ideology and history. However, the relevant point for this
dissertation is that this broad concept of "Progressive Muslims" (regardless of it being
disputed over in certain quarters), is an important one and refers to those Muslims who
are seeking to find processes by which they can engage in political participation in liberal
democracies without losing their religiosity. Most importantly, progressive notions of
Islam also challenge the idea that the only way in which Muslims can engage politics is
through militancy or political violence.
It is unfortunate that debates around progressive expressions of Islam often get
caught up in controversy, such as the one referred to earlier, viz the heated arguments
taking place within the PMUNA space, leading to the fracturing of some of these spaces,
resulting in many Muslims who do subscribe to Progressive Islam distancing themselves
from such politics. Nevertheless the movement of Progressive Islam thrives in multiple
spaces as will become evident from the subsequent discussions in the following chapters.
The South African Muslim context has, as has been alluded to earlier, been
chosen as the case study within which to frame much of the empirical study in this thesis,
which examines the broad contestation within Political Islam. Contemporary South
113 "A Comment on the formation of PMUNA", http://commentpmuna.blogspot.com/2004/lI/text-of-
comment-on-formation-of-pmuna.htm. Accessed on 3 July 2008.
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African Muslims are both a product of a post-apartheid society as well as constituting a
dynamic force which is responding in various ways to the demands of a rapidly evolving
global paradigm, with its focus on the contestations between Islam and the West, and
Islam as a political threat to "civilized" society. These competing discourses cannot be
understood in a vacuum, but must be framed against a more comprehensive historical
backdrop which links the Orientalist project and broader political developments of the
twentieth-century to latter day constructions of Islam and Muslims, in order to develop a
sustained understanding of why the categories of Militant and Progressive Islam, as well
as other categories like Wahhabi, Salafi, Deobandi, Neo-Sufi, Tablighi, and so on, are
competing with each other, and how South African Muslims are locating themselves in




Chapter One outlined the necessity of undertaking a study in the area of Political
Islam within the framework of interrogating and understanding the dynamics of political
engagement and expression, both within the Muslim world and between it and a
predominantly Western secular, multi-cultural paradigm, in light of emerging tensions
and intense scrutiny to which Muslims are currently subject. This chapter provides a
historical and "evolutionary" context within which the debates around contemporary
political Islam have developed, to the extent that it elicits the current state of
contestations referred to earlier.
In prefacing this explication, it is first necessary to construct a theoretical
paradigm that would provide a backdrop to the arguments which this thesis aims to
develop. In constructing this paradigm, two key elements form the backbone of the
discussion; first, reference to select scholarship on the history of Western empire and
Western colonialism, predominantly as it relates to interaction with Muslim civilization
and, secondly, an analysis of key debates in Orientalist thought, which intellectuals such
as Edward Said and Ziauddin Sardar argue are central to understanding the ideological
contestation between "Western" and "Islamic" civilizations in a contemporary context. I 14
The contemporary literature that documents the vast expanse of the history of the
Western empire, spans over several centuries of the existence of the empire, and in
summary provides a contextual overview of the multitude of dynamics that informed the
114 E. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978/1991) and Z. Sardar, Orientalism (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 1999). The use of "Western" and "Islamic" is not to suggest that these are fixities or
solidarities (as Samuel Huntington may imply in his arguments in The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking ofWorld Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996). They are used partly for convenience and partly
because they reflect popular and even some academic thought. As Kaiwar and Mazumdar point out,
"political and cultural projects have been at great pains to invent fixities and solidarities spanning large
expanses of time and space, a kind of heroic continuity and a sense of belonging in a world of radical
discontinuity. The concepts of race, Orient, and nation - categorical innovations of the modem epoch,
notwithstanding their appearance to the contrary and claims to antiquity made on their behalf - have been
crucial, if not indispensable in doing so.' V. Kaiwar and S. Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation in the Time-
Space of Modernity," in Antinomies of modernity: Essays on Race, Orient, Nation (London: Duke
University Press, 2003), 261.
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construction of the idea of "empire" as a historical means of subjugation and domination
of one group of peoples by another. In essence this amounted to the political, economic
and cultural domination of "natives" primarily by Europeans seeking to expand their
territorial advantage through acquiring colonies on other continents, a practice commonly
referred to as colonialism. 115 While colonialism as a political project only emerged
several centuries after the West's first encounter with Islam, this chapter will argue that
colonialist practice was in many ways a catalyst to develop and institutionalise Orientalist
thought and subsequently its various manifestations in a contemporary context. 116
This chapter engages with the Western world's initial encounters with Islam;
elaborates on (Western) colonial history and practice; and links the trajectory of colonial
history to the emergence of Orientalism as a particular ideological framework within the
broader project of Western territorial expansion as a methodology of defining, describing
and engaging with the geographical region of the Orient, and in particular Islamic
civilization. This remains relevant into the present for, despite attempts by "progressive
political activists to cast doubts on the continued salience in the postmodern moment" of
concepts like Orient and race, even nation, these have 'not lost their bite in the 'real'
world of identity and cultural politics.,,117 The arguments presented in this chapter are
particularly significant for the broader thesis, which argues that "constructions" of Islam,
by the "non-Muslim world," be they terminology such as progressive or militant Islam or
"interpretations" of existing ideological schools of thought within Islam such as Sunni
(including Hanaft, Hanbali, Shaft and Maliki) or Shiism, are being negotiated through a
political lens, which ultimately serves various latter day Orientalist agendas (which find
expression in the kind of current neo-conservative foreign policy of the United States, or
the discourses of the Rand report as discussed in Chapter One). Within the South African
context (which comprises the case study for this thesis), the links between the broader
Orientalist project and the manner in which the local Muslim community responds to it
115 See M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), who develop an
analysis of modem empire within the context of the colonial project.
116 The earliest encounter between Islam and the West, could be considered as having occurred between
705 - 715 AD, when Islam first appeared in Spain. See K. Arrnstrong, Islam: A Short History (London:
Phoenix Press, 2000), xv.
117 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation in the Time-Space of Modernity" , 261-298.
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(apart from its responses to other political developments within South Africa), is what
will constitute the key qualitative and quantitative aspects of this study.
The rise and Expansion of Islam
Islam as a faith and belief system had its origins in the seventh century in the
Middle East (Makkah) with the first scriptural revelations to the Prophet Muhammed in
610 AD. 1I8 The subsequent spread of Islam has been documented extensively as
testimony to the broad ideological revolution that defined Islam as not just a religion but
as a holistic way of life encapsulating all aspects of human existence. The basic principle
of Islam was that of uniting all who accepted the message of the Prophet, and this was the
principle that his companions Abu Bakr and Umar ibn-al-Khattab argued should define
the Ummah, after his demise. 119 This concept of the unity of all Muslims was, however,
severely tested from the very beginning, with debates ensuing among the Prophet's
followers after his death regarding who should succeed him. This dispute laid the
foundation for the most serious political disagreement among early Muslims, and led to
the creation of two sects within Islam, viz Sunnis and Shiis. 120
The Shiis had their origins in the establishment of what was referred to as the
Shiah-i-Ali, the Party of Ali, 121 a breakaway group which believed that the successor to
the Prophet should be a blood relative. They considered Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet's
cousin and also his son-in law, to be his rightful successor, and not Abu Bakr, who was
elected the first Caliph (representative / leader) of Islam after the Prophet. 122 While Ali
118 See K. Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), xii. This study mainly relies
on Armstrong for this brief overview, but A. Afsaruddin, The First Muslims: History and Memory
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2008) and the monumental M.O.H. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (UCP, 1974) are
indispensable for more in-depth discussion and analysis.
119 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 21. The word Ummah refers to "community" ofMuslims.
120 Brief mention has been made of the role that Shiile Muslims have played in the arena of developing
Political Islam in Chapter 1. The Iranian revolution which took place in a Shiite dominated country in 1979,
is considered as one of the key historical events of the 20th century which led to the rise of Islam as a
modem day political force after the end of the Second World War. While this thesis does not focus on
Shiism as a central ideology within Political Islam, it is nevertheless a significant one, which has played a
fairly influential role in defining Political Islam.
121 Armstrong, Islam: A Short HiStory, 31.
122 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 31.
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did become the fourth Caliph after his predecessor the Caliph Uthman was assassinated in
656 AD, he faced a difficult time as his rule was not accepted by all Muslims. 123 The
belief that Ali and his bloodline were the rightful leaders of Islam after the Prophet, has
shaped Shiite thought into the contemporary era, and while Shiite thought is not dominant
in the broader Muslim world, it has nevertheless played a significant role in shaping
Islam as a political force in the contemporary era. 124
Early Islam's geographic and political expansIOn began in the broader Middle
East region and spread to North Africa and eventually to Spain (705-7 I5AD), which
could be considered its first formal encounter with the Western world. 125 While Islam
entrenched itself in Spain for several centuries, Armstrong notes that the Ummayad
caliphate126 in Spain collapsed in 1010 and disintegrated into rival, independent courts. 127
In effect this signaled the end of the Caliphate as a unified institution which ruled the
Muslim world. Given the decentralisation of Islamic rule, Armstrong points out that it
was the Seljuk Turks who gave fullest expression to the new order within the Fertile
Crescent where decentralisation was most advanced. 128 They combined the political
leadership of amirs (commanders) and ulema (religious scholars) to govern the various
territories that formed part of their empire. 129 Ulema established madressahs (theological
seminaries) throughout the empire, travelled extensively, spreading their Sunni ideology
which came to be seen as the dominant form of Islam, and established a power base
distinct but equivalent to that of amirs.130 Given that the empire was vast, Muslims felt
f · . I . 131part 0 an mternatlOna communIty.
123 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 28.
124 This is particularly relevant when considering the role played by the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979,
in creating a revival oflslamic thought in the 20 century.
125 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, xv.
126 The tenn Caliphate emerges from the notion of the Caliph (ruler), and was meant to represent the
system of governance for the early Muslims, or what would be considered as the State in the contemporary
world. The Arabic word Khalifah is more commonly used instead of Caliph and Khilafah / Khilifat to refer
to the rule of the Khalifah, in Muslim circles. See A.H. AI - Mawardi, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah -- The
Laws o/Islamic Governance. Translated by A. Yate (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996),5,20 - 26.
127 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 71.
128 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 72.
129 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 73.
130 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 73.
131 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 74.
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The existence of autonomous Muslim territories governed by amirs had political
drawbacks. Amirs were constantly fighting each other, and this disunity allowed Christian
Crusaders from Western Europe to conquer Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, in
1099. 132 Muslim leaders such as Salah-ad-Din eventually succeeded in re-claiming
territories back from the Crusaders and entrenching Islamic culture in these regions. The
Ayyubid dynasty (1171-1260) that he established, is considered as one of the highlights
ofIslamic political history. m
The subsequent "golden age" of Muslim civilization was based on the adoption of
advanced military technology such as gunpowder, which strengthened the Muslim
military state and facilitated the establishment of strong Islamic empires in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, viz the Safavid Empire in Iran, the Moghul Empire in India and
Ottomon Empire in Anatolia, Syria, North Africa and Arabia. 134 These empires did not
advance the traditional egalitarian project oflslam, which had been its original vision, but
established themselves as monarchies, essentially influenced by the Mongol idea of the
army state. They won grassroots support because they involved civilians in crafting their
imperial policies. l35 Each of these empires subsequently faced unique challenges.
The Safavid Empire established Shiism as the state religion, and this led to major
political rifts between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, which continues to this day.136 The
Ottoman Empire, established in Constantinople (Istanbul) in the mid-fifteenth century
and lasting formally until the early twentieth century, is regarded as the most successful
and enduring of all Islamic empires, and was perhaps the most significant in terms of
contemporary Political Islam. m According to Armstrong, despite Europe's many
achievements, the Ottoman Empire was, during its existence, the most powerful in the
132 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 79.
133 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 81.
134 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 97.
135 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 97.
136 See footnotes 6 and lOin this chapter.
137 Olivier Roy makes reference to the glory days of the Ottoman Empire in his analysis of how many
contemporary global Muslims, crave for a return to the hegemony ofIslam's presence in Europe. See O.
Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst and Company, 2004), 12,94.
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world. 138 Ottoman rule was shaped by the principle of the Shariah (Islamic law) and had
a series of Sultans as rulers. The empire was divided into provinces ruled by Pashas
(governers), and included citizens of different faith and ethnic groups, such as Christians,
Jews, Arabs, Turks and Berbers. Ottoman ideological decl ine began when the ulama were
disempowered politically by Pashas and became extremely conservative in reaction to
this "emasculation." As a result, there was greater focus on jiqh (Islamic jurisprudence)
and the practice of engaging in Falsafah (philosophical/spiritual thought) declined. 139
While political courts were still open to ideas from Europe, madressahs, controlled by the
ulema became centres of opposition to experimentation that derived from what were
considered European "infidels." 140
The ulema became stuck in an old ethos, and when Western modernity "hit" the
Muslim world, Armstrong argues that they were unable to provide guidance to Muslims
as a result of their conservative tendencies. 141 In the Arabian region of the empire,
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab separated himself from the political hegemony in
Istanbul and created a state in central Arabia and the Persian Gulf. He believed that
excessive European influence seeping into the empire could only be addressed by a return
to the fundamental Quran and Sunnah and militant rejection of all other aspects of
Islamic tradition, such as mysticism and falsafah. He rejected the Ottoman Sultans as
apostates and tried to create an "enclave of pure faith" in the Arab peninsula. 142 This was
a significant political development as his thinking, subsequently termed "Wahhabism",
has been a major ideological influence in the contemporary Muslim world. 143
European territorial, political and economic expansion from the fifteenth century
meant that Islam and the Ottoman empire were constantly facing major ideological and
political challenges. By the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Sultans realized that they
138 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 112.
139 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 113.
140 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 114.
141 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 114.
142 Annstrong, Islam: A Short History, 114 - 115.
143 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, lIS. See also, Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New
Ummah,234.
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could no longer claim hegemony over Europeans who were making significant gains in
M I· .. h hi' I . 144us lm terrItorIes t roug co oma occupatIOn.
This brief overview underscores two points that are relevant to this study, viz, the
divisions that have emerged and exist among Muslims today, despite continued reference
to the idea of the collective Ummah and the emergence of the Ulema as an important
force shaping Muslim society. The following section focuses on the Muslim world's
encounter with Western colonialism, and subsequent emergence of Orientalist thought
and practice.
Western Empire: Colonialist Strategies and Objectives
For the purposes of this dissertation, this chapter takes as its point of departure the
impact of western political thought and action on the global community from around
1492 with the "discovery" of the New World which "came as an immense shock" to
Europeans who "believed that the scriptures, together with the writings of the church
fathers and the ancient authorities, contained the sum of all human knowledge." None of
these sources mentioned a New World; hence there was "no guidance on how the new
world should be seen - as an earthly paradise, like Eden before the Fall, or a terrifying
place inhabited by satanic creatures from which God had protected his flock. And how
should Christian Europe deal with a whole continent of pagan people?,,145 The project of
the discovery of new lands and territories by European adventurers, brought with it a new
chapter in the political and religious history of the continent. The appointment of a
viceroy to Peru in 1569 by Philip 11 of Spain signaled the beginning of a formalized
process of colonial government to rule overseas territories. 146 This was replicated by
other European countries as they conquered territories in the Americas, Africa, and Asia.
144 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 115.
145 R. Osboume, Civilization: A New History ofthe Western World (London: Pimlico, 2007),
256 - 257.
146 Osboume, Civilization: A New History ofthe Western World, 263.
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In the Muslim world, the colonial project began in Moghul India with the British
occupation between 1798 and 1818. In 1798, France occupied Egypt, which it initially
failed to control, and later Algeria in 1830.147 Subsequently, other parts of North Africa
were occupied. After the First World War, in which segments of the Ottoman empire had
supported Germany, France and Britain, protectorates and mandates were set up in Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan, by these European powers. This outraged
Arabs as European nations had promised them political independence. 148
A prominent leader of the failing Ottoman empire, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938),
also known as Ataturk, repelled European occupation and established the independent
state of Turkey in 1923. One of his first acts was to abolish the Caliphate on 3 March
1924.149 Other regions of the former Ottoman empire did not fare as well in terms of
becoming independent nations. The Balkans region, Russia and central Asia became part
of the Soviet Union after the Second World War; India was partitioned into India and
Pakistan, which was divided further with the formation of Bangladesh, after the
withdrawal of the British; and the protectorates in the Middle East became embroiled in
bitter disputes for independence. While they eventually gained independence from their
British and French colonial masters, the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state in 1947
on part of the original Palestinian territory, left a legacy that has sown the seeds of much
of the political and militant contestation between Muslim and Western nations, as many
Muslims believe that Western nations, led by the United States, continue to ignore Israeli
state terrorism against Palestinians. ISO
European colonial expansion from the fifteenth century produced political and
ideological frameworks which have effectively shaped and molded the political landscape
in a contemporary context. While this study concerns itself primarily with how
147 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 125 - 127.
148 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 127.
149 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 127.
150 See E. Said, The Question of Palestine (New York : Vintage, 1992); E. Said, The Politics of
Dispossession: The struggle for Palestinian Se/fDetermination, 1969 -1994 (New York: Vintage, 1994)
and S. Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History ofPalestine.(New York: Olive Branch Press,1989). The
2006 war between Israel and Lebanon is an example of how the region's conflicts go beyond the
contestation between Palestine and Israel.
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colonialism and its associated campaigns impacted on the Muslim world, it is significant
to note that colonialism was a global project undertaken by Europeans to advance narrow
political and economic interests, but resulted in very negative consequences for the
colonized. The political and socio-economic effects were massive and indeed pervasive,
and resulted in the establishment of what is commonly referred to as "Empire", an
arrangement of global hegemonic forces that continue to shape the contemporary
world. I5l
The effects of colonial practice leading to the hegemonic establishment of Empire
has arguably resulted in the complex articulation of dominant and subservient identity
constructions between "colonizer" and "colonized", which in many ways continues to
manifest in a contemporary context, shaped by a recurring Orientalist discourse. 152 This is
a particularly important point to note for the purposes of this study, which is attempting
to unpack the discourse of militancy and its contestation with progressive ideology vis-a-
vis, a contemporary understanding of what frames this contestation, in the context of
evolving and shifting identity formations. Frantz Fanon perhaps describes the
phenomenon of crafting dominant and subservient identities, most succinctly in his
masterpiece on colonial history The Wretched of the Earth by arguing that "in the
colonies, it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official instituted go-betweens,
the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression." 153 Even though most colonies
no longer exist, the institutionalized framework of the "authority" of the instituted go-
betweens of the colonial era continues to frame the relationship between the "rulers" and
the "ruled". Fanon further argued that "the intermediary does not lighten the oppression,
nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the
clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the
home and into the mind of the native." 154
151 See M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire.
152 See A. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (London: Earthscan, 2003).
153 F. Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth (London: Penguin, 1961/1967),29.
154 Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth, 29.
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In many ways the historical legacy of institutionalized violence which was what
colonialism represented, continues to shape even contemporary hegemonic discourses
and provides, as this study will attempt to show, a backdrop to the development of new
and evolving forms of the classic "settler / native" paradigm, advanced by various post-
colonial theorists, such as Mahmood Mamdani. 155
Mamdani, in Citizen and Subject, reminds us of the oft used comparison to equate
the African or ''Negro'' to a "childlike" being, which was clearly a rationale by
colonialists to justify a strict paternalistic form of administration, and was certainly used
as an argument to entrench imperialist superiority over adult subjects who were reduced
to an infantile status through colonialist discourse and legality. 156 Indeed Ziauddin Sardar
corroborated this strategic approach within the "Magrieb" or Orient, when he wrote that
Orientalism "construct[ed] the Orient as a passive, childlike entity that can be lover and
abused, shaped and contained, managed and consumed." 157
Orientalism is not 'just about prejudices; it is about relationships of power," and
this power is not only achieved through the conquest and violence described so
effectively by Fanon but also through "modem technologies of representation and with
methods of research, collection, and presentation of data, all of which transpired to
produce an impressive body of knowledge that hegemonised the colonizer and the
colonized." This 'knowledge' produced Europe's Other, who lacked "rationality, history,
modernity, and the powers of self-transformation," qualities that made up the
European. 158
Rashid Khalidi highlights the disparity in the way that dominant "democratic"
colonial powers such as Great Britain, France and Holland mobilized to expand the rights
of individuals at home, yet "conquered and ruled over the peoples of much of the earth
without the slightest reference to the liberal principles that animated their own systems of
155 See M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy ofLate Colonialism ( New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996).
156 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 4.
157 Z. Sardar, Orientalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999),6.
158 158 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation,", 270.
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government." I59 They utilised a variety of strategies to justify this, ranging from "overt
racism that argued that some peoples were too primitive to be allowed to rule themselves,
to the more sophisticated arguments of Orientalism about the regions where great
civilizations had existed for millennia in East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East."J60
Whatever the justification, "arguments for colonial rule and the denial of self-
determination ... were clothed in the self-serving and patronizing rhetoric of cultural
improvement, whether this was described in terms of the white man's burden or the
mission civilisatrice." 161
This similarity in tactics, regardless of geography, clearly points to the strategic
methodology that architects of Orientalist thought employed in order for the region
commonly referred to as the Orient to be subsumed within the broad framework of the
colonialist project. 162 While the construction of an Orientalist paradigm was part of the
broader project of western expansion and discovery of new lands, it was also distinct
from the imperialist and colonial campaigns undertaken in other parts of the world,
largely because of the historical contestation between Islam and Christianity. These
differences and similarities are highlighted below.
Constructing an Orientalist Paradigm
The idea of the Orient has historically had an allure for both traveler and social
scientist. In geographical and cultural terms, it comprises of the great civilizations to the
East of the West; Islam, China, India and Japan. 163 For Sardar, the "Orientalist vision"
was "based on two simultaneous desires: the personal quest of the Western male for
Oriental mystery and sexuality and the collective goal to educate and control the Orient in
159 R. Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle
East.(London : ill Taurus, 2004), 16.
160 See Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 16.
161 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East, 16-
17.
162 Sardar describes the Orient as a geographical space, which consists of the great civilizations to the East
of the West, viz, Islam, China, India and Japan; Sardar, Orientalism, 2. The Orient could however also be
regarded as an "ideological" space, representing various cultures and schools of thought.
163 Sardar, Orientalism, 2.
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political and economic terms." 164 The roots of Orientalism, he argues, can be traced back
to Christendom and its encounters with Islam. 165 While there was engagement between
the West and other "regions" within the Orient, it is this critical relationship between
Christendom and Islam that forms the foundation for the rest of this chapter.
Edward Said's magnum opus Orientalism, considered by many as the definitive
modern literary work on the subject, points out that Orientalism "can be discussed and
analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by
making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling
it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring,
and having authority over the Orient.,,166 This is arguably the most succinct definition of
what Orientalism as a "discourse" does; however, the issue of what it is and what it
constitutes is perhaps the more critical question. According to Said:
It is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the
world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a
whole series of "interests" which by such means as scholarly discovery,
philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and
sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains, it is, rather
than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to
control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or
alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means
in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but
rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of
power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a
colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning
sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy
sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts,
164 Sardar, Orienta/ism, 2.
165 Sardar, Orientalism, 2.
166 Said, Orientalism, 3.
61
values), power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what 'they'
cannot do or understand as 'we' do). 167
It is important to reflect on the use of the words "we" and "they" in Said's
analysis. The idea of a "they" or 'them", has been a central theme of western
"philosophical" and intellectual justifications to argue for a theory of supremacy of one
group over another, predominantly based on race, ethnicity and geography.168 Political
systems of oppression throughout history, from slavery to segregation in the United
States, to fascism in Europe, to imperialism and colonialism in the Third World, and to
apartheid in South Africa, have all been premised on the idea that one racial group is
"inherently" superior to another and is therefore "entitled" to dominate the so-called
inferior race. 169
Over time, cultural-academic Orientalism produced a "vast repertoire of images
and stereotypes with claims to the 'disinterested pursuit of truth' via the application of
supposedly impartial scientific methods and value free techniques in studying the
peoples, cultures, religions, and languages of the 'Orient'." In this way Orientalism
became "a set of factualized statements about a reality that existed and could be known
independent of any subjective colonizing will.... The transformation of general
philosophical precepts into a body of law ... was the very stuff of Orientalism.,,17o
The notion of race and by implication, the culture and origin of the dominant race
group is central to the question of Orientalist thought and practice. To return to Sardar's
earlier definition of the discourse, he points out that it was based on the personal quest of
the Western male for Oriental mystery. Western political philosophy and thought is a
useful source to locate the idea of the imperialist project as defined by the "western
male", given that much of Western thought is rooted in this very specific context, that is,
167 Said, Orientalism, 3.
168 See M. Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by J. Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New
York Press, 1927, 1996) and J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Translated by H.E. Barnes (London:
Routledge, 1985,2003).
169 See for example, M. Macdonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa (Scottsville : UKZN Press, 2006).
170 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation," 274.
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the historical preoccupations and desires of the "white man."17\ It is evident in writings
by most Western Enlightenment philosophers such as John Rawls, John Stuart Mill and
John Locke, that notions of liberty, freedom and equality are central to their theories of
"liberal" thought; however these political rights were never considered relevant to, nor
were they afforded to the residents of colonies and territories that formed part of the
broader European empire. In promoting equality at home, while producing "ascriptive
hierarchies cloaked in the language of science" in the colonies, Europeans "revealed their
I· I"" 172sp It persona Ihes.
It is in this framework that we unpack Orientalist thought and practice as it related
and continues to relate to Islam.
Orientalism and Islam
Much of the geographical region to the "east of the west", as Sardar defines it,
was home to Islam from about 610 AD onwards. l73 This included the Middle East, large
portions of Asia, and later on Spain and Turkey in Europe. Sardar argues that "from its
inception, Islam presented the Christian world with a 'problem'," and further it became a
political problem because the "achievements of Muslim civilization made Islam an
intellectual, social and cultural problem. Orientalism emerged as Europe's rationale for
meeting the challenge of Islam." 174 Both Said and Sardar suggest that Orientalism as a
discourse did engage with the broader geographic region of the Orient, including India
and China, but that there was a greater focus on Islam as the "challenge."
Sardar attempts to isolate the exact historical point at which the foundation for
Orientalism was laid. He points us to the writings of John of Damascus, a Christian
scholar and friend of the Ummayad Caliph Yazid (ruled from 680 - 683), who declared
Islam to be a pagan cult, the Ka'aba in Makkah an idol, and the Prophet Muhammad an
17l The concept of "white man" is used as an anthropological notion to refer to a historical set of events
defined by a very specific patriarchal context
172 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation," 268.
173 Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, xii.
174 Sardar, Orientalism, 17 - 18.
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irreligious and licentious man. 175 His works became the classical source of all Christian
writings on Islam. 176 Said affirms the idea of Islam being perceived by the Christian
West as a "problem." "Doubtless," he wrote, "Islam was a real provocation in many
ways. It lay uneasily close to Christianity, geographically and culturally." 177 American
academic Bernard Lewis, an Orientalist by Said's definition, argues, on the other hand:
Early Islam defined itself against Christian faith and power. ...For the
medieval Muslims, Europe thus presented a double challenge. On the one
hand, there was the Christian imperial rival to confront and overcome; on the
other there was the mission, felt by other empire builders before them and
after them, to conquer, convert and civilize the barbarous peoples beyond the
. . I fr . 178Impena ontlers.
Clearly, there are contested versions of the engagement between Islam and
Christianity since Islam's inception as a new faith. Said and Sardar portray this encounter
as Western Europe perceiving Islam as presenting a multi-dimensional (political,
economic and cultural) challenge, hence the emergence of Orientalism, whereas Lewis,
articulates it as Islam being on a mission to "conquer and convert." These positions
reflect not only diverging analyses but differing histories that may indeed be the cause of
contemporary tensions between Islam and the West.
Chapter One made reference to the contemporary intellectual and ideological
discourse emerging within the western world to describe Muslims and the manner in
which they are responding to a range of political crises confronting them. In particular
Chery! Benard's use of categories to "label" Muslims, such as Fundamentalist,
Traditionalist, Modernist, and Secularist, have come to be used quite liberally within
Western political circles, especially within the neo-conservative realm of American
175 Annstrong, A Short History ofIslam, xiv.
176 Sardar, Orientalism, 18.
171 Said, Orientalism, 74.
178 B. Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (London Weidenfeld and
Nicolson,2004), 123.
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foreign policy, and have served to create a particular "Orientalist" understanding of
Muslims. 179
In creating such categories, there is a tendency on the part of those that are
attempting to engage in what Sardar refers to as the "shaping", "containing", "managing"
and "consuming" of this construction, to not acknowledge their own complicity in the
problematic posed by such articulations, and their resulting political consequences. As a
result of this process, there is inevitably a form of ideological denial that lends itself to
the architect of the Orientalist paradigm being unable to fully understand the nature of the
entity that s/he is describing, other than to relegate it to a space where it can be packaged
as something to be "consumed." Hence, there are numerous constructions of Muslims as
being ''typical'' of any number of categories ascribed to them. This makes it easier for a
"western audience" to engage with this "unknown" element, and certainly helps to
advance political agendas which call for containment and management of "militant" and
"unruly" masses of Muslims who are reminiscent of the colonial "savage."
This chapter has attempted to link the development of Islamic history with its
"political" encounter with Western imperialism, and the emergence of Orientalist
thought, particularly in academia and western scholarship, as a strategic response to this
process, in order to undermine and "control" counter-veiling political forces, particularly
within the Muslim world. In essence, this chapter has argued that the project of
colonialism and its associated Orientalist discourse, has served to entrench hegemonic
forms of behavior within the West, which continue even in a contemporary context,
notwithstanding claims that globalisation is leading to uniform cosmopolitanism.
Orientalism's myths "have become central to identity politics in the postcolonial
world.,,180
Nineteenth-century concepts like Orientalism, Kaiwar and Mazumdar remind us,
"have a great and continued vitality ... not because one approves of them, but because
179 Sardar, Orientalism, 6. See also C. Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources,
Strategies (Santa Monica : The Rand Corporation, 2003), ix.
180 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Introduction," in Antinomies ofmodernity : Essays on Race, Orient, Nation, 3.
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they are thoroughly integral to the overall cultural and political economy of the capitalist
world. Fundamentalism ... cannot be understood apart from the histories of Oriental ism
and nationalism.,,181 In the "post-modern moment", they argue, Orientalism "survives as
a form of racism, yoked to post-World War 11 modernisation theories and the supposed
incapacity of the ex-colonial world ... to respond to new political and economic
challenges." 182 While this thesis does not attempt to argue that those Muslims who
engage in political violence or militant behavior are to be condoned or their actions
deemed acceptable, it does attempt to provide a context for the existence of militancy
within the contemporary Muslim world, and why Orientalist patterns of "labeling" serve
to detract from an understanding of the broader reasons underpinning such militancy.
The emergence of Hindutva and Islamic fundamentalism, for example, seen in the
context of "the uneven geography of global capitalism," are an attempt to "bring about a
modern sense of community and representation without the meltdown of old forms
implied by capitalism in full flow.,,183 As Farid Esack has pointed out:
[Post-9/11] there was desperation to distance Islam from 'terrorism'
and while some attempted to reflect on the underlying causes of terrorism
there was little or no attempt at defining it. When it was discussed at all, it
was presented as the result of long-standing and cumulative cultural and
rhetorical dynamics rather than concrete historical conditions of political
marginalization or dispossession. Demands for clarity were usually dismissed
as "fudging the issue" ... It sadly appeared as if issues of globalization, the
rise of the new empire and corporate power, the unbridled exploitation of the
earth's limited resources, global warming, consumerism and its twin sister,
poverty, as well as HIV/AIDS seem to belong to another planet. Flushed
181 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation," 263.
182 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Introduction," 10.
183 Kaiwar and Mazumdar, "Introduction," 10.
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away were all memories of the co-operative relationship between the Taliban
and the USA administration-oil industry nexus. 184
The significance of the argument outlined above, to this study, lies in trying to
frame a better understanding of how Orientalist discourse is impacting on contemporary
contestations between Islam and the West and how it is shaping the arena of Political
Islam as expounded upon in Chapter One. This chapter has attempted to illustrate that the
historical political, economic and cultural encounter between Europe and Islam, from the
seventh century onwards, and the various contested spaces that this encounter has given
birth to, has been instrumental in crafting a latter day discursive framework that seeks to
advance the Orientalist agenda, which Sardar framed as the West's project to "shape",
"contain", "manage" and "consume" the Orient.
The rise of Political Islam as a clearly defined space for political engagement by
Muslims in a twenty-first century context, as elaborated upon in Chapter One, continues
to be the subject of "Orientalist-like" scrutiny, more so because it has come to represent
the contemporary version of what Sardar referred to as the challenge to Christendom,
during its period of colonial and territorial expansion from the fifteenth century onwards.
Political Islam's ascendance in a contemporary context has been perceived, as argued by
various intellectuals, as a threat to the hegemonic project of empire, and therefore it
continues to receive unprecedented attention. 185 In some respects this attention arises
from western intellectual discourses such as those advanced by Samuel Huntington which
"theorise" that Islam is a major political fault line (along with others such as China), and
will be the continuing cause of a clash between civilizations. 186
Given that a significant component of the discourse of Political Islam in the
contemporary era revolves around militancy and militant attacks on western targets, this
184 F. Esack "In Search ofProgressive Islam beyond 9/11," 80.
http://www.progressivemuslims.com/index2.html / http://www.progressivemuslims.com/?404=Y.
185 See for example, G. E. Fuller, The Future ofPolitical Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),;R
Khalidi. Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East and M.
Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004).
186 See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York:
Touchstone, 1996).
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poses a challenge not only to the West at large, but even to those Muslims who may be
sympathetic to the political causes espoused by their militant co-religionists, and reject
the Orientalist nature of the scrutiny to which they are subject, but reject militant violence
as a way of resolving political differences.) 87 This debate around how Muslims are
supposed to respond to the various contesting political ideologies that compete for co-
existence within the global Muslim world, is effectively the key question which this
thesis attempts to grapple with. It engages this question largely within the context of how
it is that a particular community of Muslims, viz South African Muslims, is trying to
respond to the broader challenges of firstly dealing with being subjected to increased
scrutiny by a western lens of inquiry, and secondly how it is that they are participating as
political agents and the manner in which they have opted to respond to the key political
questions that face them nationally and at a global level.
Brief Overview: Studies of Islam in South Africa
It is important to briefly locate the discussion on how Orientalism and Empire,
and the encounter between Islam and the West has been documented within writings on
Islam in South Africa, as well as examine how the unique history of Muslims in South
Africa has been recorded. While much of this discussion will take place in Chapter Three
and Five, which focuses on Muslims in South Africa, it is useful to introduce some of that
work at this point.
Most of the writing on Islam in South Africa has focused on the Cape, and
understandably so, as this was the first region, where Islam was introduced to the
southern tip of Africa. The lead was given by writers such as A. Davids and Y. Da Costa,
who have written in particular about the Cape region, as well as documented
developments in the rest of South Africa. 188 Others such as E.M. Mahida, E. Moosa, A.
187 Giles Kepel engages with this debate within the context of European Muslims, arguing that there is an
ongoing "war for Muslim minds". See G. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004).
188 See for example, A. Davids, The Mosques of Bo-Kaap: A Social history of Islam at the Cape (Cape
Town: South African Institute of Arabic and Islamic Research, 1980) and Y. Da Costa and A. Davids, eds.
Pages from Cape Muslim History (pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1994).
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Tayob and S. Jeppie have written about the national context, covering a variety of themes
such as identity construction, the role of mosques and sermons, religious conservatism
and the significance of Muslim organizations such as the Muslim Youth Movement and
the Arabic Study Circle. 189 Some of this work (especially by Davids and Moosa) was
produced during the apartheid era and reflects many of the political dynamics of this
period.
In the post-apartheid period, there has in fact, been a proliferation of writings on
Islam and Muslims in South Africa, and work produced by South African Muslim social
scientists on a broad variety of subjects relating to Islam. While authors like Jeppie,
Tayob, Esack and Moosa have been writing since the 1980s, and continue to produce
prolifically, more recently, writers such as M. Haron, S. Shaikh, G. Vahed and others
have been focusing on more current developments. Some of the themes that they have
focused on include, transformation and evolution of Muslim identities, media, Islamic
feminisms, and regional dynamics. l90 Some of the most recent writings on Muslims in
South Africa, have been produced by graduate students, being mentored and tutored
under the supervision of scholars mentioned above, such as Tayob and Jeppie. Two
excellent studies on Muslims in the Cape have recently been completed by S. Bangstad
and S. Matthee, who have looked at issues such as the secularization and Islamization of
Cape Muslims, as well as their involvement in politics. 191
189 See E.M. Mahida, History of Muslims in South Africa: A Chronology (Durban: Arabic Study Circle,
1993); E. Moosa, "Muslim conservatism in South Africa," Journal of Theology for Southern Africa
(December 1989), 73 - 81; A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement
(Cape Town: UCT Press, 1995); A. Tayob, Islam in South Africa .. Mosques, Imams and Sermons
(Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 1999) and S. Jeppie, Language, Identity, Modernity: The Arabic
Study Circle ofDurban (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007).
190 M. Haron, "Voices from Beyond and Within the South(em) African Frontiers: The Muslim Print
Media," Archiv Orientalni - Quarterly Journal ofAfrican and Asian Studies 73 (2005), 13 - 42; S. Shaikh,
"Transforming Feminisms : Islam, Women and Gender Justice," In Progressive Muslims: On Justice,
Gender and Pluralism, ed. O. Safi, 147 - 162 (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003); G. Vahed, "Changing Islamic
Traditions and Emerging Identities in South Africa," Journal ofMuslim Minority Affairs 20, no. 1 (2000a),
43-73; G. Vahed, "Constructions of community and identity among Indians in colonial Natal, 1860 - 1910 :
The Role of the Muharram Festival," Journal ofAfrican History 43 (2002), 77 - 93.
191 See S. Bangstad, Global Flows, Local Appropriations : Facets of Secularization and Islamization
among Contemporary Cape Muslims (Cape Town: UCT / Radboud University, 2008) and S. Matthee,
Muslim Identities and Political Strategies: A Case Study of Muslims in the Greater Cape Town Area of
South Africa, 1994 - 2000 (Kassel : Kassel University Press, 2008).
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The questions that this thesis grapples with are not dissimilar to some of themes
contained in the writings already cited above. However, what does represent something
of a departure from these other works, is an attempt to locate the political actions and
participation of SA Muslims in the post-apartheid period within the context of the global
paradigm of political Islam, locating these within the broad categories of Militant and
Progressive understandings ofIslamic thought.
The next chapters will extrapolate further on the context within which South
African Muslims are engaging these broad ideological categories.
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Chapter Three
The Context - Islam in Post Apartheid South Africa: Multiple communities
Introduction
Muslims constituted approximately 1.46 percent of South Africa's population,
according to the 2001 census. 192 The largest constituencies making-up this community
were predominantly the descendants of slaves who began arriving in the Cape from 1658
and the descendants of Indo-Pak immigrants who arrived as indentured laborers or free
passenger migrants in the then province of Natal from 1860. 193 The latter are commonly
known as "Indian Muslims" and are concentrated mostly in KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng
in the contemporary period, while the former, known in popular usage as "Malay"
Muslims, and officially categorized as "Coloureds" in the census, are based primarily in
the Western Cape. Both communities have made very strong historical contributions to
the growth and establishment of Islam in South Africa and have shaped the dominant
Muslim cultural discourses in those areas where they predominate. They have had a huge
impact on the manner in which Islam is practiced in the contemporary period. 194
There has also been a growing population of indigenous African Muslims, termed
"Black African" in the census. In fact, a steady stream of conversions to the Islamic faith
has been observed within the African indigenous community, particularly over the last
twenty years. African Muslims now make up almost 12 percent of the overall Muslim
community, whereas in 1980 they constituted approximately 2.5 percent. 195 The reasons
for this growth are varied, but include the arrival of economic migrants from Malawi and
192 G. Vahed and S. Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa,".State o/the
Nation: 2004 - 2005, ed. J. Daniel and others (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2005), 252.
193 Vahed and Jeppie "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 260. See also A.
Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town : UCT Press,
1995), 39 - 41.
194 G. Vahed, "Indian Muslims in South Africa: Continuity, Change and Disjuncture, 1860-2000,"
Alternation 2 (2000), 67 - 98. This piece highlights the significant influence that Indian Muslims have had
on the way that Islam in South Africa has evolved. While the role of the Coloured or Malay Muslims in
South Africa has been similarly profound, it could be argued that Indian Muslims have had a hegemony
over the practices and institutional formations within the SA Muslim community.
195 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 262.
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Mozambique who brought the Islamic way of life with them to the townships in the
1970s and 80s, resulting in the spreading ofIslam amongst locals. 196 Soweto Township in
the former Transvaal became a centre for the Islamic faith and many migrants from other
parts of Africa were drawn to this area largely because of the work in the mines around
Johannesburg. In Kwa-Zulu Natal, the arrival of freed slaves from Zanzibar in 1873 led
to the establishment of Islam among Africans. Ironically though, they were as a result of
a complex race classification system, re-settled by the apartheid government in the
predominantly Indian township of Chatsworth. l97 The evolution of the "Zanzibari"
community, as they are known locally, has thus been impacted upon by the broader
socio-cultural dynamics of being assimilated into an Indian community. The table below
provides a numerical breakdown of the South African Muslim population per province at
the last census.
Table 3.1 : Muslim Population Per Province and Race: Census Data 2001 198
Province African White Indian Coloured Total
Eastern Cape 3601 630 5866 9575 19672
Free State 1798 108 1847 284 4037
Gauteng 24597 2967 98823 23695 150082
KwaZulu-Natal 2987 1036 117424 6143 142460
Limpopo 3760 90 6242 195 10287
Mpumalanga 9429 227 6680 500 16836
Northern Cape 738 65 1015 2833 4651
North West 4717 221 7234 961 13133
Western Cape 8204 3065 29800 251837 292906
Total 74701 8409 274931 296023 654064
Percentage 11.42 1.28 42.04 45.26 100.00
196 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 263.
197 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 26. For a recent
analysis of African Muslims in KZN and Indian - African Muslim relations, see P. Kaarsholm, "Population
Movements, Islam and the Interaction ofIndian and African Identity Strategies in South Africa during and
after Apartheid," The Journal ofNatal and Zulu History vo124-25 (2007).
198 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 253.
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The practice of dawah (to proselytize m an Islamic way) has also been a
contributing factor to the growth of Islam in South Africa, not just in the African
community but across all race groups. 199 However the manner in which dawah has been
implemented, over the last few decades has come under severe criticism by many African
Muslims as simply being a way of advancing Indian or Malay "cultural" hegemony,
which leaves Africans as the recipients of Zakaah as dependents of charity, as opposed to
becoming empowered beneficiaries.2°o There are complaints too that Africans are
compelled to follow a foreign brand of Islam, mixed with cultural practices, as opposed
d .. h' h 201to etermmmg t elr own pat .
Muslim influence in South Africa over the last 300 odd years has been substantial.
The role played by Islamic institutions such as mosques and the religious leadership
(usually referred to as the ulema), and over the past few decades, the increasing number
of Islamic schools (run by both local and foreign trusts), the rise of civil society
groupings such as the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) and World Assembly ofMuslim
Youth (WAMY), the influence of Muslim owned businesses on the trade and economic
sector and the opening up of various foreign investment and exchange opportunities since
the end of apartheid in 1994, have provided significant opportunities for Muslims to
impact on the broader social, economic and political life?02
Much of the recent influence will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Five.
This chapter provides a brief historical background to the establishment, evolution and
199 Dawah is generally understood as the conceptual framework within Islamic theology that advances the
spreading of the religion amongst communities. It can be exercised through various means, ie, preaching,
humanitarian initiatives such as the giving of charity, or the intellectual engagement oflslamic thought and
philosophy.
200 Zakaah is one of the pillars of faith of Islam, which requires that Muslims must donate a portion of their
earnings to the poor. This is considered as a compulsory act of faith, and the percentage to be given in
charity is usually 2.5% of a person's income.
201 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 265. See also
Kaarsholm, "Population Movements, Islam and the Interaction ofIndian and African Identity Strategies".
202 See A. Tayob, Islam in South Africa; Mosques, Imams and Sermons (Gainesville : University Press of
Florida, 1999). Tayob attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact that the religious
institutions (in particular the traditions of the mosques and their leadership in Gauteng (Transvaal) and the
Cape) set up by the early Muslim arrivals to South Africa, and their more contemporary evolution, have
had on how the religion is practiced today.
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emergence of complex Muslim identities in South Africa, which leads us to speak of
"multiple" communities.
Arrival of Islam in South Africa and the Development of Muslim Political Life203
i) Early Period ofIslam in South Africa
In order to fully appreciate where the Muslim community is located politically in
a post-apartheid context, it is critical to understand the origins of Muslim political life
since the arrival of the first Muslims to current-day South Africa. Islam was first brought
to Southern African shores by Muslim slaves and political exiles sent to the Cape by the
Dutch East India Company (DEIC)?04 One of the most significant political exiles was
Shaykh Yusuf, a religious and political leader born in what is now modern Indonesia.
Having landed at the Cape in 1694, Shaykh Yusuf began to spread Islam among the Cape
slaves very soon after he arrived. He is in essence considered to be the founder of Islam
in South Africa, although he was not the first Muslim to land on Cape shores. That is
thought to be Ibrahim van Batavia, a slave working for the DEIC.205 Other Muslim slaves
arrived soon after or were converted to Islam through the teachings of the Shaykh. Others
who made a contribution to establishing Islamic practices in the Cape included The Rajah
ofTamborah, Tuan Said Aloewie and Kadi Abdus Salaam.206
What is interesting about these early Muslim migrants is that Islam arrived on
South African shores primarily under the guise of political oppression, and found a home
within a colonial context that necessitated a "struggle conscience", an ethos that
continued to inform Muslim political life, particularly under apartheid. These early
Muslims became the ancestral foundation to what is today called the Cape Muslim
community. Included in this community are the Malay Muslims, primarily descendants of
203 While South Africa fonnaJly came into existence in 1910, this thesis makes reference to the territory at
the Southern tip of the African continent as South Africa, before 1910, although it was still a colony at that
point.
204 R.e. Shell, "Islam in Southern Africa, 1652-1998," in The History of Islam in Africa, eds. N. Levtzion
and R. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio Press, 2000), 327-348.
205 Shell, "Islam in Southern Africa, 1652-1998",327-329.
206 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 39 - 41.
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the early Cape slaves, Coloured Muslims, descendants of slaves and parents of mixed
racial background, and a small number of Indian Muslims who arrived as traders directly
from India or via Natal and the Transvaal.207 Together, they form a very diverse and
colorful backdrop to cultural life in the Western Cape province?08
The subsequent arrival of Muslims in South Africa, after the Cape slaves, was
largely through the importation of indentured Indian labourers from India between 1860
and 1911.209 They were brought specifically to work on the sugar-cane plantations of
what was then Natal and is today called Kwa-Zulu Natal. Of approximately 152,000
indentured Indians, approximately 7-10 percent was Muslim. Over 80 percent were
Hindu. As Vahed points out, "the indentured Muslim population was characterized by
diversity of religious tradition, caste, language, ethnicity and culture as migrants were
drawn from a range of ecologies and modes of production." 210
Indentured migrants were followed by Indian traders who made their way to
South Africa from the early 1870s. They were referred to as passenger Indians, because
they came at their own expense, often via Mauritius.2J I A large percentage of passengers
were Muslims. While many set up businesses in the city of Durban, where their historic
presence is still in evidence in what has been called the Indian district in the city, others
made their way to the north and south coasts and the Midlands, with the result that there
is an Islamic presence in all parts of the province.212 After serving their indentures, many
Indians, including Muslims, as well as passenger migrants, made their way to the
Transvaal (today incorporated into the province of Gauteng). A few made their way to the
Cape, where entry requirements were more stringent, while they were forbidden from the
207 The names of the provinces, viz the Cape, Natal and Transvaal are used in their historical context. All
three regions have had their names changed, and are now referred to as the Western / Eastern Cape, Kwa-
Zulu Natal and Gauteng respectively.
208 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 39 - 54.
209 Vahed, "Indian Muslims in South Africa".
210 Vahed, "Indian Muslims in South Africa".
211 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 55.
212 Shell, "Islam in Southern Africa, 1652-1998",339-344.
75
Orange Free State?13 In the Transvaal they absorbed the regional language of Afrikaans,
and become socially and politically active within the broader community.
ii) Islamic Resurgence in South Africa and Transition to an Anti-apartheid
Politics
It is important to locate Muslim responses to political developments in apartheid
South Africa, which unfolded from 1948 onwards, within a broad framework of what
Tayob refers to as Islamic resurgence. In many ways the period of Islamic resurgence is
what has ideologically shaped the participation of South African Muslims in a
contemporary context. This resurgence focused primarily on ensuring that Muslim
religious interests were incorporated into broader civic life, through the establishment of
various Islamic oriented civic organizations, in the various regions where Muslims were
located in significant numbers, such as the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal. While Tayob
contends that resurgent organizations came into existence predominantly after the Second
World War, there were according to him, traces of a "new approach" to Islam present at
the end of the 19th century, particularly in the Cape?14 The resurgence was driven
primarily by a class of educated Muslim elites, who began to establish a variety of
Islamic schools and civil society organizations that would service Muslim religious needs
and interests such as burial associations and mosque boards and trustS.215 This trend was
also seen in the other major urban centers such as Natal and Transvaal.
Apart from the various Islamic civic organizations that were being set up, the
religious leadership in the Cape, consisting of shaykhs and imams organized themselves
by setting up the Moslem Judicial Council (MJC). The MJC was considered the main
body that represented the voice of the religious authorities, and. was regarded as
213 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 55.
214 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 78.
215 Tayob refers to the establishment of the Malay Cemetery Board, Muslim Cemetery Board, South
African Moslem Association, and Cape Malay Association amongst others. See Tayob, Islamic Resurgence
in South Africa, 81. In addition, there was the setting up of Islamic missionary schools such as the
Rahmanniyya School, to meet the educational gaps that were not being addressed by the existing
traditional madressah education system, Tayob, Resurgence in South Africa, 80.
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something of an ideologically conservative space.216 It is significant to note that many of
the graduates of the newly established Muslim schools and the younger generation of that
era, who formed themselves into various youth groups, had a very different conception of
Islam to that of the religious authorities represented by the MJC.2J7 These ideological
differences between the religious authorities and some youth groups, continue to
permeate broader Muslim society today, across all the major centers.
It is also important to note that in the Cape there were Muslims from two
distinctly different ethnic backgrounds, viz Malay and Indian. In 1902 the South African
Moslem Association was formed in an attempt to try and represent the interests of both
Malay and Indian Muslims, however it did not survive for very long after its formation,
due to the intense nature of the responsibilities, that it was tasked with, viz, trying to
reconcile the differences between both groups.218 The Malay community then tried to
organize itself through setting up bodies such as the Cape Malay Association (1922), and
was relatively successful in its efforts as it represented the interests of one group only.
Achmat Davids points out that the Cape Malay Association represented a clear statement
of the division between Malay and Indian Muslims. 219
The resurgence phenomenon in Natal was also driven by Muslim elites,
predominantly of Indian origin. Pursuing an education and investing in educational
institutions was considered as the ideal way to uplift the Muslim community, especially
those that had come from an indentured labour background. Many of the indentured
workers (including both Muslim and non-Muslim) did not stay in the sugar industry for
very long and eventually moved onto other economic pursuits.22o After 1926, when state
schooling was being widely promoted, Muslim schools that had been set up through
community trusts and endowments were approached by the state and offered the option of
becoming state-aided schools, with a variety of benefits, such as state recognition. One of
216 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 82.
217 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 82.
218 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 81.
219 A. Davids, "Politics and the Muslims of Cape Town: A Historical Survey," in Studies in the History of
Cape Town. Vol 4, eds. C. Saunders and others (Cape Town: VCT, 1981), 174 - 220 as cited in Tayob,
Islamic Resurgence in South Africa.
220 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 90.
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the first schools that accepted this offer was the Jummah Madressah, which had been
established in 1917.221 Many other Muslim schools followed suit. Subsequent
generations of the indentured community would have had greater educational
opportunities, as a result of the efforts made by the Indian elite / business community to
invest in educational institutions.
The first Muslim resurgent body in Natal was the Natal Muslim Council (NMC),
set up in 1943, and was the primary supporter of integrated Islamic schooling in Nata1.222
It attempted to vigorously advance modem education among both men and women, a
position which can arguably be considered as a precursor to the later ideologically more
progressive Islamic groups, which emerged in an attempt to create spaces for Muslims of
all backgrounds to express themselves more freely. In terms of an organized voice
representing the religious authorities in Natal (consisting of the ulema), there was none
until the establishment of the Jamiatul Ulama (Natal), which was formed in 1952?23
Hence the Natal Muslim Council remained the primary voice of an organized Muslim
community in the province, for a very significant period.
The NMC was concerned with vanous aspects of Islamic life, including the
language in which young Muslims were to be given religious instruction. While Urdu
was considered a very important language and was used widely in the madressah system
as the medium of instruction, largely by the Indian immigrant ulemas teaching at the
schools, the NMC felt that Arabic should become the lingua franca of Muslim life in
South Africa, and so resolved to advance this cause.224 In an attempt to promote the
teaching and learning of Arabic, an organization called the Arabic Study Circle was set
up in 1950, and worked hand in hand with the NMC to both promote Arabic, as well as a
more modernized professional approach to education for the Muslim community.225
221 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 91 - 92.
222 See S. Jeppie, Language, Identity, Modernity: The Arabic Study Circle ofDurban (Cape Town: HSRC
Press, 2007), 27 and Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 92.
223 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 93.
224 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 94 - 95.
225 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 95 and Jeppie. Language, Identity Modernity.
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As part of the Islamic resurgence trend in Nc.tal, a dawah226 based organization
called the Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI) was set up in 1957, by Ahmed
Deedat, a well known religious personality, who became popular because of his ability to
engage spontaneously in a comprehensive critique of Christianity and the Bible, as well
as comment on other faiths. 227 It was his charismatic personality around which the
organization built its name and legacy. The IPCI has become internationally renowned
for its Islamic outreach programmes in the city of Durban, especially to visiting non-
Muslim delegations. Tayob argues that there were essentially three organizations in Natal
that can be considered to be the core of the early Islamic resurgent movement in the
region, in the post World War Two period, viz, the NMC, the Arabic Study Circle and the
IPCI.228
The Islamic Resurgent Movement in the Transvaal did not enjoy the kind of
popular support that it did in the Cape and Natal. Part of the reason for this was that the
schooling system in the Transvaal did not combine Islamic and secular syllabi, which in
effect suited the lamiatul Ulama Transvaal, which wanted to have exclusive control over
the domain of Islamic training in the madressahs?29 These madressah classes were held
after regular school hours in school buildings. This arrangement effectively meant that
the lamiatul Ulama began to establish a monopoly over the Muslim community in
various ways, particularly around Islamic practices and religious ideological spaces.
There were however one or two "resurgent" oriented or modern organizations that did
emerge in the Transvaal such as the Universal Truth Movement (1958) and the Young
Men's Muslim Association (1955), with the latter eventually becoming heavily
influenced by the ulema fraternity, and Deobandi Islam.230
226 Dawah is the act of taking the message of Islam to non-Muslims. This can be done via outreach
programmes which include addressing the social and economic needs of people, or simply through an
information dissemination campaign.
227 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 98 and http://www.ahmed-deedat.co.za/frameset.asp.
228 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 99.
229 Tayob Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 101.
230 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 101 - 102.
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iii) Anti-Apartheid Struggle and Initial Transition to Democracy
The policy of apartheid and institutionalized segregation was introduced into
South African society in 1948, by the National Party.23l Apartheid meant that people
from different race groups were separated legally, with regard to where they lived, who
they could marry, where they could work, in addition to a number of other areas, which
regulated people's everyday lives. Apartheid impacted primarily on African, Coloured
and Indian South Africans. When these apartheid policies came into effect, there was a
consensus between progressive African, Coloured and Indian forces and political
formations that they had to fight the apartheid enemy as a collective, because of its
oppressive nature, and hence many activists from these communities, regardless of
religion or sect, joined together in political resistance, were arrested and also detained
together, many on Robben Island.232
In the Cape, resistance by Muslims to apartheid policies began through mobilizing
within the Muslim Teachers Association, which is regarded as the first Cape based
Muslim organization to express an overtly Islamic anti-state rhetoric.233 Other
organizations in the Cape such as the District Six based Cape Muslim Youth Movement
(formed in 1957) and individuals such as Imam Abdullah Baron, who was a prominent
religious leader and Imam of the Stegman Road Mosque, stand out as other notable
groups and figures from this province, who were visibly opposed to the way in which the
introduction of apartheid policies in 1948, were impacting on people ofcolor.234
Imam Haron is perhaps one of the best known Muslim religious leaders who was
at the fore-front of struggles against the apartheid state. He was involved in training the
231 See F. Walsh, A History ofSouth Africa (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998) and J. Barber,
South Africa in the 2dh Century.(Oxford : Blackwell, 1999)..
232 See the history of Ahmed Kathrada at http://www.anc.org.zaJpeople/kathrada.html. He together with
Nelson Mandela was arrested and sentenced at the Rivonia trial, and served his sentence on Robben Island
and Pollsmoor Prison. See also http://www.robben-island.org.zaJ.
233 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 82.
234 See, M. Haron, Imam Abdullah Haron : Life Ideas and Impact. MA Thesis (Cape Town: VCT, 1986).
See also Barber, South Africa in the 2dh Century for detailed discussion on the introduction of Apartheid in
South Africa.
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Muslim youth in the Cape in various ways, in particular to fulfill the religious needs of
the community. He together with some teachers from Muslim Mission Schools formed
the Claremont Muslim Youth Association, which became an ideologically progressive
space, circulating a newsletter called the Islamic Mirror, quoting extracts from the
writings of A.A. Mawdudi and S. Qutb, who were considered leaders in the international
Islamic resurgence movement.235 This exposed Cape youth to Islamic ideas outside of the
standard information circulated by the Moslem Judicial Council. He also came into
contact with young people from the Black townships and worked with newly converted
African Muslims.
In 1961, he together with his youth organization was able to convene a very
successful meeting of Muslims, including ulema, mission schools and welfare
organizations, to mobilize against the state. The meeting passed a set of resolutions
referred to as the Call of Islam, which became a Cape based initiative bringing together
Muslims against apartheid.236 These resolutions were based on not just political
objections to the policy of apartheid but were inspired by Islamic notions of justice. The
Call of Islam statement had thirteen signatories to it, however there were many Muslim
organizations who were unable to identifY with or align themselves with what they
regarded as the political radicalism of the resolution.237
Imam Haron through his trips abroad and pilgrimages became a link between the
South African Muslim anti-apartheid movement and liberation activists and movements
in exile. As a result of his political activities he came to be considered as a threat by the
apartheid state and was heavily monitored. He was taken into detention several times by
the authorities, and in September 1969 was found dead in his cell.238
In Natal, anti-apartheid activities amongst Muslims were organized predominantly
through the work of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), until the formation of the Muslim
235 Haron, Imam Abdullah Haron as cited in A Tayob. Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 83.
236 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 86.
237 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 87.
238 Haron, Imam Abdullah Haron, 79, 91, 97.
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Youth Movement in 1970.239 The NIC represented the political interests and aspirations
of Natal Indians, both Hindu and Muslim?40 The Natal Muslim Council, while being an
Islamic resurgent group, did not get very heavily involved in anti-state activities and
politics, as it supported what might be regarded as an accommodationist stance which
allowed it and other Muslim organizations to extract as many concessions as possible for
state aided Muslim schools. The NIC on the other hand would not engage in any direct
negotiation with the apartheid state. Many Muslims were prominent in the NIC fold.
They included, I.C. Meer, Fatima Meer, Dawood Seedat, Cassim Amra, A.K.M. Docrat,
Jerry Coovadia and Farouk Meer.241
The Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), which eventually became one of the most
vociferous voices against apartheid, was launched in Durban in 1970, by three well
known personalities, viz, Ebrahim Jadwat, Mahmud Moosa and Abu Bakr Mohammed?42
The MYM was initially devoted to largely Islamic activities, such as Islamic education
and training, and its annual conventions had prominent Islamic intellectuals and
professionals such as Mawlana Fazlur Rahman Ansari, Dr. Ahmed Sakr and Prof. Salman
Nadvi speaking.243 The organization eventually set up chapters in various provinces and
cities and one of its key objectives was to profile and advance the plight of women and
African South Africans within the organization and more broadly. It also started
publishing a newsletter, which eventually became a fully fledged newspaper, Al-Qalam,
which became one of the key modes of disseminating the MYM's religious and political
message.244
The MYM was a contemporary of other political organizations in South Africa
like the Black Consciousness movement, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and South
239 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 106.
240 See S. Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy: The Natal Indian Congress, 1894-1994 (Pietermaritzburg : University
ofNatal Press, 1997).
241 See I.C. Meer, A Fortunate Man (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2002) and S. Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy: The
Natal Indian Congress.
242 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 106.
243 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 107 - 109.
244 The MYM started a newsletter in 1971, which was a supplement to the local Indian views, but this was
replaced by the Al-Qalam Newspaper from 1974. See Tayob.Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 113.
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African Students Association (SASA), all of which were engendering an ideological
approach which affirmed "blackness" as an identity, and rejected apartheid.245 In many
ways this was similar to the MYM's agenda of affirming Islam as an identity and a
holistic way of life. While the MYM's initial involvement with African communities in
the townships was largely restricted to outreach programmes such as Operation Winter
Warm and Qurbani meat distribution, this eventually changed when through its various
training programmes, such as the Tarbiyyah sessions, it came into greater contact with
Afi · M I· 246more ncan us lms.
The MYM sought inspiration for its Islamic resurgence agenda and anti-apartheid
policies, from many sources. One of the key events which inspired it was the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, although some aspects of Iranian Shiite thought were approached
with some degree of caution, and the Iranian model was not seen as being suitable for the
South African context.247 The MYM, however, took up a more radical political agenda in
the 1980s, after being exposed to the thought of thinkers like Khuram Murad, who
encouraged a more direct approach to political praxis.248 As a result of these
engagements, some members of the MYM began a more radical political agenda, joining
forces with groups like the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and the Call of Islam in
the Western Cape and began a campaign to discourage Muslims from participating in the
Tri-cameral parliament of South Africa, established by the government in 1983, because
it was seen as a racist structure.249 The MYM also engaged in other forms of activism
against the apartheid state, such as issuing statements against the comments of then
President PW Botha, who criticizes what he referred to as the specter of Islamic militancy
245 The Black Consciousness Movement was started by activist Steve Biko, and affirmed "blackness" as a
political identity. The PAC was a splinter group that broke away from the ANC in 1959, because of their
disagreement with the ANC's replacement of the 1949 Programme of Action, with the 1955 Freedom
Charter. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilPan Africanist Congress of Azania.
246 Tarbiyyah refers to Islamic etiquette and an Islamic way of engaging. See Interview with Ebrahim
Jadwat by Goolam Vahed, 13 October 2008.
247 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 148 - 149.
248 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 161.
249 The Tri-cameral parliament was designed by the South African state in an effort to include the Indian
and Coloured community in the country's political system. See A. Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of
Apartheid (Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 141 - 143. See also Tayob. Islamic Resurgence in
South Africa, 162.
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arising in South Africa, in reference to Muslims who 'Nere agitating against the South
An ' 250ncan state.
A 1983 MYM manifesto entitled 'Our vision for South Africa' contained the MYM's
response to apartheid. It began with an Islamically politicized declaration of faith: "Our
vision for South Africa is the establishment of a community that is subservient to no
authority, no race, no class, no individual even no ideology but to the authority of God
Almighty alone. The stance adopted by the MYM came to be known as "positive
neutrality" in that it did not (officially) align itself to any political formation but broadly
supported the struggle against racial capitalism, its perspective inspired by Islam.
There were some individuals who were however not convinced that the MYM
was effective and radical enough against the racist state, through their Islamic outreach
strategy. One such person was Achmet Cassiem, a well known anti-apartheid activist,
who had attended the MYM's Tarbiyyah programme in 1977. In 1980, he, together with
some Cape based students launched the Qiblah Movement, which basically sought to
marry the message espoused by the Iranian Revolution and local South African anti-
apartheid rhetoric.25 ! There was also a general ideological tendency for Qiblah to align
itself with the PAC. Another prominent Cape based anti-apartheid activist who was also
not convinced by the MYM's strategy was Maulana Farid Esack, who together with some
Cape Town based students launched the Call of Islam, which was based on the 1961
resolutions, mentioned earlier?52
In 1983, the Call ofIslam was involved in the formation of the United Democratic
Front (UDF), which was forged out of a coalition of a wide ranging group of community
based organizations, and organized boycotts of the elections for the Tri-cameral
250 Tayob. Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 163.
251 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement, 151.
252 Esack later became a vocal spokesperson for progressive expressions of Islam. See F. Esack, "In Search
of Progressive Islam Beyond 9111," in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. O.
Safi (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003). See also Chapter Two of this thesis, for more information on
Esack's ideological background.
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parliament.253 The Call of Islam supported Muslim membership of this body, and by
extension of the African National Congress (ANC), arguing that the broad goals of the
UDF were infonned by an ideology compatible with Islamic principles.254 While some
Muslims may have supported the system of apartheid by voting in the exclusionary tri-
cameral system, significant pockets of Muslims rejected apartheid and did not vote.
Members of the MYM and the MSA also promoted the UDF amongst Muslims and
successfully dissuaded people from voting in the race based elections. 255
While the MYM and Qibla, two prominent Muslim organizations, were visibly
involved in fighting apartheid, the ANC, as a leading political party shaping the anti-
apartheid movement, already had many Muslim recruits, nominal and practicing, who
were part of its various arms, including the Women's League, Youth League and its
militant wing Umkhonto We Sizwe. Chief amongst these were Yusuf Dadoo, IC and
Fathima Meer, Ahmed Kathrada, Dullah Omar, Valli Moosa, Kader Asmal, and Molvi
Cachalia and the Cachalia family.256 Others such as Abdullah Abdurahman from the
African Political Organization and Imam Haron had links with both the PAC and ANC.
lmam Haron, Ahmed Timol and Babla Saloojee stand out as notable Muslims who gave
their lives for the cause of fighting apartheid.257 All died in detention at the hands of the
security police.
Resistance against political, social and economic oppression by South African
Muslims was considered in predominantly progressive spaces as effectively an extension
253 See A. Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall ofApartheid (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),
142.
254 R. Ederies, The Emergence ofthe progressive Islamic Movement in the Western Cape 1977 -1989: The
case of the MYM, Qiblah and the Call of Islam. BA (Honours) dissertation (Cape Town: University of
Western Cape, 1991). See also A. Tayob, "Muslims discourse on alliance against apartheid," Journal for
the Study ofReligion 3, no. 2 (1990), 31-47, quoted in J. Buccus I and L. Nadvi, "Muslims, Participation
and Local Government Elections in Durban, " Critical Dialogue 3, no. I (2007),38 - 46.
255 A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa quoted in J. Buccus and L. Nadvi, "Muslims,
Participation and Local Government Elections in Durban," Critical Dialogue 3, no. I (2007), 38 - 46.
256 Various Authors, They Shaped Our Century (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1999).
257 See J. Cajee, Timol : A Quest for Justice - Ahmed Timol's Life and Martyrdom (South Africa: STE
Publishers, 2005) and B. Desai and C. Marney, The Killing ofthe Imam (Quartet Books, 1978) on Imam
Haron.
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of the Islamic faith, and consequently many mosque spaces, particularly in the Cape,
became places for the organizing and rallying of resistance. With the collapse of
apartheid, the new democratic dispensation after 1994, acknowledged the role that
Muslims had played in the resistance struggle, through events such as the leaders of the
ruling party, the ANC, speaking at various mosques and attending other functions hosted
by Muslims. Further, ex-President Nelson Mandela counted amongst his "right-hand
men" Ahmed Kathrada and Le. Meer to advise him on critical matters of policy and
governance. They also shared deep friendships going back almost six decades in Meer's
case.258
In the post apartheid context, many Muslims have become actively involved in
South Africa's non-racial government, shunning a view among a minority that they
should not embrace the broad democratic process, as co-operation with non-Muslims was
somehow "un-Islamic." This tendency within a minority to digress on the appropriateness
ofpolitical participation by Muslims within a predominantly non-Muslim political system
that does not use Shariah as the basis of its operation, tends to confirm the generally held
belief among scholars of Islam, that there are differing interpretations as regards modes
ofpolitical participation.259
Socio-economic and Political Life in a Post-apartheid context
Muslims260
Responses by
i) Muslim Participation in Crafting the New Democratic Dispensation
258 See, I.C. Meer, A Fortunate Man.
259 Tayob (Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement,125) makes reference to the
South African Deobandi leadership's refusal to support political involvement and reform as a response to
the MYM's call for greater political participation in national life, particularly during the era of the anti-
apartheid struggle. While the leadership of the MYM and Qiblah was resolute that Islam advocates fighting
against injustice through political engagement, the Deobandis were rigidly against it. Even in a post-
apartheid era, there are those conservative elements who are against participating in what would be termed
"secular" politics. Many of the Ulema councils were opposed to the participation by Muslims in struggle
politics, during the anti - apartheid period.
260 This theme will be covered in greater detail in Chapter Five. What follows here, is a briefoverview of
the context in which SA Muslims are engaging politically, and what some of the challenges that face them,
are.
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The crafting of the basic tenets of what would constitute South Africa's constitution, its
governance structure, and its socio-economic framework was clearly a very difficult task
when the negotiation process began. Political parties who took part in the negotiation
processes and even those who threatened to derail the discussions, were representative of
an assortment of complex political positions, which were shaped by inter alia, race,
ethnicity, class, language and, of course, religion?6! The views of religious leaders from
the main faith groups were sought as part of a broad process of consultation. This, in turn,
led to the emergence of Muslim political parties such as the Africa Muslim Party who
wanted to contest the first elections around a largely religious manifesto, in an attempt to
represent the Muslim community's interests in parliament.262
Even though Muslim political parties performed very poorly, as we shall see, as a
result of this foray into national political life in the early post-apartheid period, given
impetus by internal developments, Muslims remained part of the minority group political
scene up until the last national election in 2004, and local elections in 2006. This is
indicative of two very clear trends. First, the South African political dispensation was
tolerant of religious communities organizing politically, and created a space for them to
exercise their right of expression. Second, that many Muslims, by and large wanted to
identify themselves primarily as a religious group in their day to day lives even if the
majority did not vote for Muslim political parties. This is reflected in the way that much
of Muslim civil society engages with those who represent it in parliament. The Islamic
value system is often cited as informing the overall politics of Muslims, hence the fact
that alcohol is legal in this country, and the rights of homosexuals are protected in the
constitution, would be regarded as counter to a core Muslim political agenda.
Nevertheless, the freedom to practice their religion openly is seen as the ultimate
political triumph for Muslims, who have over the last fourteen years increasingly begun
to support the ANC, because this party, as the ruling party in government, is seen to be
advancing the agenda of freedom of religious worship. However, there seems to be the
261 See Walsh, A History ofSouth Africa, Barber, South Africa in the 20th Century and Guelke, Rethinking
the Rise and Fall ofApartheid.
262 See Chapter Five for more detailed discussion on Muslim political parties and electoral politics.
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existence of a misconception in some quarters of the Muslim community that freedom of
religion is only guaranteed by virtue of the ANC being in power, and not by the
constitution per se, such that were there to be another political party in power, freedom of
religion might be compromised.263 While this is clearly a fallacy, this notion has been
used effectively by the ANC as a campaign strategy within the Muslim community.
This was again most clearly evident in the lead up to the 2004 national elections
and the 2006 local government elections, in which there were calls by various Muslim
organizations calling on the Muslim community to vote for the ANC because it would
protect religious freedom and the right to practice one's faith and that the party had
historically been supportive of international struggles close to the hearts and minds of
South African Muslims, such as the Palestinian struggle for independence?64
This call to vote for political parties that advanced religious agendas seems to
have been affirmed by some religious bodies considered by many Muslims as their
religious "authority", such as the KZN Jamiat Ulama which, in an online newsletter,
advocated using the following guidelines, based on Shariah, in choosing a candidate to
vote for: viz, The candidate should be able to serve the Muslims; should not become an
obstacle to Muslims practicing the Laws of Islam; and the candidate should be able to
protect Muslims from Zulm (oppression). 265 Although many of the Muslim religious
councils have historically refrained from actively encouraging Muslims to participate in
elections and political processes, there seems to be a visible shift in their thinking, in
recent times.266
263 This idea has been advanced numerous times through the various pro- ANC political campaigns, and
through support offered by various Muslim organisations to the ANC. Some Muslim radio stations such as
Channel Islam International, also promote this idea.
264 A number of pamphlets were issued during the national election campaign of 2004, by a variety of
Muslim NGOs mobilizing Muslims and endorsing support for the ANC. This included organizations such
as the Durban based, Islamic Forum.
265 Fataawa Mahmoodiyya vol.13 Pg. 425, Online Newsletter, KZN Jamiat Ulama, 24 February 2006,
http://www.jamiat.co.za/newsletter/online newsletter., Accessed 17 November 2007.
266 See Chapter Six for more detailed discussion on this.
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ii) The National Picture: Socio-Economics, and the Politics ofService Delivery
in Post-apartheid South Africa
The attempt to build a post-apartheid society that can look forward to a more
prosperous future without forgetting its past, has given rise to new tensions that retain
elements of past prejudices and oppression. There has been disappointment for many
South Africans, regardless of race, who thought that after 1994 they would enjoy a better
quality of life. Increased poverty and unemployment levels since 1994 and growing
inequality on many levels have permeated negatively on efforts to reconcile South
African society. 267 It is a commonly held belief among political analysts, economists and
social scientists, that the introduction of a macro-economic policy such as GEAR
(Growth, Employment and Redistribution) by the ANC government in 1996, has been
responsible for the high levels of poverty and unemployment in South Africa.268 The
application of the neo-liberal principles of this policy has resulted in a spate of
retrenchments and increased unemployment levels in the late 1990s leading up to the
2008 period. This in turn has led to greater poverty, amongst the majority black
population as well as the Indian, Coloured and even White communities.269
In addition, the overall GEAR policy has compounded the discriminatory effects
of the ANC government's other strategies around issues such as HIV Aids and service
delivery. Given that social delivery within municipalities to poor non-white communities
under apartheid was virtually non-existent or administered by badly resourced local
authorities, these services have witnessed a decline in a post-apartheid period, most
significantly in the township areas. 270 While middle class and affluent communities
enjoy the benefits of the transition to democracy, the shanty town communities and other
267 South Africa has been ranked third from the bottom of all countries, in terms of inequality by a recent
UNDP survey. Quoted by S. Liebenberg in G. Mare, "The State of the State," in State ofthe Nation, eds. J
Daniel and others (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003), 43.
268 See for example P. Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-Liberalism in South Africa (London
: Pluto Press, 2002) and R. Ballard and others. eds. Voices ofProtest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid
South Africa (Scottsville, UKZN Press, 2006).
269 A. Desai, We are the Poors : Community Struggles in Post - Apartheid South Africa (New York :
Monthly Review Press, 2002).
270 D. Atkinson, "The State of Local Government," in State ofthe Nation: 2003. eds. J. Daniel and others,
138 (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003).
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residential areas that had been demarcated under apartheid as "non-white", still
experience discrimination. This has become manifest in frequent electricity and water
cutoffs, and evictions carried out by local government authorities in these areas because
of the inability of residents to pay accumulated utilities bills. 271 Increasingly, residents in
these communities include Indians and Coloureds, some of whom are Muslims.
There are, on the other hand, many affluent South Africans across the racial
spectrum, some of whom have been the beneficiaries of the apartheid era (mostly Whites
but in some cases Indian merchants), and others of the post-apartheid period (an
emerging African, Indian and miniscule Coloured middle class)?n What is often
portrayed to an international audience as "South Africa; the success story", is really the
"success" story of this small prosperous middle class. Though it is now spread through all
the racial groups, whites still predominate economically. The plight of the masses of poor
black South Africans has continued to deteriorate since 1994, with occasional
improvements in terms of service delivery. 273
This includes, apart from government programmes, many self-help schemes
initiated by civil society NGO's and a smattering ofIslamic dawah organizations, such as
the Islamic Dawah Movement (IDM) and Africa Muslims Agency (AMA), and
humanitarian relief groups such as Gift of the Givers. However, real transformation of the
living standards of the indigent population is still not being dealt with substantially
enough, as part of the post-apartheid transformation project, as many development and
economic theorists have argued.274 This is of particular concern, given that poverty,
unemployment and AIDS have arguably become the defining political agenda for South
271 A. Desai, The Poors of Chatsworth : Race Class and Social Movements in South Africa (Durban :
Madiba Publishers, 2000).
272 Use of racialised discourse, in social science analysis while considered broadly undesirable, is
something that is a remnant of apartheid era data gathering, and hence such terminologies are still used up
till today.
273 See N.C. Gibson, ed., Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the Questfor a new Humanism in
Post-Apartheid South Africa (Trenton : Africa World Press, 2006). Many of the essays in this collection
highlight the huge social and economic disparities in South African society.
274 See for example the edited collection of essays dealing with issues of mass mobilization against poverty
in South Africa; R, Ballard and others, eds., Voices ofProtest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South
Africa and I.S. Saul, Development After Globalisation : Theory and Practice for the Embattled South in a
New Imperial Age (London: Zed Books, 2006).
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Africa in a post-apartheid context, part of what Patrick Bond refers to as an "elite
transition", referring to the transfer of political and economic power to an elite minority
of blacks, while the previously disadvantaged masses remain largely disadvantaged In
f h
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tenns 0 t elr SOClo-economlC status.
What emerges then as part of the national picture in the post-apartheid period, is
the huge class divide within South African society that is beginning to cut across racial
lines. What has also become clear over the last decade is that class as a category is not
necessarily a unifying factor within racial groupings. In other words, the plight of the
poorest within South African society has primarily been ignored, by the more affluent
citizens of the same race group, and has been left to be dealt with by government, which
has not delivered satisfactorily either.276 Where there has been an attempt by community
outreach and grassroots forums to deal with development issues, such initiatives have
been riddled with a variety of obstacles that have impeded the advance of a progressive
political agenda, one which advances egalitarian values and socio-economic equity for
all. The test of democracy in South Africa a decade and a half after the fIrst democratic
election is no longer about achieving political stability and legitimacy, but of ensuring
social development and creating a safety net for its poorest citizens who, if neglected,
could be the very force that destabilizes the new democratic order, still very much in its
infancy.
Given the extent of the problem, this is arguably as much the responsibility of the
elected government as it is of members of civil society, and the business and corporate
sector. Hence, this raises critical questions around social and civic responsibilities of a
collective civil society, particularly within the context of a faith based social system such
as that of Islam, with Zakaah (charity) being an obligatory facet of the faith. Thus
Muslim South Africans, as part of the democratic dispensation, ideally need to be
275 The socio-economic challenges facing South Africa have been outlined by many writers, in a post-
apartheid context, in particular authors such as A. Desai and P. Bond. See in particular P. Bond, Elite
Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-Liberalism in South Africa (London: PIuto Press, 2002).
276 There have been initiatives by the ANC government to advance an agenda that creates a middle class
group amongst the previously disadvantaged African community, through Black Economic Empowerment.
However this has not addressed the issues ofgrowing poverty, unemployment and Aids in the country.
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integrally involved in a post-apartheid scenario of development and transfonnation,
taking on the toughest socio-economic and political challenges, anned with progressive
and constructive strategies that are not merely shaped by narrow religious considerations,
but are informed by the social realities present on the ground?77 This is particularly
important in tackling social issues such as HIV Aids, substance addiction, prostitution
and gambling, which are integrally linked to questions of poverty in this country.
iii) Poverty and Social Development in an Islamic context : A Dawah-based
Approach
Early Islam in the Cape within the socially disadvantaged communities
(especially the slave community) developed in a very similar fashion to that of
Christianity, that is, through the provision of social and welfare services by religious
leaders and institutions?78 While Christians used their missionary-based approach,
Muslims used dawah, which is regarded as the duty of all Muslims, that is, spreading of
their faith to non-Muslims. This does not mean however that the Imams who tended to
the social needs of the slaves and free blacks, necessarily did so with the sole purpose of
conversion. What is also significant about Islam in its early days in South Africa was that
it was used as a political rallying tool which united the early Cape Muslim slaves against
their colonial oppressors and advanced the idea that all were equal in Islam. Many slaves
would have converted to Islam, based on this belief.279 The transfer of political power in
the Cape from Dutch hands to English rule in 1795 led to a relaxation of the strict
regulations relating to religious practice that had been imposed by the Dutch. This led to
a more visible presence ofIslam in the Cape.280
277 It has been the case that some Muslims and Muslim organisations have in the past opted to not engage
with social issues that are related to sexual promiscuity (eg. prostitution, mv Aids) and therefore
considered un- Islamic and taboo areas. However much has changed, particularly over the last few years,
with Muslim medical groups like the Islamic Medical Association (IMA), adopting a very pragmatic
scientific approach to address the social dynamics of such issues.
278 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement, 45.
279 Tayob speaks about the sensitivity of the Imams to the needs of the slave population, which resulted in a
high rate ofconversion. See Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 45.
280 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 43.
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Tayob argues that the new government's decision to relax restrictions relating to
religious practice, was because it believed that it was politically more feasible to allow
Muslims to practice their faith openly than to risk the possibility of having underground
spaces where Muslims organized and prayed in secret. It was therefore in the best
interests of the colonialists to allow Islam to flourish out in the open.28 ! As a result of
these early policies to allow Islam to flourish openly, dawah aproaches and religious
propagation within Islam, has always been a significant part of Muslim life in South
Africa. However this thesis argues that dawah work must now actually go beyond just
being about conversions to Islam, and act as a force for socio-economic transformation
and development.
During the years of apartheid (1948-1994), where racial segregation was legally
enforced, many dawah centres opened up in largely rural African communities, which
were run by fairly affluent Muslim organizations or individuals?82 Many indigenous
Africans who were poor were given dawah, and arguably some saw acceptance of Islam
as a way of receiving socio-economic benefits (food, shelter, employment), and as a
result, many converted to the faith. However many African South Africans still also
believed that Islam was a politically progressive religion, and converted just on this
conviction alone.283
The application of dawah, post 1994, has seen some changes, but otherwise has
remained largely the same. Most dawah centres prefer to work only amongst converted
Muslim communities, in terms of providing social relief services to the unemployed,
poor, sick and elderly. There are very few dawah centers that provide services to non-
Muslim poverty stricken communities, without expecting or in some instances coercing
these people to convert to Islam.284 If these services exist, then it is mostly to carry out
281 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 43.
282 The As Salaam Educational Institute, located in the South Coast of Durban is an example of such
centres. It was started by Sheikh Ahmed Deedat.
283 See interview with Ebrahim Bofelo, who expressed this sentiment.
284 An example of a Muslim organisation, that does primarily humanitarian work amongst all religious
communities, is the Gift of the Givers. Whether their outreach work results in conversions to Islam is not
known by this researcher. There are other groups such as Islamic Dawah Movement and As Salaam
Educational Institute that provides primarily Islamic education to Muslim reverts, as well as engages in a
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Zakaah obligations to the poor and needy. What this arguably indicates is that there are a
number of problematic assumptions in the approach to social redress within sectors of
this Muslim community, as part of a dawah framework, which must be addressed. 285
Firstly, there seems to be an implicit assumption that people who are the
recipients of dawah should ideally convert to Islam and that this should be a criterion for
receiving any benefits. Given that social upliftment is very often an incentive, coupled
with the promulgation of the message of Islam, this would no doubt be very attractive to
many, who are poor and do not receive benefits from elsewhere. However, this is
arguably far too mercenary an approach, and is essentially counter-productive to
advancing a social development agenda but ends up rather promoting a purely religious
one. The second problematic assumption focuses around that of race. For most of the
twentieth century, dawah in South Africa has been rendered by Indian Muslims towards
African or Coloured Muslims, with the exception of certain areas, such as the Cape,
where the demographics are different.286
What this method of dawah promulgation has meant is that there has arguably
been both a racial and cultural hierarchy that has emerged, which has privileged Indian,
and to a lesser extent Malay IColoured Muslims in many respects. In other words, the
relational dynamics between indigenous Africans as the "receivers" of dawah and Indian
Muslims as the "givers" has constructed a social paradigm of historical inequality.287 The
fact that apartheid had institutionalized racial segregation has meant that while Islam was
in many ways seen as a faith that united people from different race backgrounds, the
range of outreach activities. Perhaps the most well known dawah group is Islamic Propagation Centre
International that has the infrastructure and capacity to promote Islam more widely, and supports reverts in
various ways.
285 These were the same issues that progressive leaders such as Imam EI-Seppe were raising at a South
African conference on Islam in 1999. See E. El-Seppe, "Dawah - Theme Paper 2," in Muslim Vision 1440/
2020 Conference Proceedings, ed. E. Essof and others, 68 - 76 (Durban: Muslim Vision 1440 / 2020,
1999).
286 The majority of Muslims in the Cape have a Malay or Coloured heritage. The question of charity and
social development work in Islam is a complex one. While some of it is related to dawah and conversion,
much is also about collecting funds for Muslims who face challenging social circumstances elsewhere in
the world, such as Palestine and Iraq.
287 It is important to clarify though that this is not necessarily the case at all times, in a contemporary
context, and that there are spaces where race dynamics are not really an issue. What is being referred to
here is the historical manner of the application of dawah, which is being raised as a problematic construct.
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political pressures of this system, forced people to develop fears and insecurities that
manifest themselves today as cultural bigotry. An example of this is the linguistic
discourse which developed among many Indian Muslims towards the indigenous
Africans, such as the word "kaliyas", a derogatory reference to black African people,
similar in nature to "nigger", a word that was used in the United States to refer to the
original black slaves who were brought from Africa to work on the cotton plantations.
It would, however, be misleading to argue that such cultural and racial bigotry
exists as a generalized phenomenon. There have been attempts made to reform race and
religious interaction between Muslims of all race groups, particularly between Indian and
indigenous African Muslims, within a post-apartheid context. However much of this
extends largely to a public space, or the work environment, and there is very little social
interaction outside of this, for example marriages between Indian Muslims and African
Muslims would generally be frowned upon, even though the couple were both Muslim.
One could argue though, that this has more to do with overcoming a legacy of apartheid,
where inter-racial marriages were prohibited and social segregation very often, has a long
term impact on communities.
Given however, that race still predominates the social and cultural fabric of a
post-apartheid South African society at many different levels, it is critical that a new
paradigm be effected in order to ensure socio-economic progress that is defined within an
egalitarian framework, and not purely within either race or religious terms. While Islam
as a religion advances the principle of social redress, the dawah agencies who engage in
social upliftment schemes must not do so purely to achieve religious ends, but rather
socially equitable ones.288 The issue of dawah and its implementation in a contemporary
context, must arguably be articulated, as one that promotes political and social justice,
without seeking to promote a narrow religious agenda, that is purely ritualistic and
symbolic. This idea will be expanded upon in the concluding chapter.
288 Ideally dawah should be about bringing the message of Islam to people, but not expecting a conversion
in return. Part of this work should be about building clinics, schools, and other facilities in communities,
where Islamic work can take place, without forcing anyone to convert.
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ivY Religion vs Secularism: Dealing with local and global challengei89
In post-apartheid South Africa, Muslims face precisely the same kind of
challenges faced by Muslim communities elsewhere, as regards the issue of bridging the
divide between the principles of secularism and dictates of the Islamic faith, and the
emerging ordeals of defending Islam against its critics, in a twenty-first century
framework. 290 In a post September 11 (2001) environment, the onslaught against
Muslims globally, that has very often conflated the religion with advancing a political
agenda that advocates violence and terrorism, has not spared South African Muslims.
This has led to the Muslim community reacting to these many criticisms in a variety of
ways.
It is noteworthy that SA Muslims have been very vocal on global matters
affecting Muslims elsewhere, particularly around issues in the Middle East, including
Palestine and the war in Iraq, as well as conflicts in Asia, such as factional violence in
Kashmir and the US bombings of Afghanistan (2001) and invasion of Iraq (2003).291
What has however arguably been problematic in the nature of these responses to global
issues, is that they have primarily been shaped by religious and reactionary approaches,
without substantial strategic thinking and mobilizing around these matters.292 Further,
since religious leadership of mosques and other religious bodies has in some instances led
such initiatives, the process of formulating responses has arguably been devoid of
substantial political analysis and strategic intellectual engagement; rather, it has been
informed by a predominantly religious discourse. Much of what eventually serves as a
"strategy" is the interpretations of Muslim religious leaders, proffered within a religious
289 This issue will also be unpacked and examined in greater detail in Chapter Five.
290 Omid Safi and others, articulate some of these challenges in Progressive Muslims, reflecting on the
many questions that face the Muslim Ummah globally. See O. Safi. ed.,. Progressive Muslims (Oxford :
Oneworld Publications, 2003).
29\ Vahed and Jeppie refer to an organised effort on the part of SA Muslims to respond to the issues of
conflict in the Middle East, and the global situation post 9/11, through protests and demonstrations, 272-
276.
292 Several undocumented reports stated that SA Muslims were being mobilised to go and become part of
military campaigns in the Middle East, effectively as foreign recruits to guerrilla and insurgent movements,
fighting against occupation forces, as part of a religious exercise. While at one level, such notions may
appeal to a radicalised mindset, such actions effectively only exacerbate an already heightened military
situation.
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framework. 293 This, it may be argued, is a problem throughout the Arab and Muslim
world, where there is a distinct tens!on between religious and non-religious or progressive
approaches to issues that affect Muslims. Some of the options chosen by these religious
leaders, it will be argued, are often counter-productive to the (political/social/economic)
interests of the collective Ummah. This challenge will be addressed in a more
comprehensive manner in the following Chapters.
The past fifteen years of democracy in South Africa have often highlighted such
tensions, given the struggle by new and progressive Muslim formations to emerge in a
post-apartheid context as alternatives to what might be regarded as the somewhat
conservative mainstream Islamic theological bodies. This has often led to long drawn out
campaigns between the conservative establishments and newer progressive bodies trying
to define themselves in a hostile (Muslim) terrain.294 For many years the MYM was seen
as the progressive political space for Muslims in South Africa to contest the views of the
conservative Muslim religious establishment, most visibly represented by the Deobandi
ideological tradition, in terms of encouraging greater involvement in national political
life, creating an active role for women, greater participation by African Muslims in the
organization, and developing the youth in particular.295
While the MYM continues in this vein, and has taken on more challenging
development oriented projects in post-apartheid South Africa, new spaces and
organizations have emerged in the past few years, shaped and defined by post-apartheid
dynamics, unlike those faced by the MYM which was born during the apartheid era.
These new spaces have come to symbolize what could be referred to as part of the new
era of "progressive" Islam in South Africa. An example has been the struggle by a fairly
293 A. Tayob in Islam in South Africa. Mosques, Imams, and Sermons (Gainesville : University Press of
Florida, 1999), reflects on the significance and impact of the sermon in South African mosque spaces,
calling it a "platform for a leader to make a weekly statement", and "more than an occasion for propaganda,
it calls for greater consideration", 1.
294 Newsletters such as the Majlis (http://themajlis.net/index.html) and the publications of the Jamiat Ulema
(based in the KZN, Gauteng and the Cape), are very often regarded as representing the very conservative
voice of the Muslim community in South Africa, and as such very often frowning upon any expressions of
the religious faith that seek to display a more liberal or progressive slant.
295 Tayob. Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 106 - 130.
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new movement in Durban in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal called Taking Islam to the
People (TIP), to become an "alternative" Islamic voice to that of the more conservative
establishment and provide opportunities for liberal-minded Muslims to express
themselves religiously. It is evident from these newly emerging spaces that there is a
desire and certainly a demand for such spaces to be created and maintained. Indeed this
alludes to the significant growth of a mindset within the post-apartheid Muslim
community which embraces the idea of a more progressive religious framework that does
not abandon obligatory religious observances, yet allows a more flexible expression of
Muslim faith. The work being done by Taking Islam to the People (TIP) as an example of
progressive Islamic discourse will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five?96
Alternative Approaches for Muslim South Africans: The Necessity of Reformulating
Strategy
While this area of discussion will be tackled more comprehensively in Chapters
Four, Five and Six, it is useful to briefly allude here, to some of the critical approaches
informing the process of ideological transformation among South African Muslims, and
how they are engaging in the political life in the country. It has become almost standard
now in Muslim societies, whether they are minority communities in a secular
environment or the majority population in a country, for there to be contestation between
those who subscribe to a conservative notion of Islamic theological belief and those who
subscribe to the core beliefs of the faith, yet have assimilated a degree of secularism or
liberalism into their belief system. Such contestations have come to represent the
hallmark of the struggle of Islam as a faith to redefine itself in a twenty-first century
setting.
In post-apartheid South Africa, Muslims are clearly a political minority, with
minority status on matters of grave political import such as municipal spending and
poverty alleviation. Muslims tend to compound their numerical marginality by often
choosing to not participate in these issues, relegating them to the "secular" arena of
296 See Interview with Rassool Snyman, TIP.
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engagement.297 While many Muslims stood finn in their political convictions against
apartheid as an unjust political system, they arguably find it difficult to articulate a
singular unity in a post-apartheid context, and particularly more so because of the
historical segregations of race, class, ethnicity and language that had been enforced, and
infonnally observed in some instances, during the apartheid era. The dominant discourse
advanced by the majority of orthodox ulema, privileges a conservative agenda that still
primarily believes that the only legitimate political leadership for Muslims is religious
leadership, because they have the Islamic knowledge required to lead Muslims.298
According to such a perspective, any other course of action would "mislead" Muslims
into the arena ofthe "kuffaar" or non-believers.
The few progressive ulema who have transcended the divide between engaging on
purely religious grounds or within a secular political framework, have argued the
necessity of combining (a moderate secular) political strategy with divine injunctions as
advocated in the Quran?99 Together with these individuals, groups such as TIP are
breaking the mould in tenns of advancing a progressive approach to issues relating to the
observing of core religious beliefs and practices while ensuring that broader socio-
economic issues are not left by the wayside.
Such progressive thinking however, has not as yet, become part of mainstream
Muslim ideology. In fact, there is very often confusion and indecision between Muslim
religious authorities on numerous matters, whether religious or political. This can be
evidenced by ongoing fractious debates that continue to play themselves out between the
various authorities. A clear recent example of such confusion was the differing
297 Wht:n the public is called upon to engage in various formal institutional forms of public participation
like input into civic matters, the nature of local municipal budgets, etc, the Muslim community is often
noticeable by its absence.
298 This is the predominant discourse on the website of Mujlisul Ulama, considered as one of the most
orthodox spaces in the SA Muslim community.
http://www.inkofscholars.com/inkofscholars.php?file=muilis/muabout.php.Itis important to clarify here
though, that the author of this thesis is not arguing that religious leadership is not important, however the
assertion is being made that leadership has to come from all sectors of the Muslim community, even those
that have not had formal religious training in Islam.
299 Imam Fuzail Sufi is one such religious leader. The late Imam Essa EI-Seppe also advocated such a
position.
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pronouncements (jatwahs) issued by the KZN and Gauteng branches of the same
religious authority, the lamiatul Ulema, over whether Muslims should boycott the Sunday
Times newspaper, after it had considered publishing replications of the cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammed, originally published in a Danish newspaper in 2005, which Muslims
found offensive.30o While one branch (Gauteng) gave Muslims the go-ahead to continue
purchasing the paper after it had obtained assurances from the editors that they would not
publish the cartoons, the KZN branch urged Muslims to maintain the boycott.30l These
contradictory stances within a supposedly single religious body do not lend themselves to
providing clear and resolute guidance on matters that have complex religious and
political undertones, and certainly do not instill confidence that the religious authorities
are able to lead the Ummah in such instances.
Similar contestations and controversies have emerged within the Halaal
certification and Ha}} travel industries, within South Africa, which have created a degree
of con fusion amongst Muslim consumers and clients, who often do not have recourse to
arbitration other than perhaps resorting to the secular constitutional legal mechanisms to
resolve emerging disputes around such matters.302 These kinds of issues are emerging
within similar contexts around the world where Muslims, particularly as minorities, are
forced to deal with the inability of religious authorities to provide clear and often
contextual guidance relating to contemporary dilemmas.
However, within the South African context there is a specific set of historical
factors that render these dilemmas somewhat unique, given the complex range of social
and economic considerations that shape them. These include the multi-layered identity
constructions that are a legacy of both the early migration of Muslims to South Africa, as
well as the dynamics that emerged during apartheid segregation. In this context the
ideological contestation between the conservative / orthodox establishment and
300 See "Cartoon Row: Sunday Times Gagged," Mail and Guardian Online, February 4, 2006,
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?artic1eid=263325&area=/breaking news/breaking news national I.
301 See Chapter Five for more detailed discussion on this issue.
302 There is currently an ongoing debate in the SA Muslim community, around whether Rainbow Chickens,
which has been certified halaal by SANHA, is indeed halaal, as there have been questions raised around
SANHA's certification processes. See http://www.sanha.org.za/.
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progressive forces, provides for a fascinating array of diversity within South African
Muslims, who could more appropriately be called multiple communities within a
minority.
This chapter has attempted to provide a broad overview of the political and socio-
economic fabric that constitutes the South African Muslim community in a post-apartheid
context within a transition phase. The next chapter will focus on the empirical
observations that have been articulated for the purposes of this study in an attempt to
locate some of the concerns and criticisms raised in the above discussion. Chapter Four
undertakes a quantitative study, documenting the views of South African Muslims in key
leadership positions, with regards to the broader research questions raised in this thesis.
Thereafter, Chapter Five will attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the
spaces in which South African Muslims have been most active and are engaging more
vigorously, in relation to some of the key issues that have been identified as important
and necessary areas ofparticipation for this community.
101
Chapter Four
Methodology Review and Summary of Qualitative Data: South African Muslims
and Political Participation
Methodology, Fieldwork and Research Constraints
This chapter summarizes the findings of the fieldwork research carried out as
outlined in the methodology section below.
The fieldwork and research components of this study comprised of four main
methodological approaches, viz, structured and unstructured interviews; surveys, archival
material, and an examination of websites of key organizations and individuals. The
primary methodology consisted of interviews based on a set of ten standard structured
questions.303 The interview format, however, made provision for participants to present
their opinions on a range of issues related to the main questions. In effect the interview
consis.ed of structured questions, which appear below, being posed, and the occasional
unstructured questions as a follow-up to further clarify or probe certain issues. Interviews
were recorded in audio format and transcribed into written text.
Thirty persons from across three urban centres in South Africa, Durban,
Johannesburg and Cape Town, were identified as interviewees for the study, based on
their involvement and expertise in the area of Islamic activity in South Africa.304 Of these
original thirty, twenty were available for interviews which were conducted over a period
of eight months during 2006 and 2007. An additional four interviews were conducted
with individuals not on the original list, due to problems experienced in tracking down
prospective interviewees.
303 This was in an attempt to ensure that all interviewees were asked the same questions. There were also
opportunities for interviewees to elaborate on specific points, which allowed for greater insight on certain
areas.
304 This involvement would basically have been in the area of civil society participation, government,
religious activity, humanitarian / relief / charity work and international linkages.
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Several difficulties were encountered in carrying out the fieldwork. Interviewees
sometimes re-scheduled confirmed appointments, and there were occasions where
persons who had agreed to be interviewed later declined, citing various reasons.
Importantly, and disappointingly, most of those who constitute the formal religious
'leadership' (ulema) were reluctant or outright refused to participate. Several who were
approached, interrogated the intellectual terms of reference for the study, notwithstanding
the fact that full ethical clearance had been granted by the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal.
A few were suspicious and questioned whether there were "hidden agendas." It would
have b~~en a huge bonus to have had the opportunity to probe their perspectives firsthand,
but their attitude is understandable as it is related in part to genuine security concerns in
30-
the post 9/1 1 world. :J
Below is a list of the persons interviewed for this study.
Table 4.1 : Interviewees
Name Organisation
Mohammed Amra (Director) WAMY
Mymoena Arnold (Media activist) Independent! Media
Ebrahim Bofelo (Secretary General) MYM/AMYC
Masood Boomgaard (Editor) AI-Ummah
Imraan Buccus (Editor I Researcher) AI-Qalam I CPP
Suleman Dangor (Academic) UKZN
Abie Dawjee (Media Activist) RAIN I Independent Media
Mohammed Groenewald (Deputy President) MYM
Fuad Hendricks (Director) Muslim Vision 1440 I 2020
Rafeek Hassan (Former Director) IPCI
Riaz Jamal (Director) AI-Ansaar Foundation
305 There is growing suspicion amongst Muslim spaces, of social scientists wanting to conduct research on
Muslims, as some feel that this is a way of monitoring them. In light of the policies adopted by the US
government, where it detains Muslims, simply because they have a Muslim name, this suspicion is
understandable.
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Iqbal Jhazbhai (Academic) UNISA
Zeinoul Kajee (Director) AwqafSA
Ayesha Mall (Editor I Lecturer) Africa Perspectives lOUT
Don Matterra (Poet I Activist) Independent
Fatima Meer (Academic I Activist) ffiR I Independent
Yasien Mohamed (Academic) UWC
Maryam Patel (Student Activist) MSA
Tahir Sitoto (Academic) UKZN
Rassool Snyman (Activist and Businessman) PSC I TIP
Imtiaaz Sooliman (Chairperson) Gift of the Givers
Fuzail Sufi (Imam and religious leader) Soofie Mosque Westville
Solly Suleman (Businessman) Minara
Abdulkader Tayob (Academic) UCT
Brief Organizational Profiles
The Islamic organizations that some of these individuals are based at, are
significant for the purposes of the study, as they reflect the institutional spaces within
which Islam and its various ideological trajectories were able to develop historically, and
therefore brief organizational profiles are provided below in order to contextualize these
organizational affiliations. The organizations that have not been profiled either have
academic or other non-Islamic affiliations, and their histories are not considered central to
this study.306
A I-Ansaar
AI-Ansaar was founded m 1993 with the primary objective of promoting Islamic
education and tarbiyyah. In 1994 premises were acquired at the Mariam Bee Sultan
306 While these profiles may be more appropriate as an appendix attachment, it was felt that they provide a
convenient reference point to this chapter, in terms of locating the viewpoints of the various interviewees.
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Islamic Centre where a pre-school, nursery and Madrasah were established. Since 1995,
AI-Ansaar has embarked upon a number of other educational projects such as the Hajj
Seminars, Qur'an School, and the Islamic Library. AI-Ansaar is focussed on the view that
the revival and renaissance of the Ummah can only be realised by education, tarbiyah and
dawah. AI-Ansaar believes that for Muslims to re-assert their civilizational role,
education and knowledge must be given the highest priorities. Al-Ansaar's activities and
projects are designed to create awareness, revive beliefs and enforce Islamic practices and
family values. Projects of the AI-Ansaar Foundation include Radio Al-Ansaar and the AI-
Ummah Newspaper.30?
Al-Qalam Newspaper
AI-Qalam started off as a newsletter supplement in the Indian Views newspaper, in 1971,
produced by the Muslim Youth Movement. In 1974, it became a fully fledged newspaper,
with a national circulation and was considered during the seventies and eighties as the
voice of the politically engaged Muslim community, often critical of the apartheid
government, which led to its banning.308 Former editors have included the only woman
editor, the late Shamima Shaikh and Fuad Hendricks, who were both active in the anti-
apartheid struggle. It is today a vibrant and thriving newspaper, edited by Imraan Buccus,
and publishes a KZN edition, apart from the national edition. It is however not looked
upon favourably by the conservative theological bodies, because it continues to tackle
controversial issues. It is therefore an important political space for SA Muslims.
Al-Ummah Newspaper
The Al-Ummah is an Al-Ansaar monthly publication which focuses on promoting unity
amongst the Ummah. Al-Ummah provides a medium through which Muslims can
interact with each other, exchange ideas and information about themselves, and
importantly, serve as a means by which Dawah is fostered. Primarily the objective of the
307 See the AI-Ansaar website, http://www.alansaar.co.za/foundation-about.php.
308 See A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town: UCT
Press, 1995), 113.
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paper is the dissemination of news about Islam and Muslims aimed at engendering a
spirit of brotherhood in Islam. It is however considered as a paper that does not
necessarily always tackle the same controversial issues that AI-Qalam, may for example,
cover. Presently 20,000 copies are being distributed in KZN in areas as far as Stanger in
the North, Port Shepstone in the South and Ladysmith / Newcastle.309 The paper is seen
as primarily a KZN project, and is not distributed nationally.
AwqafSA
Awqaf SA was established through the setting up of a steering committee in 200 I, whose
mandate it was to set up the National Awqaf Foundation and the SA Islamic
Development Agency. Awqaf is an independent inclusive community based trust
providing a range of developmental and financial services designed to empower
communities. Its mission is to mobilize community awqaf capital, to re-invest in
community development and to encourage every Muslim to become a waqif.310 It is
based in Johannesburg, but has a national presence. Awqaf can be considered as a
collective project of all SA Muslims, wanting to donate a legacy, which can contribute
towards improving the socio-economic situation of the country. It therefore has a very
important social role to play in the Muslim community.
Gift ofthe Givers
The Gift of the Givers was established in August 1992, and is primarily a humanitarian
relief organization. The Foundation has delivered 200 Million Rand of aid in a 14 year
period to 23 countries, South Africa inclusive. Millions of people have benefited. In 1993
they designed and developed the world's first and largest containerised mobile hospital;
deployed in Bosnia; a product of South African technology, described by CNN as
comparable to any of the best in Europe. In 1995, they designed and developed the
309 See the Al-Ummah website, http://www.alansaar.co.zaIalummah-about.php.
310 Awqaf SA Information Leaflet. Waqf (plural, Awqaf), refers to the act of a Muslim permanently
transferring a portion of one's property into a collective Trust, for the pleasure of Allah. The trust is then
meant to disburse the income from the property for a community's benefit.
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world's first Containerised Primary Health Care Unit; again a product of South African
technology. Twenty units were deployed in South Africa and collectively three million
patients have been treated in these clinics. They have a project in partnership with the
Department of Health. Clinics currently treat 40 000 per month. Several of their projects
have been carried out in partnership with the South African Government with whom they
have an excellent working relationship. They have also been the guests of several
governments in the course of fulfilling their humanitarian responsibility, and received
several awards.31I Gift of the Givers is seen as an example of a Muslim organization that
is able to transcend religious, racial and class boundaries and work for social upliftment
and development in South Africa.
Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPel)
The IPCI was set up by Ahmed Deedat and two of his close friends in Durban in 1957.312
It has become internationally renowned for its dawah work, and for spreading the
message of Islam. The organization has also been closely linked to the charismatic
personality of its founder, Sheikh Deedat, whose lectures and writings have become well
known globally. The IPCI today is seen as a place where international visitors can go to,
if they want to learn more about Islam in Durban and SA, and it conducts tours of special
Islamic sites. While its role has been largely about promoting the religion, it has also
played an important role politically by hosting seminars and offering a variety of courses
which deal with political issues, since 1994. It therefore has a significant presence in the
SA Muslim community.
Minara
The Minara Chamber of Commerce is a fonnally constituted organization fonned in May
2000 to represent and assist South African Muslim businesses and entrepreneurs. The
31 J See Gift of the Givers website, http://www.giftofthegivers.org/about-us/milestones.html.




Chamber's activities and objectives are based on the need to provide a formal voice and
guiding vision for Muslim Business. The constitution and workings are based on an
adherence to an Islamic Code of Conduct and Ethics as contained in the Holy Quran. The
Chamber was formed after much deliberation on the need for a Chamber and in
consultation with a broad spectrum of the business community. Membership is open to
Muslim business owners, professionals, entrepreneurs, organizations and students and
there is no discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, creed, language or cultural
caste. Membership extends across South Africa. The Chamber has received official
recognition from the South African government and trade organizations and has
established fonnal relationships with other Chambers of Commerce. 313 It is seen as an
organisation that brings together the Muslim business community of South Africa, and
links them with other communities, and is therefore an important and significant
networking space.
Muslim Students Association (MSA)
The MSA in South Africa, was established in 1974, and has branches on many tertiary
campuses. The first National MSA Conference since 1994 was held in Durban in January
2004.314 While the MSA spaces continue to be active across campuses in the country,
there is some concern around whether young Muslims are able to use this space
effectively to mobilize politically, and whether MSAs are indeed politically active
generally. They are however important and significant spaces, where young Muslims can
meet and organize themselves.
Muslim Vision 1440/2020
Muslim Vision was founded in 1999. At a "shura" conference held at UDW (Durban) in
July 1999, a set of principles and a plan of action was established, which outlined a way
forward for Muslim participation in national life. This vision included various themes,
313 See the Minara website, http://www.minara.org.zaIProfilelWho/who.html.
314 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam in South Africa.
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such as religious, political, economics, education and media.315 The founders included
prominent Durban based Muslims such as Mohamed Amra, Suleman Dangor and Riaz
Jama!.
Muslim Youth Movement (MYM)
The MYM was founded in 1970 in Durban, by three individuals, viz, Ebrahim Jadwat,
Mohammed Moosa and Advocate A.B. Mohammed. The group was later joined by
members from the then region of the Transvaal, where branches were established.
Chapters were later established in the Cape as well. The key purpose of the MYM
included unifying Muslims, intensifying Islamic education and integrating women as part
of the group's programme. Via its structures, it was also very involved in the anti-
apartheid struggle. Current activities include an Islamic education and Tarbiyyah
programme, and political and outreach seminars. 316 It has historically been involved with
various political struggles and has made important contributions to the social justice
agenda in South Africa, since its inception. It is therefore, a very politically important
space for SA Muslims, given its history.
Soofie Mosque Westville
In 1904 Hazrath Soofie Saheb visited the Westville area and after meeting the local
Muslim inhabitants purchased two pieces of ground from a Shaik Ally, which were put
into a Trust by Hazrath Soofie Saheb. He built a mosque and madressah, and a cemetery
was opened. At the entrance to the institution a wood and iron house was built for the
Imam and Muezzin. He placed one of his six khulafas, Hazrath Yusuf Ali Shah here. 317
Since then various Imams have served as the Imams and trustees of the mosque. The
Westville Soofie mosque is seen as a space which is very tolerant to all ideological
315 H. Essof, Muslim Vision 144012020 Conference Proceedings (Durban: Muslim Vision 1440, 1999).




perspectives and the current Imam is Fuzail Sufi. The other famous mosque in Durban,
started by Hazrath Soofie Saheb, is the Riverside Mosque.
Taking Islam to the People (TIP)
TIP was established in 2003 when a group of Muslim activists held the first ever family
Eidgah in Durban at North Beach, which became a point of contestation between itself
and the conservative Muslim theological establishment in KZN, who were critical of its
ideological orientation. The organization subsequently established itself as a group for
"progressive" thinking Muslims, wanting a space to express themselves outside of the
existing theologically conservative framework. TIP also hosts monthly Friday Jummah
prayers at the Durban City Hall. TIP's initial founders included prominent KZN Muslim
activists such as Rassool Snyman, Rumana Mahomed and Ismail Mahomed.
World Assembly ofMuslim Youth (WAMl)
WAMY established the headquarters of the Southern Africa Office in January 2001 in
Durban. The objective of WAMY's programme in South Africa is to be involved in the
areas of dawah, women and youth. Since January 2001, a wide range of programmes
were rolled out in pursuance of its objectives. WAMY has adopted a very strong
partnership approach with local organisations or communities for the establishment of
projects and programmes. This is in keeping with a strategy of empowerment of local
communities, working with grassroots based organisations. WAMY-SA's headquarters is
based at the historical Rajab Residence in Clare Estate in Durban, which will be
converted into a community centre with emphasis on facilities for youth and women.318
WAMY is an important community based organisation because of its presence in low
income and township communities, doing significant outreach and development work.
318 See the WAMY website, http://www.wamy.org.za/.
110
Table 4.2 : National Demographics of all Interviewees
Gender Race Total
M F Indian African Coloured White
20 4 19 2 3 0 24
Table 4.3 : Durban (KZN) Interviewees
Gender Race Total
M F Indian African Coloured White
14 3 14 2 1 0 17
Table 4.4 : Cape Town (Western Cape) Interviewees
Gender Race Total
M F Indian African Coloured White
/ Malay
3 1 3 1 4
Table 4.5 : Johannesburg (Gauteng) Interviewees
Gender Race Total
M F Indian African Coloured White
3 2 1 3
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Breakdown by Gender and Geography
The twenty-four interviewees included twenty men and four women; racially,
there were nineteen Indian, two African and three Coloured Muslims; in terms of
provincial break-down, seventeen interviewees were from KwaZulu-Natal; three from
Gauteng and four from the Western Cape.
The geographical bias towards KwaZulu Natal (KZN) is due to several factors.
The first is that the researcher was only able to travel once to Gauteng and the Western
Cape and several scheduled interviews were cancelled during this visit. This added to the
larger proportion of interviews in KwaZulu Natal. This is not regarded as a significant
shortcoming because most of the central organizations and individuals identified for the
study are primarily located in KZN. Second, some institutions selected for closer
scrutiny in terms of their political engagement, such as the Muslim Youth Movement
(MYM), World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Islamic Propagation Centre
International (lPCI), and Muslim Vision 1440/ 2020, while Durban-based, have a visible
national profile, and the perspectives of their directors / chairpersons is significant for this
study.
Third, and importantly, as discussed in Chapter Two, an excellent body of
knowledge already exists on Islam in the Cape, partly because some of our most
productive and outstanding scholars of Islam are / were located in the Cape, like Achmat
Davids, Shamil Jeppie, Mohamed Haron, Sa'adiya Shaikh, Farid Esack, Ebrahim Moosa,
and Abdul Kader Tayob, and partly because the activities of the organization People
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), largely attracted scholars and doctoral
students from around the world, to focus on the Cape. Thus, two recent studies by S.
Bangstad and H. Matthee covered much of the ground in the Cape that this study would
have had to cover. They focused on political participation by Cape based Muslims and
have provided significant insight into the area of study which this thesis concerns
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itself.319 This study can draw upon this established and new body of work and it IS
therefore not necessary to duplicate it in this thesis.
The gender imbalance can be explained by several factors. Some of the cancelled
interviews were to have been with women, which added to the gender imbalance in the
sample. Another factor contributing to the gender imbalance is that men continue to
dominate leadership positions in organizations. In sourcing Islamic organizations with a
political dynamic, significant to this study, as outlined in the original proposal, it was
found that most had male directors, chairpersons or co-ordinators. This is largely a result
of the historical trend of fewer women entering Muslim activism I civil society spaces
until recently.320 Overall, few "African" and "Coloured" Muslims were interviewed,
although an effort was made to locate suitable persons. This also reflects the numerical
and economic dominance of Indian Muslims in KZN. Most interviews focused on
organizations in KZN which are dominated by Indians.
Virtually all of the interviewees were in positions of authority and older than
forty.321 Their perspectives do not necessarily represent the position of their institutions
and this thesis therefore attempts to provide an analysis of their views which factors in
personal histories, as well as draws on the institutional framework of their organizations.
319 See S. Bangstad, Global Flows, Local Appropriations: Facets of Secularization and Islamization
among Contemporary Cape Muslims (Cape Town: UCT / Radboud University, 2008) and H. Matthee,
Muslim Identities and Political Strategies: A Case Study of Muslims in the Greater Cape Town Area of
South Africa, 1994 - 2000 (Kassel : Kassel University Press, 2008).
320 Shireen Hassim in a seminal work, describes the development of women's movements in South Africa
during the period of anti-apartheid struggle and its evolution in a post-apartheid era. While there isn't a
focus on Muslim women per se, she argues that women as a political constituency really began emerging in
the 1970s. From this one can extrapolate that Muslim women, while having a significant role to play in the
anti-apartheid movement, were only really becoming part of organised political spaces very much later,
than their male counter-parts. See S. Hassim, Women's Organisations and Democracy in South Africa:
Contesting Authority (Scottsville : UKZN Press, 2006).
32\ While age, income levels and other biographical data were not used as measuring instruments, much of
these could be extrapolated from the personal interviews and ascertaining interviewee's length of
involvement and experience in their respective fields. The only two categories used for biographical data
purposes are gender and race.
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Fieldwork: Surveys and Interviews
It had been hoped to supplement the interviews with surveys. Unfortunately, the
response to the request to fill out surveys, was poor and this has been extremely
frustrating. It had been anticipated that the survey, containing a standard set of questions
with respondents remaining anonymous, would form part of the fieldwork. This endeavor
was a failure. Only two of the fifty survey questionnaires distributed electronically and in
hard copy were returned despite contacting the fifty recipients via e-mail. The survey was
therefore abandoned, and the methodology refined to focus on interviews, newspapers,
pamphlets, websites of various organizations, newsletters, and archival material. The
survey form is, nevertheless, included as Appendix A.
The same set of ten questions was used to initiate discussion with all the
interviewees to ensure that they responded to the same set of issues. The questions were
deliberately wide and open-ended so as to yield a range of responses. This presented
opportunities for interviewees to elaborate on specific points, which allowed for greater
insight on certain issues and for the conversation to cover a range of subject matters. It
was not limiting in any way. The interview questions and methodology approach in
general were subjected to an ethical review and were granted clearance, by the relevant
university higher degrees committees. In addition to the questions, an attempt was made
to gather some biographical information on individuals and their organisations and how
they saw themselves fitting into the broader South Africa Muslim context. The questions
were as follows:
I. Could you please provide your name and organizational details, including your
experience / involvement in Islamic activities?
2. What is your perception of the state of affairs in the Muslim World today?
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3. What is your understanding of Political Islam as a broad field, and do you believe
that it is a factor shaping the realities of life within the global Muslim
community?
4. How would you characterize the various ideological Schools of Thought that exist
within Global Islam today? 322 Are you familiar with the terms Progressive Islam
and Militant Islam? How would you characterize these?
5. Which school of thought do you think is most influential across the globe today in
terms of inspiring Muslims as regards their politics and way of life in general?323
6. Do you think that South African Muslims are politically active in a post-apartheid
context? In what ways do you think they are expressing themselves politically?
Do you think that they need to engage politically in a more systematic way? Why?
7. Which school of thought do you believe inspires and motivates South African
Muslims as regards their involvement in political and social life? Is it Progressive
Islam, Militant Islam, or any other ideology that does not fall into either of these
categories? Why do you think this ideology has appeal?
8. What challenges do you think face South African Muslims in a contemporary
context, and how do you think these can best be addressed?
9. How can South African Muslims contribute towards the realization of a more
unified Ummah in South Africa and globally?
10. Is there anything else you would like to add in terms of your understanding ofthe
state ofeither the Global or South African Muslim community?
322 This question was further qualified by asking about the four madhabs in the Sunni tradition, and
foIlowed up by questions relating to Militant and Progressive ideologies.
323 This question was again qualified by asking about whether the madhabs themselves were influential in
shaping political activity, or the more broader categories of progressive and militant ideologies.
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In order to make sense of the responses, the information obtained in the
interviews was collated into the following five categories: (i) state of the broader Muslim
world; (ii) understanding of / attitude towards / views on Political Islam; (iii) impact of
various schools of thought on Muslim engagement on political issues; (iv) level of South
African Muslim participation in national/international issues; and (v) shaping of Muslim
identity in post-apartheid South Africa in relation to political engagement. The responses
to questions eight, nine and ten were collapsed into these five broad areas, which were
used as a measure of the general attitudes towards the research topic, how various schools
of Islamic thought are shaping political discourse within the South African Muslim
community, and the nature, frequency, efficacy, and outcome of political engagement by
South African Muslims. In discussing these responses, in some instances, interviewees
have been quoted directly, while in other cases their comments have been paraphrased,
but kept as close as possible to the original, for purposes of brevity. What follows below
is a summary of the five areas of analysis. A summary of the interview schedule is
attached as Appendix B.
i) State ofthe broader Muslim world
There was an interesting range of responses to the broad question of the "State of
the Muslim World." This was a deliberately open-ended question as the intention was to
gauge what was uppermost in respondents' minds and from this, ascertain whether there
was any similarity in how they viewed the contemporary situation. Virtually all
interviewees felt that there was a visible economic, social, and political "crisis" within the
broader Muslim world, and certainly between the Muslim and Western worlds.324 There
were nuanced positions on what this crisis was, why there was a crisis, and how it may be
possible to address the problems. One of the more significant perspectives was that the
324 There is a general perception in the global psyche (in part created by the media), that there are distinct
"worlds" where Muslims reside and other spaces where westerners are located, which are "separate" from
each other. This is however not an accurate portrayal, as the phenomenon of globalisation has meant that
there are Muslim minorities present in the west, and western minorities living within Muslim states. For the
purposes of this thesis though, worlds is used to refer to ideological and cultural differences, which set
Muslim value systems and western values apart from each other.
116
greater crisis was at an "internal" level (within the Musiim world), and that it was due to
an intellectual crisis (or one that focused around identity).325
Abdulkader Tayob argued that there appeared to be a trend where many Muslims
were moving towards a more "individualistic" expression of Islam or other forms of
expression such as Sufism. He felt that there were many who were turning to Islam at a
very "personal" level, because of the complications that were arising around defining
what a "collective" understanding of Islam meant. 326 The Muslim experience in the
contemporary moment, in other words, goes beyond violence to encompass things like
acts of piety at the level of personal experience, such as veiling, modesty, rituals,
pilgrimage, charity, and prayer.
Those who identified the crisis as being internal, pointed to the lack of strong and
decisive leadership within the Muslim world, a lack of intellectual and technological
capacity within Muslim societies to respond to challenges posed from the outside and
from within, as well as the crisis resulting from an inability by Muslims to accept
diversity amongst themselves, and a failure to reconcile Islamic ideas and western
thought.327 Sociologist Fatima Meer opined that there was "a crisis, but the Muslim world
is not really conscious of this crisis. Islam is in a sort of dormant state, a pacifist state", a
position which lends credence to the idea that there was possibly a state of denial among
Muslims globally, and that they were unable to actually identify where the crisis lies, or if
they could, then they may not know how to respond to it. For this reason, they tended to
attribute all the problems and tensions within Islam and their countries to "the West.,,328
This is compounded by divisions, a view articulated by Suleman Dangor, who said that
there was a "dilemma, because we are not of one mind in terms of how to deal with our
problems. There are many differences and divisions amongst Muslim countries.,,329 The
325 See interviews with Tahir Sitoto and Abdulkader Tayob.
326 See interview with AK Tayob.
327 See interviews with Mohammed Amra, Ebrahim Bofelo, Suleman Dangor, Imtiaaz Sooliman, Fuzail
Sufi and Zeinoul Kajee.
328 See interview with Fatima Meer.
329 See interview with Suleman Dangor.
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crisis among Muslims, it was felt, would not be resolved until parochialism ended and
there was deep introspection.
Masood Boomgaard and Iqbal Jhazbhai, among others, suggested that the rise of
militancy within the Muslim world was a "manifestation" of this crisis.33o Boomgaard,
editor of the AI-Ummah newspaper, posited the view that "there were different challenges
faced domestically and internationally. There is a rise of militancy because there are
people who feel that governments are inadequate." The absence of decisive leadership
was clearly seen as a crucial factor in the "crisis" in the Muslim world, and as causing
pockets of individuals to find their own solution in view of what is regarded as a lack of a
clear vision by leaders in Muslim countries, who are often seen, as one interviewee put it,
as "lackeys" of the West.
While conceding that talk of a restoration of the Caliphate was a flight of fancy,
having a strong Muslim country or bloc of countries with a common vision, akin to the
United States and Western Europe, may be a starting point. None of the interviewees was
naIve enough to think in terms of imposing a common Islamic belief and practice system;
rather they were thinking in terms of sustainable and democratic political and economic
systems that allowed for the development of moral and ethical selves within an Islamic
ethos.
This ran counter to perspectives which identified the crisis as being primarily
external, resulting from challenges posed from outside of the Muslim world.331 A
particularly significant idea was that Islam as an ideology was seen as a threat by the
West to its way of life, and therefore the contestations between these ''worlds'' was what
led to the crisis.332 Imraan Buccus, editor of AI-Qalam newspaper, identified this as "a
difficult point in Islamic history, where Islam is seen as an ideological threat because it
refuses to succumb to the Western way." 333 The threat therefore, is not only perceived as
330 See interviews with Masood Boomgaard and Iqbal Jhazbhai.
331 See interviews with Rafeek Hassen and Yasien Mohamed.
332 See interviews with Imraan Buccus and Solly Suleman.
333 See interviews with Imraan Buccus.
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being political, but Muslims are also seen as cultural adversaries. In this framework, the
veiled women and bearded men are signs of a civilization that continues to resist and one
that needs to be rectified.
In sum, then, virtually all the interviewees opined that there was a crisis between
the Islamic world and the West, f10t in the sense of an irreconcilable "Clash of
Civilizations" thesis posited by Samuel Huntington, or that of Orientalists who divide the
world into essentially two broad "civilizational" blocs, one rational and modernized, the
other irrational and traditional, but a crisis that emanated from contemporary socio-
economic and political factors. Respondents emphasized that this should not be taken as a
sign that Muslims were incapable of fostering democratic leaders or institutions. The
current crisis, most felt, was related to colonialism and imperialism over the past few
centuries and disillusionment with secularization and modernization over the past half
century. Islamization, viewed in this context, was an attempt by Muslims to define their
own political and cultural identity.
ii) Attitude / views on Political Islam
While most interviewees were familiar with the concept "Political Islam", there
were differing interpretations though of what it implied or meant and its historical
lineage. One view was that Islam was inherently political and had always been so from
the time of the Prophet.334 Tahir Sitoto, for example, pointed out that "classical
understandings of Islam do not distinguish between the political and non-political. The
prophetic message and mission was a radical and political one." 335 Traditional political
concepts in Islam included leadership by successors to the Prophet (Caliphs), Shariah and
duty of rulers to consult with their subjects (shura). MYM activist Muhammed
Groenewald likewise suggested that "Politics and Islam have always been there, but
perhaps the terminologies have not been developed." 336
334 See interviews with Masood Boomgaard, Ayesha Mall, Fatima Meer, Maryam Patel, Tahir Sitoto,
Rassool Snyman, Fuzail Sufi, Mymoena Amold and Mohammed Groenewald.
335 See interview with Tahir Sitoto.
336 See interview with Muhammed Groenewald.
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Another perspective was that while this was indeed the case, Political Islam, as it
is understood today, is a more recent phenomenon, emerging largely as a response to the
colonization of Muslim lands, and more particularly the political context which has
evolved since the beginning of the twentieth century.337 This position was expressed very
clearly by Rafeek Hassen, director of the Islamic Interfaith Research Institute (former
director of the IPCI), who said that ''the political agenda of Muslims is a reaction to the
Western aggression against Islam. The colonization of Muslim lands has politicized
Muslims." Hassen sees the genesis of Political Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth-
century as a resistance to Western imperialism and colonialism.338
AK Tayob traces the lineage of Political Islam to an even more recent period. He,
in fact, provides a more specific historical context to the emergence of Political Islam by
pointing out that the term was only coined in the 1990's, "emerging from the Islamist
project. There is a problem in Muslim societies because political power is not evenly
distributed." 339 Tayob is pointing to the successive defeats of Arab armies by Israel and
particularly the collapse of communism as a viable alternative to the West, which has
increased the appeal of Islamism, in the context of undemocratic and corrupt Muslim
regimes, often buffeted by Western powers. Democratic governance makes nation-states
accountable to their citizens and helps foster civil society, which is important to make
governments accountable.
As we have seen in the first two chapters, many consider Political Islam to be a
phenomenon rooted in the post-1970s era, a period that witnessed its rise as a social
movement, and considerable electoral gains were made in countries where Political Islam
was organized through political parties. Consequently, much of the current political
violence within the Muslim world can be traced as having emerged out of these very
specific sets of political events.
337 See interviews with Suleman Dangor, Fuad Hendricks, Rafeek Hassen, Abdulkader Tayob, Igbal
Jhazbhai.
338 See interview with Rafeek Hassen.
339 See interview with AK Tayob.
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Fuad Hendricks, a former director of Musli m Vision 1440 I 2020, disagrees with
the notion that Political Islam was simply a reaction to Western invasion with little
positive contribution to make. He sees it "almost like a historical genesis in terms of
ideas. It would be an injustice to define the Muslim political space as a violent reaction to
western domination. Muslim political thought has a role to play in the 21 st century." 340
Imraan Buccus too argued that Political Jslam was an intellectual space shaped and
defined by various scholars of political thought such as Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati
and is an idea that has potential to be refined in coming years.341 As to what the term
"Political Islam" implied, some saw it as that space which existed to encourage
democratic civic participation by Muslims.342 Parallel to this, yet not necessarily
antagonistic, was the view that Political Islam was about expressing political positions,
which required defending the Islamic faith in various ways, including armed struggle, and
that this process should not be seen as contradictory to civic processes.343
Despite the seemingly contradictory ideas about Political Islam, including its
historical lineage and whether it included a militant agenda, what is common in these
positions is the idea that Islam is not confined to the spaces defined by mosques, but that
it entails participation in political processes, including governance, and hence constitutes
a civic agenda. As one interviewee pointed out, leaders like Mawdudi and Qutb argued
that the main purpose of human activity was to worship God and that worldly activities
that were not directed to this end should be shunned.344 However, even Mawdudi, who
initially rejected politics and Pakistan, took refuge there and later participated in its
politics. Mawdudi, of course, by arguing that sovereignty belonged to God, defined the
political in terms of the sacred. 345 While none of the interviewees spoke of an Islamic
state in South Africa, there was consensus among the respondents that politics had to be
engaged.
340 See interview with Fuad Hendricks.
341 See interview with Imraan Buccus.
342 See interviews with Mohammed Arnra, Riaz Jamal, Ayesha Mall, Zeinoul Kajee, Don Matterra.
343 See interviews with Abie Dawjee, Fuad Hendricks, Fathima Meer, Yasien Mohamed.
344 See interview with Imraan Buccus.
345 K. McDonald, "Globalization, Civil Imagination and Islamic Movements," in Muslim Modernities :
Expressions o/the Civil Imagination, ed. A.B. Sajoo, 192 (London: I.B. Taurus, 2008).
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iii) Impact of Various Schools of Thought on Muslim Engagement on
Political Issues 346
This area of investigation provided complex insights into the relationship between
various schools of thought within Islam and whether these are shaping political
expressions amongst Muslims. For the purposes of this thesis, schools of thought refer to
the broad ideological frameworks which are shaping how South African Muslims think
and how their thoughts impact on their political expressions. On one level, these refer, in
a very strict sense, to the four madhabs or bodies of thought within the Sunni tradition,
which are followed by the majority of Sunni Muslims, viz. Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and
Shafi. However, the questions also probed how the ideological trajectory of the madhabs
was shaping either progressive or militant "manifestations" of Political Islam in relation
to these schools of thought.347
Most respondents felt that the madhabs were actually dividing the Muslim
Ummah at certain levels. The question posed to the interviewees was specifically about
the four madhabs, and was followed-up by questions relating to progressive and militant
ideologies. Some interviewees perceived the existence of the various schools of thought
as adding to the challenges that Muslims face. Media activist Abie Dawjee articulated the
view that the "differing ideologies don't really help because there are those outside Islam
who exploit this. There are different interpretations of the scriptures and these different
interpretations mean divisions." 348 MSA youth activist Maryam Pate! concurred that
while "it is good to have diversity, we are also being divided." 349 However, Mohammed
Groenewald posited the view that in the contemporary period, while the "concept of
Islam being peace-loving is what seems to be very clear, ... there seems to be a pluralistic
346 The impact of the various schools of thought (madhabs) on how SA Muslims choose to engage
politically is considered as being an important indicator of the way in which their particular religious
inclination shapes their actions. While the madhabs themselves have not been interrogated, as this is not the
central focus of the study, it does nevertheless constitute a useful area of enquiry to contextualize the
broader research questions.
347 These schools of thought refer to the schools of jurisprudence (within the Sunni tradition) that were
founded by Islamic scholars, ibn Hanbal, abu Hanifa, Malek, and el-Shafei, respectively who researched
and taught between the 9 - 11 th centuries.
348 See interview with Abie Dawjee.
349 See interview with Maryam Pate!'
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kind of Islam that is emerging." One could argue that these pluralist ideas are in keeping
with the broad framework of progressive Islam, as articulated in previous chapters and
that this pluralism is in fact an overt manifestation of progressive expressions of political
.. 350actIvIty.
While Dawjee felt that divisions were having a negative impact, other respondents
felt that such ideological divisions were inescapable; Islam was inherently about
pluralism and that the Muslim Ummah's urgent task was to learn to accommodate
diversity and plurality amongst its ranks.35I In fact, a number of interviewees felt that it
was healthy to have diversity of thought within the house ofIslam, as opposed to anyone
school of thought dominating Islamic discourse.352 One striking view was that because
there wasn't a single leader in the contemporary Muslim world, there will never really be
consensus on matters relating to the Muslim world and that there was little point striving
for this.353
Masood Boomgaard felt that madhabs did not play a role in the political reaction
of Muslims, that in fact, "people don't really know the history of the madhabs." He
pointed rather to differences among traditions like Deobandis, Barelwis, and Sufism.
Deobandi's, he said, were "less inclined to engage politically, whereas others such as
those that follow the Sufi tradition for example, are more engaged. The Jummah
platforms are used to encourage theological issues, instead of dealing with current
affairs." 354 Reference to Sufism as an inspiration for greater political engagement is
350 While it could be argued that there has always been a degree of plurality within Islam made up of the
following various components, ie Sunni and Shia, the various madhabs, traditionalist, orthodox, etc, the
plurality that is being referred to here is the egalitarian idea of co-existence and tolerance of difference,
which has historically been a contested issue within Islamic communities, where divergence from what was
seen as the hegemonic, established way of doing things was frowned upon. This kind of plurality includes
the ability of women to speak at a mosque, attend eid-gah prayers, or for African Muslims to chair mosque
boards, etc. This plurality is about co-existing within a gender neutral, non-racist, tolerant and socially just
environment.
351 See interviews with Tahir Sitoto, Rassool Snyman, Imtiaz Sooliman, Mohammed Groenewald and
Fuzail Sufi.
352 See interview with Fuad Hendricks, Ayesha Mall, Maryam Patel, Imtiaaz Sooliman, Fuzail Sufi.
353 See interview with Don Matterra.
354 Deobandi refers to a scholarly tradition of theological training in an Islamic seminary environment,
which emerged out of the Indo-pak subcontinent. The first Deobandi school was established in a town
called Deoband in India, in 1867. Deobandism is a scholarly approach which prefers to distance itself from
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intriguing, as it implied that the Sufi tradition, which is generally considered the most
spiritual of all the ideological trends within Islam, is somehow more effective in
persuading its adherents to take on political issues, as opposed to the Deobandis. This
flies in the face of the Rand Report.
Others felt that there was essentially a "fossilizing" of Islamic thought in relation
to the political challenges that were emerging around the 1970s, and that Islam somehow
took on a more "dogmatic" character.3ss In keeping with this idea, Iqbal Jhazbhai argued
that "the four schools of thought were respected up to around the 1970s. After this a kind
of fossilizing took place and a dogma emerged.,,3s6 If one reflects on the arguments
presented in Chapter One, where the emergence of Political Islam is considered by many
to have originated in the 1970s, and that the political events of 1967 in the Middle East
(Arab-Israeli War), brought about an Islamist revival, one can perhaps locate these
comments within this context, that is, the emergence of a more rigid Islamic politics
attempting to grapple with the harsh realities of a changing Middle East.
Several respondents felt that the Muslim religious leadership was using various
institutional and non-institutional structures within Islam, such as the mosque pulpits and
especially the Friday Khutbah sermons, but also the internet, radio stations, CDs, and,
increasingly, newsletters to engage in theological sermonizing aimed at cultivating their
brand of "piety", rather than presenting more concrete solutions to contemporary political
problems. In other words, there was a preference by this leadership to remain largely
apolitical, and that the differences in terms of the madhabs and their interpretation,
tended to sustain the inclination to remain away from political engagement.3S7 Suleman
Dangor, for example, stresses on the point that "some sectors such as the Jamiat are just
any deep engagement with political activism or the state. South African expressions of the Deobandi
tradition according to Tayob, "generally accepted the particular political relations established by the
mosque committees". See A. Tayob, Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams and Sermons (Gainesville :
University Press ofFlorida, 1999),70-71.
355 See interview with lqbal Jhazbhai .
356 Here he is referring to the idea that the madhabs became the ideological spaces which entrenched certain
ways of doing things within Islam (depending on the madhab one followed), and that modification of the
madhab or debate around these issues, was seen as undesirable.
357 See interviews with Masood Boomgaard and Suleman Dangor.
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apolitical and don't get involved in politics at all. Political involvement and the impact of
schools of thought differ (however), from country to country." In the South African
context it would appear that the Hanafi and Shafi traditions are most popular, with the
Cape Muslims being primarily Shafi in their orientation and KZN Muslims being
primarily Hanafi.358 What is interesting to note however, is that there has been something
of a shift in the Jamiat's recent thinking with regard to political engagement, as will
became evident in the discussion in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
Engagement in this area revealed two very clear sets of VIews. The first
articulated the position that the various religious schools of thought (in particular the
madhabs) were actually creating ideological divisions at different levels, and did not
really facilitate much consensus around political engagement. The second view was that
the diversity created by these differences of opinion, was actually healthy, even though
there may not be much agreement. With regard to whether the madhabs had any impact
on formulating a broader worldview around militant or progressive ways of engaging,
what emerges is a complex range of views, which suggests that political engagement
amongst South African Muslims, while taking place in some respects, is very often
constrained by the complexities of religious debate amongst followers of the various
religious schools of thought. While the overall view is that there are no overt
ideologically militant expressions of Islam in the South African context (post-PAGAD),
progressive political expressions, where they are taking place, are often subject to the
peculiar vagaries of a conservative theological establishment.
ivy South African Muslim Participation in National/International Issues
The ovelwhelming response to the question of whether Muslims are participating
actively in post-apartheid South African politics was "No." Fuad Hendricks found the
absence of political engagement irreconcilable with being Muslim. He linked the sphere
of political activism to the notion of how one may be able to understand the concept of
358 See A. Tayob, Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams and Sermons (Gainesville : University Press of
Florida), 33. A more detailed study on the impact of madhabs in shaping political participation in a
contemporary environment, would be a useful study to carry out in a Muslim minority context.
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Islamic identity, by arguing that "although having an Islamic identity means that by
extension there should be an awareness of almost every sphere of life, so many people are
still apolitical. There were people who were active before but now there is a political
vacuum."
Rafeek Hassen articulated this perspective most clearly when he insisted that
Muslims were "not involved. The student body is an example. While under apartheid,
students were active, today's students are less active in politics. There is no struggle for
us." More specifically, there was a clear sense among interviewees that there was
widespread Muslim apathy regarding politics as compared to the apartheid era where
many Muslims like Le. Meer, Dawood Seedat, R.A.M. Saloojee and many others
actively engaged in the struggle against apartheid, with the likes of Ahmed Timol and
Imam Haron paying the ultimate price in giving their lives to the struggle.
Imraan Buccus agrees that while Muslims were active in the apartheid context, in
the post-apartheid period "there's a huge debate, even amongst progressive Muslims,
about where they locate themselves." Buccus believes that Muslims should "participate at
various levels, such as going to imbizos, supporting social movements, as well as
engaging the ANC." There were various nuanced and qualified statements which
accompanied this perspective. Some felt that while the level of participation was not
ideal, it was nevertheless taking place, through lobby groups, progressive organizational
spaces such as the MYM and interest in what was happening in the Middle East and in
Muslim countries elsewhere.359 On this point, Ayesha Mall stressed that Muslims seem to
be "more interested in issues affecting Muslims outside South Africa rather than those
issues affecting people in the country", a trend that does not sit well with the majority
African population, she stressed.
There was striking consensus amongst interviewees that there was no new
political leadership emerging amongst South African Muslims, and that it was mainly
those from the "old school" like Kader Asmal, Ebrahim Rasool, and others who had a
359 See interviews with Ebrahim Bofelo, Masood Boomgaard, Tahir Sitoto and Mohammed Groenewald.
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presence during the apartheid era, who remain the most visible face of Islam in the post-
apartheid era. 360 Imam Fuzail Sufi pointed out that, "Muslims are not being engaged, but
we need to ensure that in the next five to ten years we have solid leaders come out of the
Muslim community." There were varying degrees of agreement on whether there was
some engagement in government structures by Muslims, such as the presence of Muslim
MPs, and politicians at other levels.361
One other conspicuous criticism of Muslims in the post-apartheid era was the high
levels of consumption and materialism. Iqbal lhazbhai argued that most Muslim
involvement was "at the economic level, and at government level. The lamiats have
aligned themselves to the power bases", implying that there was the emergence of
something resembling a patron client relationship between the religious leadership and
government structures or political figures who are in positions of influence. Mohammed
Groenewald suggests likewise that Muslims were "engaging politically but not in a
constructive manner. There is no "critical" engagement, but a "suck up" engagement."
Chapter Two of this thesis also made brief mention of this patron client relationship, in
relation to the issue of electoral politics and campaigning by Muslims, in the post-
apartheid period.
And yet, several interviewees underscored that Muslims were, by aligning
themselves with economic interests, achieving a growing commercial influence which
was important to fund the many projects, like schools and Old Age Homes, that are
required by Muslims. There was also reference to a growing affluent sector among
Muslims who opted to concern themselves primarily with material benefits in a post-
apartheid context.362 Don Mattera, for example, points out that "the liberation has led to
the rise of the middle class, and materialism is on the rise. There are some Muslims who
do good charity work, but they are not in the mainstream." Imtiaaz Sooliman, who is
directly involved in philanthropy through the "Gift of the Givers" organization, concurred
360 See interviews with Suleman Dangor, Abie Dawjee, Fuad Hendricks, Rafeek Hassen, Fuzail Sufi and
Zeinoul Kajee.
361 See interviews with Masood Boomgaard, Suleman Dangor, Maryam Patel and Iqbal Jhazbhai.
362 See interviews with Imtiaaz Sooliman, Solly Suleman, Iqbal Jhazbhai, Don Matterra.
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when he observed that Muslim "participation is less compared to what it was before.
There is more interest in material things like cars, cdlphones, etc." Whether this is
perception or fact is hard to establish. While there are unprecedented levels of
consumption openly displayed, it is also apparent that the number of organizations
involved in the field of social welfare has multiplied over the past two decades and the
money is being more widely distributed.363
In this respect, it may also be argued that both the Muslim consumerism and
apolitical behaviour is not very different from other segments of South African society. In
fact, it is the increasing levels of poverty and social stress among the majority African
population, and perceived lack ofdelivery of social services, that has ushered in increased
levels of protest across South African townships, and even xenophobic attacks against
African foreign migrants and refugees, during March 2008. While the "comfort levels" of
most Muslims remain satisfactory and their rights as Muslims are not directly threatened,
there seems to be little need for them to engage politically. We have seen that over issues
that they believe affect them, such as the Anti-terrorism Bill, Palestinian questions, and
the "War on Terror." Muslims are prepared to engage government, but this is sporadic
and un-sustained.
As the respondents in this study have stressed, the current situation of Muslims, as
the "other", remains precarious. Aside from being Muslim, many also additionally carry
the tag "Indian" or "Coloured" and this is a second level of vulnerability, in light of
recent tensions, and an even more important reason to embrace and engage with the
broader African population across a host of spaces.
363 See also B. Maharaj and others, "Religion and Development" in Giving and Solidarity: Resource Flows
for Poverty Alleviation and Development in South Africa, eds. A. Habib and B. Maharaj, 79 -- 119, (Cape
Town: HSRC Press, 2008).
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v) Shaping ofMuslim Identity in post-apartheid SA in relation to Political
Engagement
The responses to the previous four areas of analysis were collated in a manner
which attempted to facilitate the formulation of an overall understanding of whether there
is a distinct trend that one can ascertain in relation to how South African Muslims are
engaging politicalIy in a post-apartheid context and what the implications of this are for
the broader arena of Political Islam in a 21 st century context. In an effort to assess
whether political engagement was geared towards employing progressive methodology or
militant strategies, or responses that did not fit neatly into either category and call these
categories into question, the questions were specificalIy structured to gauge the nature, as
well as the frequency, efficacy and outcome ofpolitical engagement.
There were significant and constructive observations regarding how South
African Muslim identity is being shaped in relation to political engagement. These can be
divided into two broad areas, viz. spaces where political engagement is taking place and
making a constructive contribution, and spaces where this is absent. The majority of
comments alIuded to the general conclusion that there were far more challenges for
Muslims than accomplishments, as far as politics was concerned. These comments
however do not necessarily reflect on the broader set of accomplishments as outlined in
Chapters Three and Five, using archival material which documents some of these
accomplishments. Some of the challenges and gaps in engagement outlined by the
interviewees were:
"Muslims are not engaging in social issues affecting others in society, such as
non-Muslims and the poor": Mohammed Amra.
"There is no synergy between Muslimness and South Africanness. The working
class don't have 'working class' expressions of Islam and depend on people who
have 'elitist' expressions ofIslam to inform their practice": Ebrahim Bofelo.
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"The challenge amongst South African Muslims is their mindset, there is a
resistance to new ideas and there is a history of conflict amongst Muslims":
Masood Boomgaard.
"In struggle, people's Islamic identity becomes reinforced; however, all that has
disappeared and the younger generation of Muslims are cast adrift": Abie Dawjee.
"There is a lack of education amongst average Muslims. There is ignorance about
how to choose our leaders, and if we can't choose leaders for the mosques, how
are we going to find leaders in a political context"?: Rafeek Hassen.
"Muslims must have control in areas such as the broader media. We need to have
influence through Islamic universities, schools, etc": Riaz lama\.
"We don't have leadership and our religious leaders are ignorant and
conservative. The Friday Khutbah's are very conservative. In the Western Cape
though, the lamiats are more progressive but in KZN and Gauteng, they are
reactionary": Fatima Meer.
"We need to involve more Black Muslims in key areas. We also need to find ways
to unite our community": Solly Suleman.
"South African Muslims have inherited an enslavement mentality, and together
with that a lot of racial constructs, cultural biases, ethnic prejudices, etc":
Mymoena Arnold.
"Muslims express themselves in an emotional way, and cannot give academic
responses, such as for example with the cartoon incident": Mohammed
Groenewald.
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"Muslims don't want to conf~l)nt issues of violence, they switch off and ignore
it": Abdulkader Tayob.
"We need to establish a movement for people with compassion": Don Matterra.
On the basis of the responses of interviewees, we can reach a few elementary
conclusions, which will be further unpacked in Chapter Six, with regard to how Muslim
identity is being shaped in relation to political engagement in South Africa. Some of the
broad observations gleaned from the interviews, and which the above comments attest to,
were that South African Muslims are not engaging sufficiently in broader social issues
affecting both them and non-Muslims, such as poverty alleviation and lack of social
delivery, and that there was an absence of a "working class expressions" of Islam with
Muslims dependant on "elite" interpretations of the faith. 364 There was also, no real
synergy between "Muslimness" and South "Africanness";365 there was an "intellectual"
resistance to new ideas amongst South African Muslims, and that the challenge amongst
them, is their mindset.366 There was a lack of appropriate and adequate (political)
leadership among South African Muslims, as well as a lack of political literacy;367 and
that unnecessary "distractions" prevented South African Muslims from tackling issues
that they should be tackling to fulfill their mandate as Muslims, which is to contribute to
the betterment of society as a whole. These "distractions" included arguing over
"theological" issues like how one should dress, how one should stand in prayer, etc.
While these conclusions are subject to varymg degrees of interpretation, it
becomes clear that the concern of many of the interviewees really lies with arguing for a
far more effective civic space for engagement by Muslims. While most of the
interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the current (international) status quo, there
364 See interviews with Mohammed Amra, Ebrahim Bofelo, Imraan Buccus, Fuad Hendricks, Don Matterra
and Imtiaaz Sooliman. Working class expressions ofIslam refer to the discourse that is shaped by a social
reality, such as one's class status, and the various forms of inclusion / exclusion that that brings with it. The
dominant discourse within the SA Muslim community has historically been shaped by the merchant
classes. See Chapter Three for more discussion on the history ofIslam in South Africa.
365 See interviews with Ebrahim Bofelo and Tahir Sitoto.
366 See interviews with Masood Boomgaard and Abdulkader Tayob.
367 See interviews with Rafeek Hassen, Fathima Meer, Fuzail Sufi.
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was no indication that they would prefer South African Muslims to engage in any kind of
militant forms of political expression. Rathc'f there is a general preference for democratic
public participation, where substantive socio-political issues such as poverty alleviation
are addressed, a greater degree of 'synergy' between Muslimness and South Africanness
is established, and a more serious effort is made to create and grow new leadership
among younger Muslim South Africans to replace the likes of Ebrahim Rassool, Naledi
Pandor, Enver Surtee, Kader Asmal, Vally Moosa, and others.
While most of the interviewees, by virtue of the nature of their work in civic
spaces, would opt for more progressive political engagement by South African Muslims,
what is missing in this analysis is the perspective of the theological establishment, which
represents an important component of this study. As indicated at the beginning of this
chapter, one of the major constraints faced by this study was the failure to secure an
interview with members of the more "orthodox" Muslim religious councils. Initial
exploratory requests for interviews resulted in an attempt by such individuals to
"interrogate" the parameters of the study and "question" the purpose and need for such a
study.368 No interviews could be secured with religious leaders, apart from the Imam of
the Westville Soofie Mosque, Fuzail Sufi, who subscribes to both a religious and
egalitarian worldview, and stressed on the importance of Muslims participating politically
and tackling social issues such as HIV Aids.
However, substantive use was made of archival material which is produced on a
regular basis by these religious councils in the form of electronic or printed newsletters
and publications, to ascertain their perspectives and commentary on political engagement
on relevant issues. In particular, two sources of information were accessed viz. the online
websites of the lamiatul Ulama (Council of Muslim Theologians) of South Africa and
The Majlis.net newsletter (produced by the Majlisul Ulama of South Africa).369
Information from these sources will be used to frame the final conclusions of this study in
Chapter Six.
368 The religious establishment is however profiled in Chapter Six, through the use of archival sources.
369 See http://www.jamiat.co.zaJ and http://themajlis.netJindex.html.
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The next chapter will through the use of archival material (printed and electronic /
digital) attempt to provide a descriptive picture of political engagement by South African
Muslims since 1994. This discussion will be framed to some degree by earlier chapters,
commenting on the kinds of engagement that Muslims are participating in, and what the
implications are, in respect of the nature, frequency and efficacy of the engagement. This
discussion will also link with what has been examined in this chapter with respect to the
perspectives expressed by the interviews.
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Chapter Five
Post-Apartheid Period - Insular or p~lrt:dpatingcitizens?
Introduction
The history of how Islam was established in South Africa and the ways in which
Muslims made this their adopted country, and lived as part of a broader multi-religious
and multi-racial community has already been documented in this dissertation.37o
Democracy and the demands of a new dispensation have presented a new set of social,
economic, cultural, and political conditions in the post-apartheid period, giving rise to
new challenges. Muslims have faced critical questions around the emerging politics of
class, race, culture, and of course, religion. These are no doubt similar to issues faced by
other minority and even majority communities in South Africa.
However, Muslims are in a somewhat unique position, given the context that they
are part of a global faith group, Islam, which has come under intense scrutiny over the
last decade, largely because of the emergence of political violence, which is seen as being
predominantly perpetrated by Muslims from various parts of the globe, as well as the fact
that Muslims are seen as a threat to the Enlightenment heritage in many parts of the
Western world. The reality that this political violence may be a response to what Muslims
regard as state terror and a range of structural oppressions imposed by western nations, or
that only a minority is resorting to violent forms of political expression, is often ignored.
There has been huge domestic contestation over how Muslims should react to
these political issues, including disputes over whether violence is a justifiable response to
such challenges. South African Muslims, this thesis contends, have struggled to find a
common and constructive position on many of these challenges. The race and class
divisions entrenched during the apartheid era, coupled with differences of culture and
religious traditions, means that it is unreasonable to expect the forging of a homogenous
370 R. Shell, "Islam in Southern Africa: 1652-1998," in The History ofIslam in Africa, eds. N. Levtzion and
R. Pouwells, 327-348 (Oxford: lames Currey, 2000). See also Chapter Three of this thesis.
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Muslim community to articulate common positions on issues.37I However, despite
continuing racial and ethnic divisions, Islam plays a significant role in the lives of many
Muslims. While it does create a common space for Muslims to engage each other, there
are many issues over which Muslims are, as alluded to earlier, unable to find common
ground.
Given that the last decade has given space to religious leadership to emerge as a
strong force among Muslims, alternative radical, secular and progressive approaches to
politics and socio-economic concerns have often been frowned upon by the religious
bodies because they are seen as a threat to the established hegemony of religious leaders
and their followers. While the ulema (religious leaders) are considered an important part
of the social and religious fabric of the Muslim community, until now very few have
articulated, or are able to articulate, a constructive political position on many issues,
either domestic or international. One of the concerns around the lack of a clear political
vision has been that because Muslims are still evolving in a post-apartheid context, the
ability to unite outside of a religious framework to, for example, tackle social-economic
issues such as HIV Aids, poverty, etc, is seriously hampered.
Non-racial democracy has brought about numerous changes and reforms in South
African society at large. The plethora of newly democratized institutions at various
levels, the establishment of an independent judiciary, and a burgeoning civil society,
amongst other developments, are all indications of a society engaged in transformation
and nation-building.372 Despite the progress over the past decade, the legacy of apartheid
has not disappeared with the introduction of democratic reform.373 From the outset, the
challenge of transition has arguably been largely informed by an over-arching paradigm
of race. What defined South Africa during its apartheid years, viz, the racial and ethnic
profiling of its citizens, has effectively also served to entrench these categories within a
371 G. Vahed and SJeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa,". in State of
the Nation: 2004 - 2005, eds. J. Daniel and others, 252 (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2005).
372 See J. Barber, South Africa in the 20th Century (Oxford: Blackwel1, 1999).
373 See P. Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-liberalism in South Africa (London: Pluto Press
2002); A. Desai, We are the Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2002) and N. Gibson, ed. Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the
Questfor a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa.(Trenton : Africa World Press, 2006).
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post-apartheid context, such that South Africans continue to use these as a frame of
reference. They have become part of the historical legacy and lexicon.374
This is evident when examining statistical data relating to all groups that
constitute the South African demographic. Nevertheless, it may be argued that while the
labels "African", "Coloured" (or "Malay"), "White" and "Indian" are still used to identify
communities officially and in popular usage, the 1996 constitution protects communities
against all types of discrimination, unlike the status quo under apartheid.375 This has
meant that post-1994 developments have created the space for communities to transform,
not just within a racial context but within the context of a range of other significant
demographic categories, such as religion, language, class, rituals, tradition, culture and
caste in some instances.
These categories have also been part of the defining framework of South Africans,
particularly minority communities, in both the apartheid and post-apartheid context. What
began as a political exercise for separate development under apartheid has become the
foundation for what defines the major race groups in South Africa today. In some cases,
this has meant the development of what one might term a minority sub-culture that
exercises its own particular brand of identification of particular sub-groups and religious /
cultural imperatives, based on a range of defining characteristics, which might in some
instances be peculiar to that community. In other words, the broad racialising of identity
formation in South Africa has led to various (religious / ethnic / language) groupings
articulating their identities in relation to these demographic markers of difference,
regardless of the over-arching paradigm of race. This is arguably the case for the
approximately 600,000 to 1 million Muslim South Africans.376 While the majority of
Muslims are of Malay / Coloured ancestry, the race groups officially termed Indian /
Asian, Africans and, to a lesser extent, White, make-up a fair chunk of this community.377
374 See M. Macdonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa.(Scottsville : UKZN Press, 2006).
375 South African Constitution, 1996.
376 The estimate ranges from between 600 000 to 1 million. The last comprehensive South African national
census was conducted in 2001, and this paper uses this data as a framework for the arguments presented.
377 While this might be the general description used to identify a particular ethnic group, ie, Indian, within
a larger religious grouping, there are a number of other sub-identities within this category, eg, language and
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Muslims of the Western Cape region, consisting largely of Coloured and Malay ancestry,
have played a huge role in creating a particular discursive space in Islamic thought within
the country, one that has arguably been the most progressive in terms of political
engagement, and has sometimes even been militant, as was evidenced by the rise of
PAGAD in the mid-1990s.378
Despite the historical legacy of race as an over-arching paradigm, religion
continues to play an important role in the lives of South African Muslims. This can be
explained by an understanding of the role of the global Islamic Resurgence movement in
locating the social identities of Muslims since the turn of the twentieth century. Tayob, in
a study tracing the influence of Islamic resurgence in South Africa, argues that the rise of
a class of educated elites among politically marginalized South African Muslims was
influential in ensuring that Muslim civic organizations had a central role in Muslim
public life, despite being denied crucial political rights.379 These civic groups were
constituted by teacher's associations, trading associations, burial societies, youth groups
such as the Muslim Youth Movement, and a host of other civic bodies. Global events
such as the Iranian revolution of 1979 lent ideological vigour to energizing the project of
ensuring that Islam as a religious ideology remained central to the lives of South African
Muslims.
There was a parallel development of Muslim religious councils that maintained
theological hegemony over large numbers of Muslims, such as the lamiats in the then
Natal and Transvaal. Inevitably, this led to an ideological contestation between those
educated elites who were seeking a more progressive understanding of Islam as an anti-
imperialist agent that could challenge an oppressive apartheid dispensation, and those
traditional sectors who feared that this might lead to further political marginalisation.
caste. See also G. Vahed, "Indian Islam and the meaning of South African Citizenship - A Question of
Identities,".Transformation 43 (2000),25-51.
378 The Western Cape is notorious for giving rise to militant groups such as PAGAD (People against
Gangsterism and Drugs). This group has also been implicated in certain past terrorist activities such as the
bombing of public places in Cape Town. The group is currently inactive, as a result of police vigilance of
its activities.
379 A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa. The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town: University
of Cape Town Press, 1995).
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Islamic resurgence, in effect, became a contested ten'ain between what could be referred
to as a progressive political movement and a conservative religious establishment. Each
was bound to an exclusivist interpretation of what constituted Islam and Islamic practice.
There were however nuanced spaces within the religious establishment, where
progressive Islamic leaders such as Imam Haron and Molvi Cachalia, broke with their
more traditionally minded peers, and sought to use the religious spaces for mobilizing
against apartheid.38o In many ways this contestation between the traditional/conservative
space and progressive space, has spilled over into the post-apartheid context, raising
perhaps the central dilemma faced by Muslims in South Africa.
The conflation of Islamic theological injunctions, as a means to tackle broader
socio-political challenges, with more secular notions of political strategy, has to some
degree resulted in the Muslim community being left in a somewhat disadvantaged
position in a post 1994 context. In other words, conventional political strategy has often
been shaped by injunctions issued by the religious leadership that generally do not equip
Muslims to deal with the substantive nature of the contemporary challenges that they
face. The realities of post-apartheid South Africa have brought about in particular,
debates relating to the relationship between religious and secular spaces, participation in
public spaces, civic engagement, the nature of state - civil society relationships and the
interfaces between the inequalities brought about historically as a result of race, class,
gender and other differences. These complex dilemmas are often reduced to religious
pronouncements (jatwahs) on whether or not Muslims can, for example, participate in
elections in a secular democracy, whether they should only vote for Muslim politicians,
and so on.381 Indeed, this oft-repeated tendency is a phenomenon that pervades many
parts of the Muslim world. The lack of articulation of a lucid and resolute political will
and set of strategies as separate from, even if influenced by religious dictates in order to
address contemporary challenges, is a common criticism leveled at Muslim societies
380 M. Haron, [man A Haron. Unpublished E-mail correspondence to SAHO (University of Botswana,
2003). See also Chapter Three for more detailed discussion on these figures.
381 There are various Muslim theological councils, such as the Sunni lamiatul UIema (with branches across
the country, such as in KZN and Gauteng), that have become the spaces and institutions which issue on a
regular basis, fatwahs or pronouncements on religious matters, either as a response to questions from the
Muslim public or as part of their ongoing educational programmes.
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globally, very often from within its own ranks, and has come to represent the hallmark of
an ever-increasing fragmentation of such societies.382 While the Quran provides broad
guidelines around social justice and redress concerns, these can, and often are, narrowly
interpreted theologically, and such interpretations are often not reflective of the
substantial application of the essence of the Quran.383
Since the advent of a non-racial democratic dispensation in South Africa, the
minority Muslim community has struggled to define itself politically and ideologically, as
can be evidenced by the many schools of thought that have emerged within the various
theological councils set up to serve the religious needs of Muslims.384 Decades of racial
denigration and political exclusion have undoubtedly impacted on the conceptual and
ideological framework of Muslims generally, and their difficulty in finding their political
space. Another area of concern is the way in which the dawah-centric approach to the
development ofIslam has shaped Muslim public spaces. The nature of this discourse, it is
suggested, is insufficient to tackle the emerging challenges in a post-apartheid period,
where greater involvement is required outside of merely a religio-social framework, for
reasons outlined below.385 In other words, simply paying the obligatory zakaat, or
performing the other ''farz'' duties of a Muslim, are not necessarily substantively
addressing the key social needs of broader society.386
The disclaimer here is that if Muslims are interested only in self-preservation, that
is, they will engage civic spaces only in so far as their immediate interests are affected,
then one can understand the lack of participation. However, what is striking when
382 See a collection of Ziauddin Sardar's critical writings, edited by S. Inayatullah and G. Boxwell, Islam,
Postmodernism and Other Futures: A Ziauddin Sardar Reader (London: Pluto Press, 2003).
383 The Quran has various verses where it enjoins it followers to be actively engaged in social change, for
example, verse 13: 11, which reads, "God will not change the condition of a people until they change it
themselves", or verse 4: 135, "0 you who believe, be upholders ofjustice, bearing witness for God alone,
even against yourselves or your parents and relatives".
384 These include the Muslim Judicial Council, the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, the Jamiatul Ulama KZN,
Majlisul Ulama amongst others.
385 Dawah, which refers to the practice of taking the message of Islam to non-Muslims, has in the South
African context arguably been primarily religious and theologically conservative, in terms of its outreach
strategy. It has therefore not necessarily transcended the boundaries of a strict orthodox understanding of
the Islamic faith and practice.
386 Farz refers to the obligatory duties that a Muslim must discharge as part of fulfilling the requirements of
their faith.
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reflecting on the Muslim discourses emerging in a post-apartheid context, particularly
from the conservative religious establishment, is the emphasis on being "Muslim", and
following to the letter the mandate of the Quranic revelations. As alluded to earlier,
Quranic revelations are clear and unambiguous with regard to the importance of pursuing
social justice and actively participating in civic activities. What seems to be at issue here
however, is the interpretation of exactly what it means to be Muslim in the current
context, and how these interpretations are being expressed and articulated in broader
society?
Given the turn of global events post 9-11, South African Muslims, like other
Muslim communities elsewhere, have been faced with an increasing number of socio-
political dilemmas. In some instances they have managed to engage with these in a
constructive, well articulated manner. A good example is around the issue of the anti-
terrorism legislation proposed by the ANC government.387 But on other issues, domestic
and global, Muslims remain deeply divided, strategically unprepared to meet the
challenges, and often-times politically obtuse, which is a matter of great concern to many
Muslim social activists. This does not mean that the resources to rectify these gaps do not
exist; rather, there needs to be a constructive and progressive harnessing of such
resources to create the space for mature and reasoned dialogue and responses to those
issues that affect Muslims.
While the new South African dispensation promotes a non-sectarian, non-racial
ethos, many members of minority groups do nevertheless want to exercise their right to
express their unique identities. Indeed, this is the strength of the country's growing
democracy which advances equality, unity and diversity as essential components for
nation-building. South African Muslims, diverse as they are, constitute a crucial
component of this democracy. The challenges they face, as outlined above, require
radically alternative approaches to those that have defined their responses to date, In
order that they do not become denuded as a community.
387 1. Buccus and L. Nadvi, "The Role of (Muslim) Civil Society in Resisting the Ant-Terrorism
Bill," Annual Review ofIslam in South Africa 8 (2005), 45 - 49.
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Developing a Post-Apartheid Political Culture among South African Muslims
The political landscape of South Africa changed dramatically in 1994 as its
citizens were thrust into a new historical epoch, one that would be shaped not only by a
new set of political realities, which included a non-racial post-apartheid dispensation, but
also the more exacting demands of a globalizing world order.388 Muslim South Africans,
along with the rest of the country, had to acclimatize themselves to the numerous changes
that the nation was going through and in so doing embarked on a new chapter in their
collective history. This meant responding to a variety of political, social, economic and
cultural transformations which in some instances required entering previously un-
chartered territory. This following section analyses some of this engagement and attempts
to provide an overall summary of the key political issues that South African Muslims
have engaged with since 1994.
What is documented below is largely from archival resources, but does In some
instances draw from interviews and field research conducted for this study.
i) Political Campaigning and Participation in Elections
The prospect of a new non-racial democratic government in 1994 led to some South
African Muslims mobilizing along religious lines to create a political party to contest the
national elections and have a voice in parliament to address issues relating to Muslims.
The Africa Muslim Party was created with the express purpose of contesting the 1994
elections. It failed to gain representation in parliament, possibly because it did not have a
track record which voters could identify with or because Muslims were not interested in
religious insularity. Interestingly, virtually all the Muslim politicians and MPs who
gained seats in Parliament in the first democratic election, belonged to the ANC, which
won the national election with a 63 % majority.389 Muslim Ministers have held key
388 See Barber, South Africa in the 2r1' Century, 312 and T. Lodge, Politics in South Africa: From Mandela
to Mbeki (Cape Town: David Philip, 2002).
389 See Barber, South Africa in the 20th Century, 312 and Lodge, Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to
Mbeki.
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positions in the Cabinet and National Assembly since 1994.390 The fact that a political
party that articulated itself along secular lines, viz the ANC, brought into power more
Muslims than a Muslim political party, sent a significant political message; that appealing
to religious sentiment would not necessarily secure political support. It was precisely the
ANC's guarantee of freedom of religious expression that made it arguably more popular
amongst even Muslim voters.
Ten years after the first national election, the ANC in 2004, realizing that Indians,
including the Muslim component, constituted an important minority vote, campaigned
heavily within this community, with President Mbeki meeting with various Muslim
business and religious leaders in an attempt to secure their vote. In Durban, a meeting
with the President was set up, inviting in particular, prominent members of the middle
class Muslim elite to a gathering at the City Hal1.391 In the weeks leading up to the 2004
elections, the ANC vigorously courted the religious, business and community leaders of
minority groups nationally. This included Muslim organisations, some of whom
subsequently paid for advertisements in local newspapers calling on all Muslims to vote
for the ANC.392 They argued that because Muslims could freely practice their religion
under an ANC government, and because this government had sent a representative to the
International Court of Justice to make a presentation on the security wall (also referred to
as the "apartheid wall") in Israel/Palestine, Muslims should vote to keep this party in
power. 393
What was noteworthy was that there was virtually no critical debate within the
Muslim middle class a decade into democracy around the failures of the ruling party to
address key socio-economic issues, which affected the poorer, historically disadvantaged
communities. The major opposition party in the country, the Democratic Alliance (DA),
390 These included Dullah Gmar and Valli Moosa. Currently, one of the most important ministerial
portfolios, ie, Education, is held by a Muslim, viz, Naledi Pandor whose deputy was another Muslim, Enver
Surtee. After the recall of former President Thabo Mbeki and resultant changes in cabinet positions, Enver
Surtee was appointed Minister of Justice, the second Muslim to hold this position since 1994.
391 This meeting was held on the 20 March 2004, to which primarily the Muslim middle class and religious
leaders were invited.
392 This included organisations such as the Islamic Forum, based in Durban.
393 These adverts appeared in newspapers such as Al Qalam, leading up to the elections.
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was not seen as a viable alternative as its party leader at that time, Tony Leon, was
Jewish, and married to an Israeli woman who had served in the Israeli army. It was not
his being Jewish per se that was a problem, as there were Jewish members in the ANC
(Ronnie Kasrils for example): rather it was Leon's assumed political connection to and
support of Israel that was problematic. Palestine remains a political issue close to the
hearts of many Muslims. This suggests that most Muslims chose to support the ruling
party in order to engage in national political life, primarily as an exercise in self-
preservation.394
The key question is: would Muslims have voted for the ANC if there had not been a
call by some religious leaders to do so, and if there had been a range of other parties who
had directly addressed issues relating to Muslims, and had therefore endeared themselves
to a Muslim electorate? The tactic of the ruling party engaging with religious and racial
minorities as an electoral block suggests a somewhat innovative trend, one that allows for
the (dangerous) development of a patron-client relationship between the moderate
Muslim religious leadership and middle class, and the ANC. This suggests that Muslims
have, for the foreseeable future, given up on the earlier tentative strategy of creating
Muslim political parties to represent Muslim concerns, however there are regionally
based parties who are mobilizing in their areas. The ANC strategy paid-off. With the help
of the minority vote, the ruling party captured nearly 70 percent of the votes in the 2004
national elections.
A recent study of the Muslim vote in Durban in the 2006 local government elections
suggests a similar pattern.395 An analysis of five wards in the Durban metro region, with
the highest Muslim demographic percentage, indicates that the ANC continues to remain
the party of choice among Muslims, with the DA, IFP and MF trailing significantly. At
local level, some of this popularity may be related to the fact that several ANC ward
councillors, such as Fawzia Peer and Yakoob Baig, were Muslims. The ruling party has
394 Although the DA even recruited prominent Muslim religious leaders such as Maulana Rafeek Shah, this
did not get them extra Muslim votes.
395 I. Buccus and L.Nadvi, "Muslims, Participation and Local Government Elections in Durban," Critical
Dialogue 3, no. 1 (2007) 38 - 46.
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clearly found a loyal constituency among Muslims, both in Durban and more broadly. For
the foreseeable future it seems that Muslim voters would continue to support the ANC.
However, it remains to be seen what impact the recall of President Thabo Mbeki in
September 2008, as well as the subsequent appointment of President Motlanthe and a
new cabinet, will have on Muslim voting patterns.396 While there was no time to
investigate the impact of this development in any systematic way, a cursory examination
of recent letters to the press does suggest some concern about the seemingly contradictory
tendencies of strong Africanist and communist influences within the ANC, as well as the
specter of corruption. Before the split in the ANC and the breakaway by "Terror" Lekota
and Sam Shilowa to form the Congress of the People (Cope), concerns that Indians,
including Muslims, may shift away from the ANC led to calls from the likes of Fatima
Meer to reconstitute the NIC as an alliance partner of the ANC. These calls have however
been tempered to some degree with the argument that it would be inappropriate to revive
the NIC, given current political dynamics.397 This idea has been replaced by calls for a
new lobby group which will represent Indian interests, but also work with all racial
groupings to respond to critical issues, that affect all South Africans.398 It also remains to
be seen what effect the replacement of Ebrahim Rasool as Premier of the Western Cape
will have on the behaviour of Muslim voters in the region. The "breakaway" ANC
faction, Cope, is campaigning as a party that will represent all South Africans. Whether
Muslims will be drawn to this party as an alternative option to the ANC, also remains to
be seen.
In preparing for the 2009 national elections, there have been two recent developments
within the Muslim community that are worth mentioning. The first was the launch of a
new Muslim political party, the AI-Jamah party, which while being primarily Cape based,
has been hosting rallies and meetings in other parts of the country.399 AI-Jamah fashions
itself as campaigning on a moral platform, which it hopes will also attract people from
396 See Political Bureau, "Its all over," Sunday Tribune, September 21,2008.
397 See J. Naran, "NIC Proposal making way for Lobby," Tribune Herald, August 31, 2008.
398 Naran, "NlC Proposal making way for Lobby".
399 Al- Jamah website h.!:!:R://www.aljama.co.za/. The party was launched in 2007.
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other faith backgrounds. Second, there has been an intensified call by the Islamic
religious councils for Muslims to participate in the elections, which seems to be a slight
departure from earlier uncertainty among some of the ulema bodies on whether they
should endorse a call for Muslims to vote.400 Both of these developments signal the fact
that the Muslim religious bodies (even the conservative ones) are actually realizing the
importance of participating more intensely in the national political arena.
ii) Social Activism and the Emergence ofNew Progressive Forces
The Muslim leadership that government met with in 2004 was overwhelmingly
middle class, and this dynamic has clearly played a role at the level of class politics, with
emerging criticism among Muslims in poorer communities that their issues have not been
addressed by the state, nor is the Muslim leadership, either religious or political, taking
up their causes in any sustained manner, other than through relief and charitable
support.401 Low-income Muslim residents in townships like Chatsworth and Phoenix, and
indeed in other areas throughout South Africa, have become increasingly involved in
social movement activities that are challenging the state regarding the delivery of social
services and homes, as well as job creation.402 This is clearly in response to growing
disparities over the last decade in the living standards between those living along or
below the poverty line and the middle classes. 403
This social activism is conducted largely along class lines without distinction of race
and religion, as common concerns force alliances that transcend such barriers. While the
majority of communities engaging the state around issues of social delivery are not
400 The SA Muslim Network (SAMNET) sent out a mass mail to Muslims in November 2008, encouraging
them to register to vote, having consulted with leading ulema who endorsed this. See e-mail by SAMNET,
Public Announcement: Muslim Participation in Political and Community Structures, November 6, 2008.
Also, Darnl Ihsan, considered a conservative religious body, sent out an e-mail to Muslims, encouraging
them to register to vote. E-mail by Darnl Ihsan, Register to Vote, November 6,2008.
401 Groups like Gift of the Givers, Africa Muslims Agency and Islamic Relief do work in low income
Muslim communities, but this is mostly humanitarian as opposed to activist oriented.
402 This emerged during interviews with key Muslim activists such as Rassool Snyman, Ebrahim Bofelo
and Mohamed Amra. See also, A. Desai, The Poors ofChatsworth.(Durban: MadibaPublishers, 2000).
403 See P. Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-/ibera/ism in South Africa (London: Pluto
Press, 2002) and P. Bond, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (Scottsville : UKZN Press,
2006),6.
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Muslims, there are individual Muslims who are outspoken on these issues. They include
individuals from the academic, business or professional sector, such as Rassool Snyman,
Naeem Jeenah and Ebrahim Mphutlane Bofelo, who have joined national activist
movements such as the Social Movements Indaba, as well as low-income or unemployed
Muslims who have chosen to become fully active on issues around which their livelihood
depends, such as members from the KZN Subsistence Fishermen's Coalition and the
Street Traders Associations in Durban, whose 2007 struggles have been well documented
'h . I 404m t e natlOna press.
Vahed and Jeppie reflect that there are significant numbers of unemployed Muslims
countrywide. 405 This remains an issue which is part of a broader national question around
social welfare and poverty alleviation. Durban's Muslims have yet to become more fully
involved in the campaign to address social disparities in broader South African society.
There are exceptions of course. A small number of Muslim welfare organizations are
engaging in relief and humanitarian work, rather than just "dawah". Notable among these
is the KZN-based Gift of the Givers, which was started in 1992, by a Muslim medical
doctor, Dr. Imtiaaz Sooliman, and has become internationally renowned as an
organization that does not just respond to natural disasters but has sustainable poverty
alleviation and social upliftment schemes which benefit all religious and race
communities.406 In interviewing Sooliman for this study, it became evident that he is
deeply inspired by his faith. He refers to the Sufi Tariqa that he follows, which has been
according to him, the main driving force for his work. Sooliman draws a clear link
between his religious beliefs and his social outreach work and argues that while he will
never work for government, he will engage with them in order to benefit mankind, which
404 See, K. Ganpath, J. Wicks & Sapa, "Durban police arrest 500 street traders," Mercury, June 20, 2007;
KZN Subsistence Fishermen's Coalition, 2007, Notice of Protest Flyer; Notes / Transcript from interview
conducted with KZN Subsistence Fishermen representative Max Magnussen, 26 May 2007. See also
interviews with E. Bofelo and R. Snyrnan.
405 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa"
406 Based on an Interview conducted with Dr. I. Sooliman on 14 November 2006. See also
http://www.giftofthegivers.co.za/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=72&Itemid=79 . While
Dr. Sooliman originally started doing relief work in Muslim nations such as Bosnia, this focus has
eventually shifted to the Gift of the Givers operating in all conflict areas, regardless of the demographics of
the region.
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is the key philosophy of Gift of the Givers.407 Another notable group which works among
township and shack settlement youth is the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY),
which has taken on the challenge of sustainable development programs targeting low
income communities, primarily from the indigenous African community.408 Mohammed
Amra, the director of WAMY, who was interviewed for th is study, felt that Muslims need
to use financial resources more effectively, and instead of simply feeding people on
certain occasions (which he does not necessarily oppose), monies should be used to
invest in schools and other institutions which will continue to sustain communities on an
ongoing basis.409 Both Gift of the Givers and WAMY stand out as exceptions among the
plethora of Muslim relief organizations that have a transforrnative activist agenda as
central to their outreach strategy.
The post-apartheid period has also been witness to the rise of newly emerging civic
groups, who have roots in minority religious communities and cater to local needs. In the
case of Muslims, these civil society groups reflect the plight of "progressive" Muslim
formations struggling to emerge in a post-apartheid context as alternatives to what might
be regarded as conservative mainstream theological bodies.41o This has often led to long,
drawn-out campaigns between conservative establishments and younger bodies trying to
define themselves in a "hostile" (Muslim) terrain. An example of this contestation has
been the struggle by a fairly new movement in Durban called Taking Islam to the People
(TIP), formed in 2003 to challenge the existing conservative and rigid interpretation of
Islam. One of the key challenges faced by TIP centered around its efforts to hold a family
Eidgah prayer on the beachfront.411 Women have generally been barred from this public
practice, whereas their counterparts in the Cape are able to attend. In the preparations
leading up to the first such Eidgah, the conservative theological establishment in KZN
407 See interview with 1. Sooliman, 11 November 2006.
408 Based on an Interview conducted with Mohammed Amra on 8 November 2006.
409 See Interview with M. Amra, 8 November 2006.
410 Progressive Islam has emerged as a fairly recent school of thought within the broader global Muslim
community, over the last decade, and its primary focus is on embracing "pluralist" understandings ofIslam.
Scholars of this school of thought include Omid Safi and Farid Esack. See also, O. Safi, Progressive
Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworid, 2003).
411 The Eidgah is a mass prayer usually held on an open field on the morning of the Eid festival (Bid ul-Fitr
and Eid ul-Adha).
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issued pamphlets against the event and its organisers, describing it as the "Naked /
Topless Eidgah," given that it was being held near the beach.412 While this generated a
huge controversy, the Eidgah was held, with a successful outcome in that it had both
male and female speakers, and has now become a regular feature in the city calendar with
numbers of participants increasing. TIP organisers felt that in accomplishing this, the
group had won both a religious as well as a political victory. More recently, another
newly launched Islamic group, ILM SA, organized a family Eidgah at Essenwood Park in
Durban, during the Eid festival in September 2008. 413 The organizer too was subjected to
a barrage of criticism.
TIP has also held open air midday prayers on the last Friday of each month outside
the Durban City Hall, inviting progressive speakers to address the congregation. Given
that the prayers are held outside the usual confines of a mosque (under an open tent), this
has meant that passersby of all backgrounds can observe Muslims praying, as well as
listening to the religious sermons in both English and Arabic. This has had the effect of
demystifying the performing of the prayer to non-Muslims, some of them being homeless
people who live in the city centre, while both Muslims and non-Muslims who choose to
listen have access to progressive speakers and social activists addressing issues of social
justice, poverty alleviation and job creation, which are very close to the hearts of the
city's many indigent people.
This group is one of a small number of groups emerging nationally, who are trying to
tackle key socio-political issues from an alternative activist platform, which they see as
very central to their Islamic faith.414 While they are slowly gaining a following among
those Muslims who have grown weary of the one-dimensional rhetoric of traditional
theological institutions, they continue to face an ongoing battle with the conservative
412 Maj/is Newsletter, 2003.
413 ILM SA, is the Institute for Learning and Motivation, SA, a recently launched organisation, which
organises Islamic oriented events, and hosts international Islamic scholars at public lectures.
414 Other groups such as the Interfaith Foundation of South Africa (Durban based), Women United in Islam
(Johannesburg based) and ILM SA (Durban) are attempting to create alternative spaces and platforms for
Muslims to engage with each other.
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elements who control most of the institutions of power and regularly pillory these
progressives as "modernists", which is the ultimate "crime." 415
It is also important to note that there are a vari(,ty of new lobbying and civic aligned
Muslim groups that have emerged recently, which are attempting to organize Muslims
politically through civil society structures. Two such organizations are i) Durban Central
Islamic Forum (DCIF) and ii) South African Muslim Network (SAMNET).416 Both have
emerged on the political landscape in 2007 / 2008, and while it has not been possible to
examine their activities in any substantial detail, it is necessary to make brief mention of
the context within which they have emerged and what purpose they hope to serve.
The DCIF has largely been an initiative of eThekwini municipality's Chief Whip of
the ANC, Fawzia Peer, who has been actively trying to mobilize Muslim civic
organizations in eThekwini (Durban) to structure themselves under an umbrella body,
where they will have a formal voice in the eThekwini Council and municipality
structures. The purpose of setting up the DCIF has been to facilitate Muslim bodies
located in the broader eThekwini region having; a) official recognition with the Council
and b) the ability to make input and representation into Council matters, which affect
Muslims in particular, as well as other residents in the city. The constitution of the DCIF
states that its objectives will include the following;
a) To create a forum for Muslim organisations representing the broader Muslim
community (Muslim civil society) of Durban (eThekwini) so that they can
collectively and in a unified way, represent the concerns of the Durban Muslim
community at Local Government level in an official capacity
b) The Forum and its appointed members in whatever capacity shall not be used to
promote any party political agenda
415 See for example the The Maj/is websites http://themailis.netlname-Slkkllk.html and
http://themajIis.netlSections-article221-pl.html , which contains various condemnations of "modernist"
thought and views.
416 See SAMNET Conceptual Discussion Document, April 2008 and DCIF Notices of Meeting, June,
October and November 2007 I DCIF Constitution, August 2008.
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c) The Forum shall be inclusive and non-sectarian and will also work with other
religious and civil society groups for the greater good of all citizens of eThekwini
and South Africa
d) The Forum shall address all civic and social issues that affect the Durban Muslim
community in particular, and the broader community in general as decided by the
Executive Committee
e) The Forum's work will be geared towards ensurmg that principles of social
justice, harmonious community relations and advancing the interests of the poor,
marginalised and vulnerable sectors of the community, will inform and guide its
actions
t) The Executive Committee will nominate relevant experts to serve on its Shura
Committee when such a need arises. 417
It becomes clear from these stated objectives that the body intends to adopt a very
broad set of resolutions, however these are also very clearly framed within an Islamic /
Muslim community context, as is evidenced by (a), (d) and (t). The DCIF has been
making initial inroads into developing an agenda and action plan, trying to address issues
such as the plight of street beggars in eThekwini.418 The umbrella structure is still very
new, and it remains to be seen, what impact it will have in mobilizing Muslim bodies in
eThekwini to participate more actively in local pOlitics. There is some skepticism among
Muslims around whether the DCIF will degenerate into a front for the ANC.
SAMNET was launched in 2008, and it is still developing its final vision and mission
statements. However a brief summary of its exploratory vision and mission is as follows;
Vision
Internally: A community that is united on core issues, having a sense of direction,
purpose, self-esteem - a community that is committed to its duties towards the
CREATOR and towards CREAnON
417 See DCIF Constitution.
418 See E-mail invitation, 9 May 2008 to discuss 'begging" issue.
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Externally: as a community to stand out as benefactors of mankind, patriotic and
I b'd' 419aw-a 1 109
Mission
To obtain Social, Economic. Spiritual and Educational excellence within the
framework of Islam, to establish a flourishing, integrated, empowered society
through selfless service as reflected by the principles of Ubuntu, Ujima and
Ukhuwwah. The Mission attempts to be all inclusive and moves beyond the
boundaries - to some extent of the nation state. The intention is for the Muslim
community to play a pivotal role not only in South Africa but to extend its
influen.ce and profile within the region and further afield.420
It is conceptualized as a national networking platform for South African Muslims,




iv) Youth, women, indigenous Muslim empowerment
v) Community social responsibility421
Some of the key concerns that SAMNET highlights as being the driving force behind its
establishment are:
i) The fragmentation and lack of co-ordination of activities between different
groupings within the community
ii) The community is currently REACTIVE and needs to be more PROACTIVE
iii) Absence of volunteerism in the community
iv) Insufficient political representation
419 See SAMNET Conceptual Discussion Document, April 2008, 2.
420 SAMNET Conceptual Discussion Document, April 2008, 2.
421 SAMNET Conceptual Discussion Document, April 2008, 3.
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v) Lack of political engagement with centres of power
vi) Dawah approaches need reviewing
vii) Lack of empowerment and leadership within the community
viii) Lack of women empowerment
ix) Lack of reading, writing, research and intellectual poverty
x) Lack of identification of potentially influential Muslim human resources within
various power sources
xi) Lack ofoptimal usage of resources (human and financial)
xii) Absence of well-knit and well organized leadership
xiii) Lack of inter-community dialogue422
SAMNET seems to constitute on the surface at least, an ideal vehicle for
facilitating greater participation by Muslims in a variety of areas, particularly politics.
Given the areas of concern highlighted above, it would appear to have its pulse on the
core ailments and issues affecting the South African Muslim community. In that respect it
is a highly commendable initiative. However in perusing its early discussion documents,
it becomes evident that much of the steering committee driving this process in its initial
stages is not necessarily representative of all sectors of the Muslim community, in terms
of gender, race and class. Given the stated goals of the network, it therefore becomes
imperative that it attempts to recruit as widely as possible from within the Muslim
community, to become truly representative of all voices.423
iii) Muslim Personal Law
One of the most intensely debated issues within both the Muslim community as well
as the broader legal fraternity has been the possible implementation of Muslim Personal
Law (MPL) as part of institutionalized customary law that would only apply to members
of the Muslim community. This law would be based on compliancy and implementation
422 SAMNET Conceptual Discussion Document, April 2008, I - 2.
423 Virtually all of the members of the steering committee are of Indian Muslim background. This
observation is not intended as a criticism of the initiative, rather it signals concern around how to best
achieve the vision and mission as articulated by the network.
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according to Shariah (Islamic) Law. In effect this would mean the establishment of
Shariah courts or similar institutions that would hear \~ases related to common personal
law issues such as marriages, divorce and inheritance. MPL has become highly
politicized, with Durban's Muslims central to many of the debates around this as yet
unresolved matter.
In May 2000, a discussion paper produced by the South African Law Commission,
titled "Issue Paper 15: Islamic Marriages and Related Matters" was put out into the public
domain for discussion.424 This was essentially a legal paper examining the merits of
recognizing Muslim marriages, in accordance with Shariah Law. It comprised a set of
proposals that requested public participation and responses regarding the feasibility of
introducing a Bill that would legislate the functioning of matters related to marriages
contracted under traditional Islamic custom (Nikah). The motivation was essentially to
provide benefits for Muslims (especially female spouses and their children) that many
were denied where Islamic law was applied on a de facto basis. The two main proposals
were that couples contemplating marriage should have the right to choose a marital
system (MPL or secular law) that was compatible with their religious beliefs and with the
Constitution, and that such legislation could provide for both new and existing
marriages.425
The most contentious issues were polygamous marriages and divorce, where there
were differences between Islamic and secular law. After considering various responses, a
second discussion paper (Discussion Paper 101: Islamic Marriages and Related Matters)
was circulated for further comment in December 2001.426 After intense consultation and
debate, a report was presented by the Law Commission to Justice Minister Penuell
Maduna in July 2003.427 The report proposed a set ofrecommendations for a statute to be
effected into law that would legislate all matters relating to Islamic marriages and related
424 See SA Law Commission, 2000, Issue Paper No 15, http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/ip15.pdf . The
issue paper is available in full.
425 SA Law Commission, 2000, Issue Paper No 15, V.
426 See SA Law Commission, 2001, Discussion Paper 101
http://wwwserver.Iaw.wits.ac.za/salc/discussn/dpl 0 I.pdf.
427 See SA Law Commission Report, 2003, http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/pr59report.pdf.
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issues such as divorce, marital support and maintenance, ehild custody, and so on. The
report, popularly known as the Draft Bill on Islamic Marriages, is yet to be ratified
because of the high number of emotive and complex responses to it. Durban-based
lawyers and academics like Saber Jazhbay and Suleman Dangor, were central players in
some of these debates. The engagement around this draft bill exposed major fault lines
within the Muslim community.
Engagement around Muslim Personal Law is of critical import as regards the Muslim
community's relationship with the state post-1994. It was clearly evident throughout the
process that the state took the religious beliefs of its Muslim citizens seriously given that
the courts were being faced with cases that had arisen largely as a result of disputes
emerging out of agreements or marriages contracted according to Islamic Law, which
was technically not recognized by the South African judicial system. A case considered a
precedent was Amod & Another v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund, in which
the court gave legal recognition to a Muslim marriage for purposes of the duty of
support.428 Customary practice cannot be ignored in a diverse society like South Africa.
Debates around MPL paralleled those around customary practices within traditional
African communities that contracted marriages according to specific cultural rituals,
which while not religious per se, had a similar rationale in their execution. What is
interesting about MPL is that Muslims, can choose to marry under secular or Muslim
Personal Law. Clearly, there can be no legal compunction on Muslim women to force
compliance with MPL though social pressures may exist.
Muslims remain deeply divided over MPL. The ulema consider it too liberal, while
women's rights groups feel that it gives too much leeway to men. However, this debate
illustrated some fundamental principles related to the new democratic dispensation,
particularly within the context of participation by Muslims. It suggested that freedom of
religious belief needs to be protected through state institutional support in the form of
legislation, that freedom of expression means that choices offered to citizens must allow
them to follow either their own religio-cultural system or a secular legal system, and that
428 SA Law Commission, 2000, vi.
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where an issue concerned conservative elements directly, they were prepared to
participate in the political process.
iv) The Anti-Terrorism Bill
After 9111, many governments across the globe came under increased pressure,
some applied by the United States, to introduce extra anti-terrorism legislation as part of a
global "war on terror". The South African government introduced a draft Anti-Terrorism
Bill in September 2002. Many human rights organizations such as the Freedom of
Expression Institute initially opposed the bill arguing that it would significantly curtail
civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution. Government showed little sign of relenting.
Detractors of the bill next sought to change technical aspects of the draft text of the bill.
Muslims in particular would have preferred the bill to be completely abandoned as
opposed to being revised.
Given that similar anti-terror legislation had been used elsewhere to detain
Muslims without charging them or allowing them a trial, even subjecting some to torture
in prison, South African Muslims were extremely nervous about the bill as it had been
originally introduced. Muslims, instead of hoping that the bill would go away, sought to
organize as part of a national lobby that made presentations to parliamentary committees
regarding their objections. A key argument was that the state already had 22 pieces of
legislation to deal with terrorism.429
Muslim representation constituted the involvement of a number of Muslim
organizations, both religious and professional bodies who provided resources and
capacity to engage with the bill. These included the Islamic Medical Association (lMA),
Jamiatul Ulama (KZN), Muslim Judicial Council, Muslim Youth Movement (MYM),
Association of Muslim Accountants and Lawyers (AMAL), Al Ansaar Foundation, South
African National Zakaah Fund (SANZAF), Islamic Dawah Movement (IDM), Red
Crescent Society of South Africa, and Media Review Network (MRN). Engagement was
429 Written Submission made by Saber Jhazbhay, a human rights lawyer based in Durban, and COSATU.
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primarily driven by the perception that Muslim South Africans would be first in line as
"targets", given their involvement and support for resistance struggles and movements
throughout the Muslim world, which could be construed as support of terrorist
organizations. The secretariat for organizing a comprehensive Muslim community
response to the proposed bill was based in Durban under the auspices of the Association
of Muslim Accountants and Lawyers (AMAL), which provided its offices and logistical
infrastructure to ensure a well coordinated infrastructure. Their 2003 submission to
President Thabo Mbeki noted:
Our government should be the first to OPPOSE a bill of this type because it
goes against everything that the freedom struggle stood for. If the liberation
movements, during the apartheid days, were judged today under this bill all
would be condemned as terrorist organizations. If the ATB is passed here,
no South African will be able to support in ANY way ANY of the liberation
struggles presently being waged in many parts of the world. This is hugely
ironical because virtually the entire world supported the South African
freedom struggle. We are told that the ATB is needed here in order to deal
with groups like Pagad and the Boeremag. Both these groups have been
apprehended without the bill. It took good police work, not new laws to
achieve this. However, we must emphasize that if measures are
contemplated to tighten up domestic security we will certainly be supportive
of such moves provided they don't infringe on civil liberties. 430
It is significant that while the Muslim community's input was powerful, the
submissions made by other sectors of civil society, particularly trade unions such as
COSATU, was arguably the crucial factor that forced the government to revisit aspects of
the bill. While a revised bill, taking into account COSATU's concerns, was eventually
passed in November 2004, this foray by the Durban (and national) Muslim community
into organised lobbying and participation over a national issue, albeit one that was of
430 This was part ofa letter submitted to President Mbeki, in November 2003, authored by Mr. A. Dawjee, a
media personality based in Durban and written on behalf of the signatories.
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direct concern to Muslims, marked an important political shift in a post-apat1heid
context,431 Even though the issue was largely based along group interest, it reflected the
fact that Muslims were willing to seek a political voice on matters of concern to their
broader interests, and were prepared to make this voice heard through civic structures.
The challenge, ofcourse, is to extend that participation into other aspects of life.
v) International Solidarity Campaigns
From around 2000 there was renewed interest within Muslim civil society, but
also segments of the public at large, in political solidarity with international campaigns,
initially in the Middle East region but subsequently within the Muslim world in general.
The breaking out of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 was in many ways
the catalyst for sustained involvement by Muslims, albeit by a small number of Muslims
working in conjunction with broader based civil society. The events of 11 September,
200 I, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its
coalition partners led to increased anger among Muslims locally, resulting in protests,
marches and demonstrations. An Anti-war Coalition movement was launched, with the
most intense activity concentrated in three main urban areas, viz, Johannesburg, Cape
Town and Durban.
What was intriguing about the engagement of Muslim activists around these
issues was that they were essentially divided into two discrete camps, a conservative
element motivated primarily by religious factors, and including the religious leadership,
and progressive liberal minded activists whose activism, while partly inspired by their
faith, was not bound by constraining religious injunctions issued by the religious
leadership around how the campaigns should be conducted. An example of religious
conservatism in Durban was a declaration by the Muslim clergy that men and women
were to march separately during one of the public marches organized by groups such as
431 1. Buccus and L. Nadvi, "Resisting the Anti-Terrorism Bill : The role of Civil Society in Legislative
Refonn," Critical Dialogue 2, no 1 (2006), 18-23.
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People Against War and the Palestine Support Committee in 2003. 432 This meant in effect
that non-Muslim activists who wanted to participate would be forced to protest separately
or accept gender segregation. The intervention of more liberal Muslim activists led to a
choice being offered to men and women to either march separately or together. Most
Muslim women, it should be noted, chose to march in a women's only section.
These dynamics were clearly indicative of a community struggling to define the
nature of its engagement with international solidarity campaigns. While many Muslims
were arguing for constructive engagement with the state regarding its foreign policy
stance on the Middle East, some religious leaders advocated for the recruitment of
Muslims to engage in military campaigns against the occupation armies of the United
States. They also criticized individual activists for not being "Muslim" enough in terms
of how they conducted their activism.433 These kinds of tensions detracted from building
a unified coalition with broad based civil society in some instances, to take on the issues
at a national level.
There were, however, various forms of activism that galvanized Muslims broadly
into committing acts of solidarity that were recognized by the state as immensely
courageous and worthy of national accolades. In early 2003, a group of 32 Muslims from
across the country left South Africa to go to Iraq as human shields, and monitor and
document the initial bombing campaign launched against Iraq by the United States
government and its allies. This group was co-ordinated by a Durban based media activist,
Abie Dawjee. While they performed an important task by providing first hand accounts
of the bombings and its impact on ordinary Iraqis to media agencies back home, they
were eventually pressured to return by families concerned about their safety, as they were
432 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 273.
433 Very often the mosque pulpits became a space where the Imams of the mosque would in their sermons,
refer to the ongoing war in Afghanistan and Iraq and argue for the necessity of SA Muslims becoming
involved in various ways such as sending money to the region or even considering going to fight in the
wars. Also, in the wake of an op-ed article entitled, Enemies ofthe faith (M&G, 6-12 August 2004) written
by the author of this thesis"which ran in both the Mail and Guardian and AI-Qalam Newspapers, a heated
public debate erupted around what was appropriate Muslim behaviour and response to these ongoing issues
affecting Muslims in the Middle East. I became the subject of severe criticism for daring to argue that
random militant approaches (such as the beheading of innocent civilians) to dealing with these issues was
not the only route to follow, and was criticised for "not being Muslim enough.".
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clearly not in a position to stop the war. They returned to South Africa to a hero's
welcome from the community and acknowledgem~nt by the South African
government.434
Political pressure was placed on the South African government, by a broad based
coalition of activists which included a significant number of Muslims, in the form of
petitions and memoranda that demanded that the government cease trade agreements with
countries engaging in activities that broke international law. This was considered by
many across the spectrum necessary to force the government into complying with
measures that would ultimately make a powerful political statement. In addition, as a
result of ongoing lobbying and advocacy around international solidarity, parliament
engaged in a debate on the issue of its foreign policy towards Israel. The South African
government was one of a handful of governments that delivered a presentation against the
Security Wall being built by Israel, in support of an International Court of Justice ruling
which had declared the wall illegal.435
It is significant that despite heightened emotional sentiments by local Muslims
towards the United States and its allies, there have been no major incidences of political
violence or terrorism directed at foreign embassies or public facilities to express anger.
The exception has been those of isolated armed attacks by a fringe militant group in the
Western Cape called People Against Gangterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in the late
1990s.436 This group pre-dated 9/11 and is now dormant and no longer active. The only
major terrorist attack in post-apartheid South Africa was the work of right wing Afrikaner
nationalists who attacked railway lines and mosques in Soweto in 2002 as an expression
of dissent against the government.437 The relatively peaceful approach of Muslims is
significant in light of more militant engagement by Muslim groups elsewhere. It affirms
434 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 274.
435 See the text version of the SA Government's submission on the Apartheid Wall to the rCl, at;
http://212.153.43 .18/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement 26 RepublicofSouthAfrica
&M.
436 See S. Jeppie, "Introduction," in Drugs, Gangs and People's Power : Exploring the Pagad
Phenomenon, eds. R. Galant and F. Gamaldien (Cape Town: Claremont Main Road Masjid, 1996).
437 See B. Phillips, "Blast on South African Bridge," BBC Online, November 28,2002
http://newswww.bbc.net.ukl1Ihi/world/africal2522579.stm.
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the idea that South African Muslims have opted to exercise primarily civic modes of
public protest and dissent.
It is important to note that the broader South African solidarity movement, that has
historically been rallying around causes such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and
which has a significant Muslim membership, continues with its work in various ways in
the contemporary context. Organisations such as the Palestine Solidarity Committee and
the Anti-War Coalition continue to mobilize nationally and organize events that advance
these various political struggles.438 Significant campaigns marking forty years of the
occupation of the Palestinian territories (2007) and sixty years since the creation of Israel
(2008), as well as the five year anniversary of the Iraq war (2008) have been observed,
where both SA Muslims and the broader national activist fraternity have participated.
However the involvement by Muslims has been limited.
vi) Foreign Policy Engagement
The focus of South Africa's foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the 1994
elections, and under the guidance of Nelson Mandela's presidency, was a commitment to
advance and protect human rights.439 Roland Henwood points out that the early foreign
policy agenda after April 1994 was representative of the perspective of the Government
of National Unity (GNU), with the ANC having greater influence on foreign policy after
the exit of the National Party from the GNU, and despite the continued presence of the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).44o Henwood further argues that in the initial stages there
was a strong link between the Reconstruction and Development programme (ROP) and
the foreign policy agenda in light of a broader identification by the GNU of its
438 See the online sites ofthese groups, AWC, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AWC-SA/ , PSC
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/psc-sa/.
439 R. Henwood, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems, " in Fairy Godmother,
Hegemon or Partner: In search ofa South African Foreign Policy, ed. H. Solomon, 6.(Pretoria : ISS
Monograph Series 13, 1997).
440 Henwood.,"Sonth Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems", 6.
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responsibilities to its domestic economic context as well as the regional Southern African
I·· I 44\po Itlca context.
It could be argued that the new South African government was defining a foreign
policy agenda literally from scratch. Mandela's stature was in many ways the stabilizing
factor in creating deeper ties with the rest of the world, as has been argued by many
analysts, and this is also clearly evident in the formal diplomatic relationships that the
"new" South Africa opted to pursue with nations that were deemed "problematic" by the
United States, such as Cuba, Libya, Iran, Syria and China.442 This points to the very clear
political position that South Africa was adopting from the beginning, which was to act in
its own interests, and not be influenced by the US, which was no doubt keeping a very
close eye on developments in this fledgling democracy. It was also Mandela's way of
acknowledging the political support that these nations had provided to the ANC and the
broader anti-apartheid movement during the most difficult years of its struggle against the
former racist regime. The establishment of relationships with Muslim nations such as Iran
and Libya was arguably the stimulus for nascent interaction between the country's
Muslims and the government's foreign policy agenda.
During the early years of democratic rule, Muslims were beginning to adjust to a
transitional mode on two levels. They were, in the first instance, seeking to contextualize
their own role within the new South Africa, and, secondly, trying to come to terms with
the high levels of diversity within their own ranks. This heterogeneity meant that they
could not speak with a single voice.443 This latter dimension has since been the cause of
divisions largely due to sectarian disputes, theological differences, as well as differing
political views between conservative sectors of the community and a growing group of
moderates and progressive thinkers.444 In addition, while there had been a whole sector of
441 Henwood. "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems", 8.
442 Henwood, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems", 12 - 14.
443 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 252 - 286.
444 There are a number of theological councils, including the Muslim Judicial Council, The Iamiatul Ulama
(Johannesburg and Durban) and the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, that are tasked with offering religious advice to
the broader Muslim community on a number of levels. While they often agree on a number of theological
questions, there are also differing sets of advice offered on a single issue, a recent example being whether
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Muslims active in the anti-apartheid struggle, and indeed very central to many of its
campaigns, the post-apartheid context raised a number of questions around the political
role of Muslims in this new dispensation, both at domestic as well as foreign policy level.
Given also that some quarters of the religious leadership within South Africa had
objected to Muslims participating in national political life, during the anti-apartheid
struggle, and the fact that religious political parties had done very poorly in the election,
a debate began among Muslims as to how they should participate within a predominantly
secular political system that guaranteed rights to all, including those of a homosexual
orientation, and permitted liquor and gambling, all of these aspects of the South African
constitution being an anathema to Muslims in genera1.445
This debate was not necessarily centralized nor was it controlled by anyone faction
or grouping within the community, and was scattered across various sectors. Some of it
occurred within intellectual and academic circles, while other aspects such as the NGO
and dawah sectors formulated strategies to create greater awareness of the Islamic faith
through outreach and charity work.446 In the first GNU, there was a reliance by Muslim
citizens on Muslim members of parliament (MPs) to take care of "Muslim" interests.447
However, there was soon a realization that these MPs were not primarily advancing a
religious agenda but were focused on secular party political concerns. They toed the party
political line and were not able to do much to influence policy processes. This raised
questions as to where Muslim allegiance as a faith-based citizenry lay, and what options
they could develop to take their collective interests forward within civil society circles in
relation to a predominantly secular government.
the Sunday Times newspaper should be boycotted or not for running controversial cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammed.
445 See A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town: VCT
Press, 1995), 125, 154. Given that the Muslim Youth Movement was one of the driving forces behind
advocating for political participation by Muslims, in the fight against apartheid, it became the target for
attacks, particularly by the Deobandi ulema fraternity.
446 A number of prominent intellectuals such as Ebrahim Moosa, Abdulkader Tayob and Farid Esack were
engaging in academic work advancing both a general Islamic scholarship as well as contributing to the
debates on Muslim identity in South Africa, while NGOs and Dawah agencies like the WCI and IDM in
Durban were increasing their outreach activities to try and increase conversions to Islam.
447 There wa<; an assumption in the Muslim public discourse that MPs such as Kader Asmal, Dullah Omar
and others would ensure that the "Muslim" voice would be heard in parliament.
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The Mandela (1994-98) years were a period of transition on many levels.
Internationally, South Africa was seeking a foothold within the international community
as the newest member of the democratic family of nations.448 Domestically, South
Africans, including Muslims, were coming to terms with the country's racial past, within
the context of national processes such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC), and the move from the RDP to a new macro economic policy, viz Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Muslim influence on foreign policy making
from 1994 to 1999 was minimal, almost negligible, apart from occasional interactions
between community leadership (religious and civic) and government figures on broader
issues relating to overlapping domestic / foreign matters such as the Ha}} (pilgrimage)
period, which required occasional diplomatic intervention between the South African and
Saudi authorities to secure South African travelers' interests to the region.449
Given also the influx of immigrants from Muslim countries such as Pakistan and
Bangladesh to South Africa for economic opportunities, there was an increasing focus on
dealing with the occasionally illegal status of some of these immigrants. This raised
minimal debate among Muslims and it was left to the Department of Home Affairs and
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to resolve. However, the growing Muslim
immigrant population, both from within Africa and externally, is not only a challenge for
the government, but this injection of new Muslims is changing the Muslim demographic
and will become a broader issue for South African Muslims to address more
comprehensively in coming years, particularly over issues of resources, marriage, and so
on.
The election of Thabo Mbeki in 1999 ushered a new era of governance marked by
a clear shift in both economic and foreign policy prescriptions, with the South African
government coming to play a greater role in global affairs.45o South Africa was beginning
to solidify its diplomatic ties with many more nations in the world, in particular the
448 See Lodge, Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki.
449 This usually meant liasing with the Saudi embassy in South Africa around visa concerns.
450 See M. Gevisser, The Dream Deferred: Thabo Mbeki.(Johanesburg : Jonathan Ball, 2007) and W.M.
Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battlefor the Soul ofthe ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007),
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Middle East and the broader Muslim world, which in many ways created greater impetus
for Muslims to become more involved in foreign policy issues.
The more urgent task for Muslims, however, was to craft a cogent political agenda
and vision, given their minority status. The experiment of getting Muslim political parties
to contest elections having failed, as did reliance of Muslim MPs, there remained a need
to identify a clearer political role by creating a structure that could operate both within
and outside the parameters of government. In other words it became clear to many
Muslims that a strong independent lobby group had to be created to lobby or exert
pressure on government around issues affecting Muslims. To this end, a conference was
hosted in 1999, by a Durban-based organization Vision 2020 / 1440, whose stated
purpose was to encourage Muslims to be an "integral part of and contribute to the
development of the nation as a whole".451 Out of this and other processes emerged the
beginnings of a more concerted effort by some Muslims to become involved in both
domestic and foreign policy matters. Vision 2020 set up pennanent offices to act as a
conduit for engagement between Muslims, government and other stakeholders.
Organizations like the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) and Islamic Propagation
Centre International (IPCI) continued to promote the Islamic faith within the broader
community through a variety of socio-political, cultural and educational programs, which
were both faith based as well as outreach oriented. The challenge of articulating a vision
that would capture the imagination of all South African Muslims, given their diverse
positions, was difficult, and remains unresolved. Debates continue over acceptable modes
of political engagement within a secular society. While Muslim Vision has tried to create
a space for Muslims to craft a collective response to ongoing national issues, especially as
regards politics, it has not necessarily been able to mobilize a broader sector of the
community (with some exceptions). The reasons for this are varied, and complex.
Clearly these tasks remain a challenge, which perhaps newly emerging groups like
SAMNET can begin to address.
451 See Conference Proceedings, Vision 2020, Durban, 1999,2.
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The impetus for Muslims to play a greater role in foreign policy affairs arguably
began in 2000 with the second Palestinian lntifada. This, as pointed out, re-energized
Muslim protest as well as that of the broader political left movement to revisit solidarity
initiatives with Palestine. The 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in
Durban intensified mobilization around Palestine, given that many sectors of the
conference were arguing that Israel was a racist apartheid state.452 The NGO segment of
the conference became the platform for an organic process of organizing a number of
protest actions, including a march against racism both generally as well as the plight of
Palestinians specifically. This protest action became one of the largest marches in the
history of the city, and included massive participation from Muslims.453 Within the
formal segment of the conference, the South African government faced considerable local
and international pressure to take a firmer stance towards Israel. Some of this pressure
came from South African Muslim delegates at the conference who were already long
term veterans of the anti-apartheid struggle, as well as a variety of other NGO
representatives. In some ways this was part of the burgeoning culture of engagement with
government structures by the Muslim activist fraternity, around issues of foreign policy,
particularly South Africa's relationship with Israel and its support for Palestine.454
WCAR had barely ended when one of the most momentous political events of the
current century, the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, took place. Many
commentators have argued that this marked a shift in attitude and treatment of the global
Muslim community, which has since become the focus of much world attention.455 South
African Muslims are no exception. After the United States invaded Afghanistan in late
2001, Muslims in South Africa were galvanized into action in protest. While it did not
452 See also M. Bishara, Palestine / Israel: Peace or Apartheid.( London: Zed Books, 2002).
453 This march was held in August 2001, and was organised by a coalition of Durban based organisations
and individuals, which included the religious leadership, academics, civic bodies and social movement
formations. The march was led by anti-apartheid stalwarts such as Fathima Meer and Dennis Brotus.
454 The author of this article was a delegate at the conference and is able to provide first hand accounts of
the proceedings.
455 Intellectuals such as Tariq Ali, Mahmood Mamdani together with journalists such as John Pilger have all
commented extensively on how there has been a shift in the way that Muslims are being viewed in the
international community. See T. Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms : Crusades, Jihads and Modernity
(London: Verso, 2002); M. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004) and J.
Pilger, Freedom Next Time (London: Bantam Press, 2006).
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have many political leaders amongst its ranks, it was arguably the Muslim activist
fraternity that initially provided the political direction for much of the strategic vision
during the campaigning and protest action. This eventually led to the emergence of the
religious leadership, with Imams of mosques and seminary teachers (Alims and
Maulanas) stepping in, perhaps to assume some control over how Muslims should
respond, given that they were expected to provide guidance in all respects of the faith. 456
Critics have argued that religious leadership which is not schooled in the
methodology of political engagement and international relations should not be providing
strategic guidance to a vulnerable faith-based community, who is itself not generally au
fait with matters relating to international politics, however there are heated debates
around this.457
Some of the criticism arises out of the observation that mosque spaces were
during these early days of the US invasion of Muslim states such as Afghanistan, often
being used by fiery religious clerics to mobilize for a military jihad, and to encourage
ordinary community members to engage in military training to fight against the US army
as part of their religious duty.458 This was happening in mosques across the globe and
signalled growing anger at what was unfolding in Afghanistan and subsequently in other
Muslim countries. While this sort of mobilising did not necessarily take place actively in
South African mosque spaces, there were certainly discussions around these issues. Of
course the concern here is, that apart from the moral questions this raises, clearly there
are legal implications that present themselves if South African nationals, however pious
456 In Durban for example, the Imam of the West Street Mosque, Maulana Essa, took a leading role in the
protest activities.
457 Islamic scholars such as Ziauddin Sardar have written extensively on the failings within the global
Muslim community, in particular the religious leadership to be able to articulate clear political strategies for
a way forward. See Z. Sardar, Islamic Futures: The Shape ofIdeas to Come.(London : Mansell Publishing
Ltd, 1985). Some of these debates have also taken place on online discussion sites such as the SA based
Political Islam list. http://groups.yahoo.comlgroup/politicalislam.
458 Debates in various public spaces were engaging with the call by some lmams to take a more active role
in the militant campaigns in the Middle East.
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and well intentioned, start engaging in mercenary activities outside the framework of the
government's official position and indeed political mandatc.459
The 2003 US led invasion of Iraq triggered global opposition as unprecedented
numbers of protestors came out in their millions on the streets of major cities in protest.
South Africa's major urban centers also saw many Muslims and non-Muslims, come out
in significantly large numbers to protest, although this was nowhere near that of the
figures in the United States and Europe. Activists and religious leaders combined to
mobilize Muslims and the broader South African community. Letters of protest and
petitions were sent by a range of groupings within South Africa to both the government
as well as to the US Embassy and its consulates. The South African government's
position was that it would not be part of the "Coalition of the Willing" which US
president George W Bush was trying to create across the globe to join both this war and
the Global War Against Terror (GWAT). The decision by the SA government not to join
the Iraq war was considered by the majority of South Africans as the principled position
to take and they applauded the government for its stance.
Another aspect of GWAT which was raising the ire of South African Muslims
was the policy of "extraordinary renditions" employed by the United States government
to effectively outsource interrogation and torture of abducted suspects of terrorist
activities to third parties.46o Muslims formally questioned the complicity of the South
African government in this practice through government channels and the media. One
particular case that caught the public headlines was the government's role in the apparent
extraordinary rendition of Pakistani national Khalid Rashid, who was resident in Estcourt
459 The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed
Conflict Act, 2006 (Act No. 27, 2006) was, after a considerable delay, assented to and signed by President
Thabo Mbeki on 12 November 2007. The intent of the Act is to prohibit mercenary activity, to regulate the
provision of assistance or service of a military or military-related nature in a country of armed conflict, to
regulate the enlistment of South African citizens or permanent residents in other armed forces, and to
regulate the provision of humanitarian aid in a country of armed conflict. It provides for extra-territorial
jurisdiction for the courts of the Republic with regards to certain offences and it provide for penalties for
offences related to the Act.
http://www.iss.co.zalindex.php?link id=5&slink id=5421&link type=12&slink type=12&tmpl id=3.
460 See D. Strumpf and N. Dawes, "Khalid Rashid: Govt's cover is blown," .Mail and Guardian. June 9,
2006. http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=274024&area=/insight/insight national!.
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when he was arrested and handed over to Pakistani authorities in 2005, disappeared for
two years, and resurfaced in a Pakistani court in 2007, where he was cleared of all
charges.461 The practice of renditions has been widely condemned in the international
community as inhuman and against international law. There has been a similarly intense
condemnation of the high security facility run by the US government at Guantanamo
Bay. This issue remains an ongoing focus for lobbying by South African Muslims who
have been demanding answers of their government around this most controversial of
practices.462 Unfortunately, some South African Muslims have become victims of the
United States' increased monitoring of foreign nationals entering its territory, as have
Muslim nationals from other countries. Even well respected academics are not immune
from having faced the now notorious deportation or interrogation by US officials. An
example here is that of a prominent SA Muslim academic, Adam Habib, who in 2006,
was deported back to South Africa, from the US. Although being on official business
representing his research based organization, the Human Sciences Research Council, he
was still considered a threat to US Security.463
South African Muslims, it may be argued, have become increasingly more
politically conscientised and acclimatized to global concerns; however, their focus has
arguably remained on Muslim regions such as the Middle East, Kashmir and Chechnya.
While many other parts of the world competed for attention, such as the conflict in the
DRC, the continuing repression in Myanmar and Chinese occupation of Tibet, these
concerns have not really featured actively within the political radar of the Muslim
community. This may be a result of ignorance of other conflicts, but more likely reflects a
461 D. Strumpf and N. Dawes, "Khalid Rashid: Govt's cover is blown," Mail and Guardian. June 9, 2006.
http://www.mg.co.za/articIePage.aspx?articIeid=:274024&area=/insight/insight national! and J. Naran,
"Has Rashid disappeared again?," JOL Online, July 8, 2007,
.http://www.iol.co.za/index.phpset id=1&cIick id=15&art id=vn20070708094504945C663650.
462 At a meeting ofMuslim civil society leaders in 2006, addressed by ANC MP Essop Pahad, academics
such as Prof. Suleman Dangor engaged Mr. Pahad around the question of the South African government's
involvement in extra-ordinary renditions. The response to these questions resulted in the government
setting up a series of meetings with Muslim leaders and themselves to alleviate any concerns amongst SA
Muslims, that the SA government supported such activities.
463 See SAPA, "US embassy probing SA academic's deportation," JOL Online, October 25, 2006,
http://www.iol.co.za/?art id=gwl161766982976B224.
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preference for their activism and lobbying In regions where primarily Muslims are
affected.
This tendency to concentrate on Muslim regiOns of conflict may serve to
advantage certain foreign policy questions which Muslims were continuously lobbying
government on. As pointed out, in 2004, South Africa was one of the few governments to
deliver an argument against the 'Apartheid / Security Wall' at the International Court of
Justice at the Hague. The court's ruling that the wall was illegal according to international
law was considered a victory within global and South African Palestinian solidarity
circles. However contradictions have emerged in the government's foreign policy on
Palestine over the past few years which has led to increased lobbying by South African
Muslims and the broader Palestine solidarity movement.464 The first discrepancy was
government encouragement of South African - Israeli businesses ties. This policy
initiative was announced not long after the moral high ground that the government had
won with its position on the wall. To this end trade and political delegations from Israel
visited South Africa and vice versa.465
This sparked strong protests among the broader SA Palestine solidarity
movement, expressed primarily through discussions and debates held within the
movement and through engagement with government, and created greater impetus among
Muslims to engage in direct discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with an
urgent demand for South Africa to cut off all diplomatic and trade ties with Israel,
through both formal lobbying and popular protests and demonstrations.466 This was met
with a flat refusal by the government which argued that it wanted to keep channels of
communication open between South Africa, Israel and Palestine in an effort to continue
464 Much ofthis mobilizing has been taking place through the national Palestine solidarity movement, and
its discussion list: psc-sa@yahoogroups.com.
465 In 2004, Ehud Olmert, the then Israeli Minister for Trade led a business delegation to South Africa to
explore bilateral trade relations, between the 2 countries. The following year South Africa took a trade
delegation to Israel. See http://www.zionism-israel.com/israel newsI2007/05Ironnie-kasrils-Ieads-south-
african.html and M. Kransdorff and S. Magid, "Why Jewish S. African minister forms friendships with
Israel's enemies," May 30, 2007, lmP;L/www.ynetnews.comlarticies/0.7340.L-3405940.00.html.
466 The movement space consists of activists, both Muslim and non-Muslim who are concerned about the
Palestinian issue.
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dialogue.467 The 2006 war between Israel and the Lebanese-based Hezbollah once again
brought into sharp focus the campaign by South Africans, in particular Muslims, to insist
on the ending ofdiplomatic ties between South Africa and Israel. The campaign has taken
on new sustenance through intensifying its call for a boycott, sanctions and divestment
strategy to be implemented against Israel, which is currently being implemented.468
Other issues too continue to anger and mobilize local Muslims. They include the
publication of derogatory cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in a Danish newspaper,
replicated in some South African papers; comments about Islam considered controversial
by Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg in Germany in September 2006;
questions raised by British politician Jack Straw around the wearing of the veil by
Muslim women; and the recent arrest of a British teacher in Sudan for naming a
classroom teddy bear Muhammed.469 While these issues do not relate directly to foreign
policy engagement strategies, they are nevertheless significant because each in their own
way caused a reaction among Muslims globally in response to international events and
merit a brief discussion.
In South Africa, and especially in urban centers such as Durban, the cartoons
sparked protest marches attended primarily by Muslims. The participation of Muslims,
we should note, far outnumbered their attendance at protest marches against the Iraq war
or invasion of Afghanistan. Also of note is that certain sectors of the Muslim community
467 The fonner Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, has often been quoted in the press,
expressing this sentiment.
468 The various branches of the Palestine Solidarity Coalition in South Africa, as well as the SA Anti-war
coalition has through its various networks, been advocating for an ongoing consumer boycott ofIsraeli and
even US products.
469 The Sunday Times and Mail and Guardian came under severe attack for wanting to publish selected
cartoons from the original Danish paper Jyl/ands-Posten in 2006. See "Cartoon Row: Sunday Times
Gagged," Mail and Guardian Online, February 4, 2006,
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=263325&area=/breaking news/breaking news national/.
Pope Benedict's comments were seen as controversial as they alluded to the idea that Islam was somehow a
violent religion, spread through the sword; See
http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news syndication/article 060916pope.shtml for his original speech and
comments. British MP Jack Straw's comments on the question of whether Muslim women should wear the
veil particularly in Britain, while engaging in civic consultations with local government officials caused a
huge uproar globally, "Straw's veil Comments spark anger," BBC Online, October 5,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/54I0472.stm. See also "Teddy bear' teacher leaves Sudan after
pardon," MSNBC, December 3, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22076390/.
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called for the boycotting of Danish products as well as the South African newspapers that
had published some of the cartoons.470 This call was not consistent in that some religious
authorities called for the boycott of the Sunday Times while others did not.471 The Pope's
comments about Islam and its history, and British MP, Jack Straw's views on the wearing
of the veil by Muslim women, were received with varying levels of rage, but this soon
settled into an exasperated acceptance among most Muslims that such comments would
continue to be made, and that not much could be done apart from engaging in a popular
discourse around these issues through the print and electronic media.472
South African Muslims' engagement around political issues since the inception of
a non-racial democratic regime has been very selective. As alluded to in this chapter,
much of the focus, domestic and foreign, has been on issues directly relating to Muslims.
As regards foreign policy, it has become clear that international questions that do not rest
on immediate South African Muslim concerns, such as political repression in China or
Zimbabwe, do not really feature widely in Muslim popular discourse, either in relation to
community discussions or more broad questions of international relations. Muslim
participation has largely focused on Muslim regions; however, this involvement has not
been consistent nor without contradictions. For example, the Darfur region in Sudan is
home to a significant Muslim population and is experiencing an enormous humanitarian
catastrophe, mostly at the hands of fellow Sudanese Muslims.473 However, this issue has
rarely been discussed within Muslim circles apart from the occasional op-ed article or
letter to the press by Muslims who are aware of the gravity of the situation. It is clearly
not seen as deserving of a major protest action in the same way that tensions in the
Middle East have generated mass public sympathy and anger among South African
Muslims. This tendency amongst Muslims to align themselves with regions where fellow
470 The Mail and Guardian published one cartoon, which led to fierce criticism of the paper's editor Ferial
Haffejee.
47\ The KZN branch of the lamiatul Ulema was advocating the continued boycott of the Sunday Times,
however the Gauteng branch ofthe same organization lifted the boycott, after consultations with the
paper's editors.
472 Some of this debate was taking place on the SA based online discussion list, Political Islam,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicalislam.
473 See M. Mamdani, "The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,".London Review of
Books 29, no. 5 (2007) http://www.lrb.co.ukiv29/n05/mamdOl.html.
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believers are facing challenges, is however not necessarily a phenomenon that is unique
to this community, and therefore must be seen in perspective. For example the struggles
going on in Sri Lanka, are of concern to the South African Tamil community, and people
of Jewish ancestry are similarly concerned about Israel, and so on.
South African Muslims are a minority community of around two percent of the
national population and cannot be expected to focus on every single national and
international issue. But there is arguably an almost insular approach in dealing with
broader political questions and relegating to the margins what is not directly related to
Muslims. It could be argued that Muslims are part of a still burgeoning democratic
dispensation that is just over a decade old, and have yet to develop a rigorous political
culture of engagement. Awareness of issues connected to the Muslim world suggests
however that Muslims can be aware when they want to, and are deliberately ignoring
more general questions of global security and welfare.
The failure to engage with the Darfur issue arguably also points to race, In
addition to religion, as a crucial determining factor in the choices that Muslims make.
Several of the "progressive" individuals interviewed for the study, argued that if
community survival and self-preservation were goals of Muslim South Africans, as one
may presume they are, then it is imperative for Muslims to become more involved in
engaging government on both global and indeed domestic affairs in a more holistic and
comprehensive manner. This would translate then, into setting up some kind of formal
lobbying space, where Muslims have a direct relationship with the South African state,
and will be heard on matters both of concern to them, as well as those issues that affect
broader society (as opposed to the somewhat informal engagement that currently takes
place via various other formations).
What has, however, come to occupy the South African Muslim community's
attention far more in the contemporary period is the broader debate around whether
Muslims globally are becoming the target for a generalized attack from Western
imperialist domination that implies greater persecution of Muslims, even beyond what
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they may be experiencing currently. If this trend becomes more entrenched than it
currently is, this is arguably signaling a very worrying trend, namely, that instead of
expending energies in creating structurally viable modes of engagement with
government, the primary mode then becomes a knee-jerk reactionary one, and does not
'd . bl I . 474proVI e sustama ea tematlves.
Muslims must by all means remain engaged around questions that affect their
wellbeing and security. However the kind of siege mentality that has become
characteristic of Muslim spaces for some time now, is exactly what needs to be avoided.
A holistic framework for engagement must be accompanied by an acknowledgement, that
while Muslims are under attack at certain levels (and this is evident through various
Islamophobic tendencies in some spaces), Muslims cannot afford to abandon their
broader responsibilities as citizens and members of society. While in the South African
context, they constitute less than 2% of the national population, this is a community that
has demonstrated its ability to make a significant impact in certain areas, and it needs to
continue harnessing this potential to benefit society more broadly.
An overvIew of the foreign policy issues that South African Muslims have
engaged their government on, reveals that the most significant areas have been the crises
in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The most successful engagement has
arguably been around the issue of Palestine, which has led to greater government focus
on this region, including parliamentary debates as well as bilateral meetings and
initiatives.475 Here too, the jury is out because Muslims will consider success as nothing
short of the actual severing of political and economic ties with Israel or a mutually
acceptable political solution on Israel/Palestine.
It could be argued that the South African government's focus on Palestine and the
Middle East region in general has remained relatively consistent, largely because of
474 The group SAMNET has pointed to this phenomenon of reactionary responses, amongst Muslims in its
discussion document.
475 Palestine is a very personal issue for many Muslims globally, because of its links to Islam's third holiest
site, the AI Aqsa mosque. It is particularly significant for SA Muslims, because of the links that have been
drawn between apartheid in South Africa and the current situation in Palestine.
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lobbying pressure (both formal and informal) by Muslims. Despite some advances around
foreign policy engagement, South African Muslims have a long way to go in terms of
developing more nuanced mechanisms and approaches for liaising with government,
which remain largely informal. Muslims have arguably not yet fully developed the
capacity and skills to have formal lobbies to engage with government on a regular basis.
While engagement does take place between "Muslim" interest groups (like the religious
councils) and the government, this still needs to be developed into a proper political
lobbying structure. A process of deeper reflection and introspection to ascertain how this
could best be achieved is of paramount importance. What is significant to note however,
is that as a result of various internal differences among Muslims (which is not, as has
already been established, a homogenous community), there are certain areas of
engagement, which have proven to be far more successful than others. For example the
failure of the resolution of the Muslim Personal Law issue, is a reflection of the deeply
divergent views of the community, whereas on the question of Palestine / Iraq, etc, the
community tends to speak with a broadly unified voice, despite differing views on how to
respond on certain issues.476
Regardless of their minority status, they have nevertheless evolved into a
powerful social and indeed political force which, if organized in a more structured way,
could make greater input into national issues. The nature of this community's
engagement with the South African state and broader political issues, as articulated in this
chapter, has served to illustrate that such engagement is effectively taking place. Strong
identification with the faith of Islam tends to inform most political and social activity.
Indeed even the state has acknowledged the important role that faith plays in communal
life in Muslim society, through its deliberation on Muslim Personal Law.
Despite the clear separation between religion and state in South Africa, religion
clearly still plays a very significant role in political life in the country. This is arguably
the case for not just Muslims, but for other faith groups as well, such as Christians, Jews
476 During the public marches in 2003 around Iraq for example, the religious leadership differed from more
progressive Muslims, on the issue of women marching separately.
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and Hindus amongst others. As many Muslims have articulated, they believe that they are
fortunate to be living in a country that is sympathetic to Muslims, one that has provided a
safe place for them to practice their religion without fear of prosecution and harassment.
Given this, it may be argued that South Africa is in many ways an ideal society for
Muslims to develop a stronger political identity, secure in the knowledge that both their
political and religious rights will be protected.
The following chapter will reflect on the implications of the findings of the
previous chapters for the future of South African Muslims, summarise these findings, and
articulate a way forward.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions - In pursuit of a way forward
Summary of Study and Broad Research Findings
This thesis has engaged the area of Political Islam, which has come under intense
scrutiny, particularly since the events of September 11, 2001. The focus on the global
Muslim World over the past decade (discussed in detail in Chapters One and Two) has
meant that the factors which shape and impact on how Muslims express themselves
politically, has become an important and, in many ways, a central aspect of contemporary
world politics.
While this study has conducted both a historical and political analysis of the key
research questions, it has focused far more rigorously on i) the political dynamics that
have been pivotal in fore-grounding the acts of political violence committed by Muslim
militants in various parts of the world in a contemporary context, resulting in the
emergence of "Militant" Islam; ii) engaging in debates over whether these acts are
appropriate and actually effective in achieving the desired and stated objectives of
militants; iii) analyzing global responses to these acts of militancy and the various
manifestations of Islamophobia; iv) exploring alternative civic approaches to dealing with
challenges faced within the Muslim world, such as "Progressive" Islam; v) conducting a
quantitative study of the viewpoints of South African Muslims and examining how they
have chosen to express themselves politically in a post-apartheid context; and vi)
establishing to what extent Progressive Islam is the preferred ideological space within
which South African Muslims are choosing to engage.
Chapter One laid the foundation for the conceptual and historical framework
within which Political Islam emerged as a discursive space of engagement, particularly in
response to the increase in Western focus on the Muslim world, greater interaction
between Islam and globalised society, as well as growing Islamophobic tendencies that
have become far more acute in their manifestation since the events of September 11,
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2001. What emerged as particularly significant in this discussion is the observation that
there is a tendency within western academic circles to document and discuss Islam as an
"anthropological" subject of study, which this thesis has argued is reminiscent of
Orientalist thought and practice, which first emerged in the aftermath of Western colonial
exploration and expansion several centuries ago.
A typical example of this "orientalising" of Islamic thought in a contemporary
context is Cheryl Benard's reduction of the complex global Muslim population into four
'types' "Fundamentalist", "Traditionalist", "Modernist", and "Secularist", with
suggestions on how the United States in particular and the West in general, should relate
to each. To reiterate the discussion in chapter one, Fundamentalists, according to Benard,
reject democratic values and contemporary Western culture in pursuit of an authoritarian,
puritanical state that will implement their extreme view of Islamic law and morality;
Traditionalists want a "conservative" society and are suspicious of modernity, innovation,
and change; Modernists want the Islamic world to become part of global modernity, and
to this end want to reform Islam to bring it in line with the contemporary age in every
respect; finally, Secularists want the Islamic world to accept a division of church and
state in the manner of Western industrial democracies, with religion relegated to the
. h 477pnvate sp ere.
While this perspective may appear to some policy analysts and scholars
(especially in neo-conservative ideological circles in the United States) as extremely
useful and relevant in terms of how one should "manage" and "contain" the problematic
elements within the Muslim world, this thesis suggests that it is precisely this
"anthropological" approach within the non-Muslim world and an inability or refusal to
recognise Western complicity and culpability in creating "militant" and extremist pockets
within Islam, that continues to fuel the ongoing project of Militant Islam. Such
perspectives also ignore the vast majority of Muslims who occupy what some have
described as a "middle ground" between fundamentalist/secularist polarities, that is,
477 C. Benard, Civil Democratic Islam Partners, Resources, Strategies (Santa Monica The Rand
Corporation, 2003), x.
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Muslims, particularly in minority situations like South Africa, who are willing to engage
with civic mainstreams, while "drawing on traditional bonds of faith as well as modem
communicative action in creating social capital.,,478
One of the consequences of the European project of colonization and the
subsequent phenomena of globalization has been the emergence of particular ideological
trajectories amongst some Muslim groups who have adopted militancy as a way of
responding to the effects of ongoing exploitation and oppression, often drawing on
religious sources to justify the militant nature of their engagement.479 A. Sajoo reminds
us, for example, that the "persistent failure of the international community to attend to
issues of social and distributive justice, and of political self-determination (as in
Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir) will exacerbate the tendency to feed single /exclusionary
identities at the expense of civic ones." 480
It is important to point out though that the arguments in this thesis do not attempt
to attach a precise normative framework to whether Militant Islam is in fact an
appropriate and acceptable expression of Islamic thought. There is however
acknowledgement of the fact that militancy expressed by Muslims in certain contexts,
such as self-defense in cases of invasions and occupations of Muslim lands and
oppression of Muslim societies is deemed as most appropriate, in fact considered as
necessary to uphold values of human self-determination and preservation entrenched in
universal charters of human rightS.481 There is also a distinction drawn between various
forms of conservative expressions of Islamic thought which Olivier Roy refers to as neo-
fundamentalism, all of which do not necessarily always manifest as militancy, but do
nevertheless act as an ideological framework within which militant acts are condoned and
indeed encouraged.
478 A. B. Sajoo, "Reimagining the Civil: Pluralism and Its Discontents," in Muslim Modernities
Expressions ofthe Civil Imagination, ed. A.B. Sajoo, 211 (London: LB. Taurus, 2008).
479 See Ch 2.
480 Sajoo, "Reimagining the Civil", 225.
481 Prominent writers and journalists such as John Pilger have made the argument that contemporary forms
of imperialism and its effects have forced many to take up arms against western nations and powers. See J.
Pilger, Freedom Next Time (London: Bantam, 2006).
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The rise of militancy within global Islam was discussed in detail in Chapter One,
in relation to the growing emergence of a more recent ideological phenomenon within
Islam, viz, Progressive Islam. Some may argue that Progressive Islam is diametrically
opposed to Militant Islam in its ideological influences and forms of expression. This
thesis does not, however, attempt to make any such absolutist assertions. While many of
the proponents of Progressive Islam such as, Omid Safi, would argue that it is primarily
about "striving to realize a just and pluralistic society through a critical engagement with
Islam, a relentless pursuit of social justice, an emphasis on gender equality as a
foundation of human rights, and a vision of religious and ethnic pluralism", others argue
that Progressive Islam is not necessarily opposed to militant engagement, especially
where it involves anti-war agendas and a critique of western imperialist expansion.482 It is
here that there is something of a grey area with regard to whether one can actually class
militant expressions of Islam as being Progressive Islam or not. This thesis has not
sufficiently illustrated the differences in ideological thought and practice between
Militant and Progressive Islam to present them as distinct categories of thought, which
constitute the theoretical basis for the broader arguments presented in this study.
This thesis has also interrogated the ways in which political engagement by
Muslims has been shaped and impacted upon by religious ideology which, as argued
earlier, has particular genealogies and trajectories, arising out of the broader global
discourse of Political Islam.483 To this end this study has engaged in an investigation of
what the primary modes and methods of political engagement have been and whether
these have articulated themselves within the ideological framework of either "Militant
Islam" or "Progressive Islam." Chapter One defined Militant Islam as broadly referring to
(for the purposes of this thesis) those ideas and actions that emerged from the tradition of
the Islamic Brotherhood Movement (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) which gave rise to various
militant factions in the Middle East, such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine,
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Gama'af (or Jemmah) al-Islamiyya in Egypt, in the latter half
of the 20th century, but became a school of thought that evolved beyond the original
482 O. Safi, "What is Progressive Islam". ISIM Newsletter 48 (2003,13).
483 See Chapter One.
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Islamist conception of what the Brotherhood was meant to represent, as originally
articulated by its founding thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna (1906- 49) and Sayyid Qutb
(1906_1966).484
Our discussion also reflected on whether the idea of Militant Islam as it was
manifesting itself in a contemporary context through the method of political violence
being undertaken by militant groupings throughout the Muslim world, was indeed
reflective of what Olivier Roy calls "neo-fundamentalism", "a closed, scripturalist and
conservative view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension in favor of the
Ummah, based on Sharia." Chapter One argued that contemporary Militant Islam (as an
eventual offshoot of the Muslim brotherhood) is effectively a limiting and conservative
discourse, without providing the space for a sustainable and constructive agenda of
engagement and praxis. A distinction was drawn, however, between the armed liberation
struggles that are currently unfolding in regions such as Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
which are effectively under occupation and which many Muslims believe justify militant
strategies to achieve satisfactory political outcomes.
Progressive Islam, on the other hand, was defined for the purposes of this thesis as
that school of thought which had a particular origin rooted in the intellectual discourse of
Iranian scholars such as Suroosh Irfani and Ali Shariati (1933-1975) and earlier Islamic
scholars like Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-98) and lamal aI-Din AI-Afghani (1838-97).485
The ideas expressed by Khan, AI-Afghani and later by Irfani and Shariati have come to
be regarded as the inspiration for the evolution of a contemporary mode of thought within
Islam, referred to as Progressive Islam, which while also having several trajectories, has
come to broadly refer to an understanding of Islam, which is best encapsulated by the
following articulation;
Progressive Islam is that understanding of Islam and its sources that comes
from and is shaped within a commitment to transfonn society from an unjust
484 See Chapters One and Two ofthis thesis.
485 See Chapter One of this thesis.
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one where people are mere objects of exploitation by governments, socio-
economic institutions and unequal relations. The new society will be a just
one where people are the subjects of history, the shapers of their own destiny,
in the full awareness that all of humankind is in a state of returning to God
and that the universe was created as a sign of God's presence. 486
Diasporic Muslim communities of Europe, North America, and Australasia, as
well as Muslim minorities elsewhere, have witnessed the emergence of individuals and
organizations who are seeking to combine "particularist and universalist readings of the
texts", who are willing to accept "gender and minority inclusion", and who are committed
"to ethics beyond traditional rule-bound understandings." They are seeking to engage in
civic citizenship rather than embrace isolation.487 We will return to this point in the next
section.
Chapter Two engaged in a discussion around the emergence and development of
Orientalist thought, within the context of the encounter between Islam and the project of
Western colonial expansion. What is critical in this chapter is the argument that locates
the roots of the contemporary political violence manifesting itself as "Militant" Islam,
within the context of a resurgence of Orientalist thought and action, which is described in
Chapter Two as being not "just about prejudices; but also about relationships of power."
These relationships of power are articulated (amongst other means) through "modem
technologies of representation and with methods of research, collection, and presentation
of data, which constructed a particular body of knowledge that hegemonised the colonizer
and the colonized." Chapter Two emphasized that this particular form of "knowledge"
effectively produced Europe's Other, who according to the colonial/Orientalist model,
lacked "rationality, history, modernity, and the powers of self-transformation", qualities
that made up the European.488
486 From the Progressive Muslim Network website http://www.progressivemuslims.com/index2html.
487 Sajoo, "Reimagining the Civil", 211.
488 See V. Kaiwar and S. Mazumdar, "Race, Orient, Nation in the Time-Space of Modernity," in
Antinomies ofmodernity : Essays on Race, Orient, Nation (London: Duke University Press, 2003), 270.
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It is this very European notion of the "other", best described in the writings of
philosophers such as Jean Paul Sartre, as a "construction" of "slave" and "master", that
the Orientalist paradigm has arguably relied on, to pursue an ideological, political and
socio-economic domination of those societies located within the "Orient", as elaborated
upon by Said and Sardar, in their analysis of the thought and practice of orientalism.489
We are witnessing the reemergence of what Edward Said described as the problem of
"discourses of power, ideological fictions - mind-forg'd manacles - too easily made,
applied and guarded.,,49o
Through documenting the history of the evolution ofIslamic thought and practice,
and the ways in which Islam has responded to external dynamics, such as its encounter
with the west, Chapter Two highlighted the very real crises that has emerged as a result of
this encounter and the subsequent manner in which the project of the expansion of
western "empire", has impacted on the relationship between Islam and a latter day
Orientalist agenda. This crisis is effectively the context within which contemporary
militancy within Islam finds a home, and is further fuelled by the kind of discourses
espoused by Cheryl Benard, Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, among others.491
Chapter Two also focused on the emergence of Islamic studies in the South African
context, by briefly looking at the key authors and thinkers who have recorded and written
about Islam in South Africa, both in a historical and contemporary context. They include
the likes of Achmat Davids, Farid Esack, Ebrahim Moosa, Shamil Jeppie, Abdulkader
Tayob, and Mahomed Haron whose works serve as the theoretical and historical
framework within which the empirical study of South African Muslims and how they are
engaging politically in a post-apartheid context, unfolds.
489 See I.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Translated by H.E. Barnes (London: Routledge, 1958, 2003);E
Said, Orientalism and Z. Sardar, Orientalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999).
490 E. Said, Orientalism. (London: Penguin, 1978),328.
491 See also S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1996) and B. Lewis, The Political Language ofIslam (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1991); B. Lewis, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response
(London: Phoenix Books, 2004).
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Chapter Three constitutes a critical part of the study as it records the history of the
political development of South African Muslims, largely from a post World War Two
context, a period which coincided with critical developments in the broader global
Muslim world, such as the creation of the state ofIsrael on historical Palestine (1948), the
evolution of oil politics in the Middle East (especially in the 1970s), the Iranian
revolution (1979), and the Afghani resistance against Russian occupation (1980s), all of
which were shaping and impacting on Muslim thinking across the globe, and also
impacted to a significant degree on the emergence of militant and progress expressions of
Islam.
These historical events are documented in Chapters One and Two; however the
links between them and the South African Muslim responses are more clearly articulated
in Chapter Three. What is of particular significance in this chapter is a deeper reflection
of the project of Islamic resurgence, which arguably had a profound effect on the
formation of what this thesis will refer to as progressive Islamic spaces and organizations
in South Africa, beginning with the Muslim Youth Movement in the 1970s and including
latter-day organizations such as Taking Islam to the People (TIP).492
Resurgence ideas may have, according to critics, had an impact to some degree,
on the emergence of overtly Islamic militant groups such as People Against Gangsterism
and Drugs (PAGAD), in terms of shaping the visible "Muslim" identity of the group.
However, this notion was contested by Shamil Jeppie who linked the group's emergence
to drugs and gang wars in the Cape. At the same time there is nothing that suggests that
the resurgence movement has inspired or is inspiring a broadly rabid militant ideology
within the South African Muslim space.493 Chapter Three does allude though to the
492 See A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town:
University of Cape Town Press, 1995) and Chapter Three for a more detailed understanding of the Islamic
resurgence phenomenon.
493 Chapter Five speaks briefly about the emergence ofPAGAD as a militant group, based in the Cape Flats
from 1996 onwards. However the lifespan ofPAGAD was very short and the organisation was effectively
neutralised by 2000. See G. Vahed and S. Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in Post-Apartheid
South Africa," in State of the Nation: South Africa, 2004 - 2005, ed. J. Daniel and others (Cape Town:
HSRC Press, 2005).
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resurgence movement having had some impact on the emergence of groups such as Qibla
and Call of Islam in the 1980s, which were oriented to a more radical praxis, as compared
to the agenda of the MYM.
While there was brief discussioil about the ideological contestation taking place
within the Muslim religious leadership fraternity in Chapter Three, this debate was not
fully explored there, as it is re-articulated in Chapters Four and Five as a central question
in terms of how it is that various trajectories of religious ideology (such as the four main
Sunni schools of thought) shape and impact on political engagement. The question of the
role of Islamic theology and philosophy (as alluded to in Chapter One), is one that is
conceptualized as being central to understanding whether any, much or most of the
political engagement by South African Muslims is shaped primarily by religious thought
and practice, which in turn frames the broad ideological categories of Militant Islam and
Progressive Islam.
Chapter Four provided the empirical component of this study (largely qualitative),
which examined the views of key participants and subjects of the study sample that were
identified as being central to the project of political engagement in post-apartheid South
Africa. Ten central questions were posed to the interviewees, which attempted to
interrogate in particular the state of political participation by South African Muslims and
more broadly the ways in which this participation is shaped by a range of factors such as
the various madhabs within the Sunni tradition, as well as whether participation was
ideologically motivated by militant or progressive trends. The overall results of the
qualitative study point to five very specific things;
1. There is a crisis within the contemporary global Muslim community, largely
because of religious ideological differences, between the various schools of
thought (madhabs), traditions (eg. Deobandi, Barelwi, etc) and ideological
approaches (militant vs progressive);
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11. There is a lack of political engagement by South African Muslims, especially
around social issues such as service delivery, poverty and HIV Aids, but there was
acknowledgment that there are pockets / spaces in the Muslim community where
this engagement is taking place, such as Gift of the Givers, WAMY and MYM;
111. There is a lack of adequate "qualified" leadership within the South African
Muslim community to guide Muslims on political questions;
IV. There is no overt militancy within the South African Muslim community;
v. There is a preference to engage within the paradigm of progressive expressions of
Islam, through civic participation and political engagement, among many
Muslims.
These five broad conclusions thus represent the core findings of the empirical
(qualitative) component of this study. They cannot be seen in isolation from the
discussion in Chapter Five which, through the use of archival material, documents areas
where there has actually been political engagement by Muslims since 1994. Chapter Five
categorised this involvement in six broad areas, viz,:
i) Political Campaigning and Participation in Elections
ii) Social Activism and the Emergence ofNew Progressive Forces
iii) Muslim Personal Law
iv) The Anti-Terrorism Bill
v) International Solidarity Campaigns
vi) Foreign Policy Engagement
What is striking about these six areas of involvement is that in examining the
nature and frequency of engagement, it becomes clear that Muslims have opted to
participate in political issues where they are directly affected as a community; there is a
religious dynamic; there is frustration in pockets, with old ways of thinking and a desire
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for change in the local context and / or where there is identification with the plight of
Muslims elsewhere in the world. What is also significant to note is that the participation,
where it happens, is broadly articulated within the framework of the state's provisions for
religious participation as well as the various civic / civil society structures that cater to the
needs ofthe community.
This then foregrounds the broad ideological trend that appears to be dominant
within the South African context, viz, Muslims are generally willing to engage within a
civic framework which, while making space for more radical and conservative religious
expressions, is one which is broadly progressive in the manner articulated by the earlier
definitions of Progressive Islam prQvided in Chapter One. While the nature and substance
of the participation may often fall short of the precise definition of Progressive Islam, as
articulated by Farid Esack and others as being "the struggle for justice - or praxis - rather
than the arenas of critical thinking for its own sake.....", it is clear that the broader
paradigm of participation is inclined towards attempting to embrace justice and plurality,
two of the hallmarks of progressive expressions of Islam.494
It is also important to make the point that those Muslims who do not participate in
politics, are usually not inclined towards either a progressive or militant approach; they
simply prefer to focus on religious and spiritual aspects of the Islamic faith. The Tablighi
Jamaat in South Africa is one such group in the local context. It has not been discussed in
any detail in this dissertation simply because of its broader absence from the political
arena.495 In this regard, this thesis disagrees with the assertion of Benard et a1. that that
494 F. Esack, "In Search of Progressive Islam beyond 9/11," in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender
and Pluralism, ed. O. Safi 80 (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003). This is cited from the declaration of
an online discussion list, called Network ofProgressive Muslims
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NPMuslims/?yguid=127854211.
495 See G. Vahed, who argues that the main purpose of the Tablighi Jamaat is to propagate Islam, according
to the Prophetic model, and aims to bring about transformation of society, without political mediation.
Tablighi's remain deliberately apolitical, as this allows them access into countries, without coming into
conflict with the authorities. G. Vahed, "Contesting Orthodoxy: The Tablighi - Sunni Conflict among
South African Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s," Journal ofMuslim Minority Affairs 23, no. 2 (2003), 319.
See also Z. McDonald, "Constructing a Conservative Identity: The Tabligh Jama'at in Johannesburg," in
Globalisation and New Identities: A View from the Middle, ed. P. Alexander and others (Johanesburg :
Jacana Media, 2006).
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the Tablighi Jamaat is only "outwardly benign ... violent anti-Western Islamic behaviour
is manifested ... by a sector of its adherents.,,496
There are however religious formations that have a primarily theological identity
and function, who have been engaging politics, albeit in a somewhat inconsistent and ad
hoc manner. These are the organized bodies of the Islamic religious leadership (ulema
bodies), in South Africa, who merit a brief detailed discussion here, although they do not
necessarily incline themselves to either an overtly progressive or militant approach to
political engagement. While this study concerns itself broadly with spaces where political
engagement is happening, and not theological engagement per se, which is the domain of
the ulema bodies, it is critical to locate the political engagement within the framework of
how the religious leadership are impacting on this participation. Brief references to this
influence by the ulema was made in Chapters Three, Four and Five; however it is
important to expand on this debate here, to some degree, before making
recommendations on the way forward.
Muslim Religious Leadership in South Mrica and Political Engagement: Brief
Overview
As mentioned in Chapter Four, attempts to interview members of the South
African Muslim religious leadership were not very successful, and with the exception of
one religious leader, there was no formal input into this study by this sector.497 In the
absence of this, archival material from the various formally constituted bodies
representing the religious leadership was perused and utilized to obtain a clearer picture
of their position. These organizations include a wide cross section of the Muslim
community such as Darnl Ihsan, Jamiat KZN, Jamiatul Ulama (or Jamiat SA), Majlisul
Ulama, Muslim Judicial Council and the Sunni Jamiat.
496 A. Rabasa, C. Benard, P. Chalk, C. C. Fair, T. W. Karasik, R. Lal, I. O. Lesser, D. E. Thaler, The
Muslim World after 9/11, Rand Foundation Report, 447.
497 One of the potential interviewees (Imam) contacted with regard to filling out the survey, argued in an e-
mail that, "It is my humble suggestion that the questionnaire be revisited as the three questions in section B
are extremely vague and ambiguous. The questions on political Islam, religious militancy and progressive
Islam could be addressed from many dimensions," (August 2006). However, an interview with lmam
Fuzail Sufi ofthe WestvilIe Soofie Mosque was conducted.
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Arguably the most prominent VOIces amongst the organized ulema bodies in
South Africa, with regard to political participation, are those of the Jamiatul Ulama (JU)
(Gauteng / National - formerly Transvaal), Jamiat KZN (KZN) and the Muslim Judicial
Council (Cape). They have the longest histories, and have effectively been more actively
involved around issues that required political guidance, such as participation in elections
and responding to international issues, such as Palestine, the Iraq War, and the Danish
. . h 498cartoon CrISIS amongst ot ers.
The Jamiat's also have a history of having engaged the nationalist government
around the question of the location of mosques during the apartheid era, when mosques
were under threat of demolition under the Group Areas Act, and successfully preventing
their demolition.499 The Gauteng Jamiat has also been involved in discussions around the
introduction of Muslim Personal Law (discussed in Chapter Five). While the key function
of the JU remains Islamic education and training, and imparting advice through the
issuing ofJatwahs, it has in recent times become more deeply involved in political issues.
It issues a regular online newsletter, which has become its most effective form of
disseminating information and commentary, mostly around religious matters, but also
political issues.50o Recent issues of the newsletter include commentary on the civil war in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the November 2008 presidential elections in the
United States, global financial meltdown and upsurge of Taliban resistance in
Afghanistan.501 While it is often the case that the newsletter focuses on foreign issues,
past issues have included discussions on political developments relating to South Africa.
This has included the economic policies of the ruling ANC party not benefiting the poor,
controversial comments by ANC Youth League President Julius Malema in support of
498 The MJC was fonned in 1945, Jamiatul Ulama in 1923 (http://www.jamiat.co.zalprofile/history.htm )
and the Jamiat KZN in 1955 (http://www.jamiat.org.zalhistory.html.).
499 See http://www.jamiat.co.zaIprofile/history.htm.
500 See http://www.jamiat.co.zalnewsletter/online newsletter.
501 See http://www.jamiat.co.zaInewsletter/onlinenewsletter0343.htm;
http://www.jamiat.co.zalnewsletter/online newsletter 0344.htm and
http://www.jamiat.co.zalnewsletter/onlinenewsletter0345.htm.
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Jacob Zuma, and the detention of two South African Muslims in Uganda In August
2008.502 The Jamiat also publishes a quarterly magazine called Ar-Rasheed.s03
Similarly, the Jamiat KZN has historically engaged the former nationalist
government around mosque locations in what was formerly Natal, and has in more recent
times been involved in debates around recognition of Muslim marriages and settling of
estates in the Islamic tradition, all issues pertaining to Muslim Personal Law.S04 Its
original mission was to set up a sustainable and flourishing madressah programme for the
province, which it oversees. The membership of the Jamiat KZN currently stands at
around 450 ulema.
The history of the Muslim (formerly Moslem) Judicial Council (MJC) has been
briefly discussed in Chapter Three.sos It is the most vocal voice of religious leaders in
the Cape region. An earlier observation records that when it was first established, it was
considered very conservative by the younger generation, who were later attracted to the
likes of youth organizations such as the MYM and MSA.s06 The aims and objectives of
the MJC, stated at the time of its founding, were to strengthen the spirit of unity
amongst the ulema and to help the Muslim community attain its spiritual, educational,
intellectual, moral, social, cultural and economic aspirations.s07
While the MJC was regarded as a politically conservative space, certain
individual members were exceptions. The likes of Imam Haron, Sheikh Nazeem
Mohamed and Sheikh Abubakr Najjar voiced their opinions against racial and
discriminatory legislation in the country. The MJC had affiliated itself to the United
Democratic Front (UDF) but had to withdraw because of criticism within the Muslim
502 See Newsletter Vo13, No 29 : http://www.jamiat.co.za/newsletter/onlinenewsletter0329.htm;
Newsletter Vol 3 No 31 : http://www.jamiat.co.za/newsletter/onlinenewsletter0331.htm; Newsletter Vol
3 No 34: http://www.jamiat.co.za/newsletter/onlinenewsletter0334.htm.
503 See http://www.jamiat.co.za/arrasheed/ar0308/arrasheedonline3.08.htm.
504 See http://www.jamiat.org.za/history.html.
505 See Chapter Three, 8.




community of the UDF, and its liberal supporters who they suspected of having Zionist
affiliations and leanings.508 During the countrywide upheavals in 1985, when the then
government ofP.W. Botha was forced to declare a state of emergency, and also during
the 1986 Crossroads crisis, the MJC played a leading role in providing the economic
and material assistance to the Black community at large. Sheikh Achmat Behardien and
Sheikh Ismail Ganief (Ranif) Edwards were among the founder members of the Muslim
Judicial Council.509
The MJC remains involved in political affairs. During 2008 for example, it
presented its findings on South African Muslim approaches and attitudes to politics at an
event hosted by the Institute for the Study of Current Islam. The MJC focused on the
strategies underlying its approach to political engagement in South Africa and South
Africa's constitutional democracy in light of Islamic legal principles.51O This workshop
was preceded by another entitled "South African Muslims and political involvement:
thinking in the long term." That workshop drew criticism from Professor Abdulkader
Tayob, Director of the Center for Contemporary Islam, who argued that the ulema
"themselves enjoy the fruits of the secular if they are wealthy enough. Or they mobilize
the secular aspirations of the downtrodden, in promise of a fabulous utopia called the
Islamic state. The secular is part of the religious and Muslim leadership lives on its fruits
and promises.,,511 This commentary has resulted in some deeper reflection around the
question of the role of Islam in what is very much a secular space, ie, politics, in various
subsequent discussions.
While the Jamiat (Gauteng), Jamiat KZN and MJC are seen to be more overtly






511 See http://www.ipsauniversitv.com/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=118:isci-to-host~
seminar-on-south-african-muslims-and-political-involvement-&catid=I:2008&Itemid=86 and A. Tayob's




Ulama and Darul Ihsaan, seem to be less so. Their focus revolves primarily around the
issuing of fatwahs, and responding to the various religious questions that Muslims pose
either through online websites or via e-mail or telephonically.512 The Majlisul Ulama is
considered particularly conservative and issues a regular newspaper called the Majlis,
which has been critical of "modemity" and modern modes of thought.513
What is intriguing, however, in a more recent context, is that some of the
historically more conservative religious bodies, such as Darul Ihsan, have been sending
out e-mails to its mailing list encouraging Muslims to register to vote for the 2009
national elections.514 In addition, religious leaders speaking at the Eid-ul-Fitr prayers in
October 2008, at some of the best attended sites, like Orient School in Durban and the
MJC Hall in Overport, which together catered for around 10,000 worshippers, urged
Muslims to register and vote, and without recommending any parties or candidates,
implored them to vote for candidates who will address the needs of the poor. Muslims
were also urged to participate in society generally. As the Maulana at Orient explained,
by spending all their time in worship within the confines of a mosque, Muslims will not
have an impact on the wider society. But they can have a great effect by upholding
"Islamic values" and interacting with non-Muslims in a range of settings.515 This is a
fairly radical departure in the outlook of these ulema. Recently, Mufti Ebrahim Desai of
the Daml Iftaa Madrassah In'aamiyyah was asked whether Muslims can vote, given that
Shaikh Awlakhi of Yemen ruled that it was haraam (forbidden) for Muslims to vote in a
non-Muslim state. Maulana A. Yahya and Mufti Desai, responded in the following
manner;
We have read the comments made by Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki and do not
concur with [his] approach. Firstly, all the arguments the Shaikh has raised
are based on the rationale that our participation in voting is a tacit acceptance
on our behalf to play by the rules of the democratic system. This rationale is
512 See the Majlisul Ulama site, http://www.inkofscholars.com/inkofscholars.php?file=muilis/mu about.php
and Darul Ihsan http://www.darulihsan.com/.
513 See http://themajlis.net/index.html.
514 E-mail correspondence.6November2008.Registertovote.Darullhsanenews@darulihsan.com.
515 These lectures are available on eDs in audio format.
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incorrect, as we have clarified in our former response that if we go by this
rationale, then our living in the country and paying of taxes to the government
will also mean that we support the evils of the country. Hence, we will be left
with no option but to leave the country for another country that does not
incorporate such evils. However, if we do not accept this rationale and justify
our staying in the country, then we will have to abide by their existing
system. Secondly, once we have opted to reside in the country, then we would
rather vote for such members that will advance our views and help the course
of Islam and minimize harm on ourselves. If we opt not to vote, then we are
in fact benefiting the party we do not wish to be elected. For example, if 2
million Muslims were to vote for party A, but were discouraged to do so; then
party A would lose out 2 million votes which would benefit party B, who
would otherwise be lagging by 2 million votes. Hence, by voting we are
actually selecting a party that would be less harmful to Islam; and by not
voting we are giving preference to the party that would be more detrimental
to Islam. Moreover, what we have mentioned is also in accordance with the
principle of Islam which states that if we are faced with a situation in which
we have to choose from one of the two evils, then we should choose the lesser
evil. 516
It becomes clear from these statements that despite whatever their motivations
may be, these conservative spaces within the SA Muslim community are beginning to
slowly realize the necessity of political engagement in a contemporary context. The
question that this raises is whether there has been a major ideological shift in the thinking
of the conservative religious leadership, in the post-apartheid period, whereas there was
previously something of a historical reluctance (albeit contextualized within an apartheid
history) to be involved in mainstream politics. It would appear that the shifts are
becoming more clearly evident over the past year to eighteen months. While the
significance of the Muslim religious leadership becoming more politically active requires
516 A. Yahya, (Student, Darul Iftaa) and Mufti Ebrahim Desai."Ruling on Voting and the Current
comments from Sh. Anwar Awlaki," (Darul Iftaa, Camperdown : November 19,2008).
192
further study to fully understand the broader ramifications of these developments, it
would appear cursorily, that this is related to recent developments such as the post-
election violence in Kenya, ongoing turmoil in Zimbabwe, xenophobic violence against
African migrants and refugees in March 2008, perceptions that crime and violence are
spiraling out of control in South Africa, and especially the recall of Thabo Mbeki by the
ANC. The growing influence of the Jacob Zuma faction within the ANC, and the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and Communist Party of South
Africa (CPSA) have, from observation and informal discussions, shaken many Muslims
out of their comfort zones and is forcing them to reconsider the country's future and their
own wellbeing. This is certainly a change from the past decade or more when many
Muslims (in South Africa and elsewhere) constituted what Turner has referred to as an
"enclave society." 517
The participation by religious leaders in mainstream politics has not necessarily
always been under the auspices on an organized ulema body. There are examples such as
Maulana Rafiq Shah who joined the Democratic Alliance (DA), albeit under a cloud of
controversy, as the DA was at the time considered as being sympathetic to the plight of
Israel, and was considered very unpopular amongst Muslims, especially under the former
party leader Tony Leon. Maulana Shah was subjected to huge criticism for his decision to
join the DA, and was even shunned in some quarters especially by his former
organization the MYM, for his decision.518 The criticisms have however lessened over
the years, especially since the party leadership was taken over by Relen Zille, who is not
regarded as demonstrating overt support for Israel. There is also the example of religious
leader Ismail Vadi, who through the ANC, has represented Muslim interests in
parliament. As these two examples illustrate, religious leaders have voiced Muslim
concerns in the national structures, quite apart from the formal ulema bodies.
517 "The call to return to a primary identity represents the creation of spiritual enclaves," writes Turner.
"This enclave allows the believer to follow dress, dietary and sexual codes without secular interference."
See B. S. Turner, "Revivalism and the Enclave Society," in Muslim Modernities. Expressions of the civil
Imagination, ed. A. B. Sajoo, 156 (London: LB. Taurus. 2008).
S18 Maulana Shah was interviewed on various radio stations, such as AI-Ansaar and interrogated for his
decision to join the DA.
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It is important to stress that this thesis has not focused on religious leaders as a
specific category, but rather considered the ulema as one component of the broader
sample of Muslim South Africans engaging in the political realm. Nevertheless it
becomes obvious as one examines this community, that religious factors play an integral
role in shaping and impacting on the actions of large numbers of Muslims, be it the
influence of religious leadership or religious ideologies that manifest in various ways, and
their perspective is consequently, very important.
Concluding Remarks - Charting A Way Forward
This study asked a number of questions, which can basically be summarized into
two specific areas of enquiry:
i) What is Progressive Islam and Militant Islam and how do they manifest
themselves within the arena of Political Islam?
ii) How are South African Muslims expressing themselves politically? Are
the majority inclined towards either progressive or militant expressions of
Islam?
The previous section summarized the key findings of both the qualitative study and
the analysis of the archival documentation, which pointed to five specific conclusions.
This final section of the thesis reflects on these broad findings and charts a way forward.
It is important to emphasise that while this thesis has attempted to focus on Islam as a
central ideological framework which grounds and locates the political participation of
most South African Muslims, it has not explored in any detail the tendencies among those
who opt to participate in a secular manner, without using Islam as a frame of reference.
This study limited itself, for precise research purposes, to very specific questions, which
produced a specific set of conclusions, as outlined above. However the secular dynamics
within this community, which cursorily seems small, remains a largely unexplored
question, which merits further study and is certainly an area that this researcher will
undertake for further interrogation. There is no doubt that some Muslims do not
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necessarily wish to foreground their "Muslimness" when participating in the public
domain and it would be valuable to establish the nature and scope of this section of the
Muslim demographic, in post-apartheid South Africa.
Conclusion 1: There is a crisis within the contemporary global Muslim community,
and it is in part due to religious ideological differences between the various schools of
thought (madhabs), traditions (eg. Deobandi, Barelwi, etc) and ideological approaches
(militant vs progressive)
This conclusion seems to affirm much of the scholarship on political Islam which
has been perused and examined for the purposes of this study.519 While it reflects the
view that the crisis exists at a global level, it is also present in particular ways in localized
contexts. In the South African context, the crisis among Muslims seems to be located
largely around the fact that there are serious theological differences among Muslims, as
well as traditions and political leanings, which often results in no clear strategies being
available from an Islamic perspective, as to how to respond to political issues that are
unique to the national context. All religions have these divisions, and differences per se
do not equate to a crisis. In fact, it may even be argued that without division it would be
difficult for a religion to respond to new conditions. Where would the impulse come
from?
In Christianity for example, there are stark and growing divisions between the old
traditional churches and new Pentecostal churches. In Islam, however, it may be argued
that the division has come to constitute a crisis because of broader issues like
Islamophobia and how these divisions get exploited by the United States, for example, as
well as the fact that Muslims are constantly judged as "Muslim" irrespective of their
positions on a range of issues. The need to present a coherent response becomes urgent
519 See in particular G. Kepel, Jihad.' The Trail ofPolitical Islam (London: IB Tauris, 2004), O. Roy, The
Failure ofPolitical Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996) and O. Ray, Globalised Islam.' The
Searchfor a New Ummah (London: Hurst and Company, 2004).
195
under these circumstances. While Chapter Five did reflect on the fact that there had been
evidence of systematic organizing around some of these issues such as the ATB, these
methodologies were not consistently applied throughout, as was evident in the lack of a
clear programme of action in terms of how to respond to the issue of electoral politics and
the government's complex foreign policy agenda.
It therefore becomes evident that a key area for South African Muslims to focus
on is to identify a clear strategy with regard to how they wish to address the broader
ideological crisis, as well as a methodology to deal with the lack of action plans for
responding to local issues and national political questions. Whether the ideological
differences will ever be resolved, remains an open question. The view of many of the
interviewees seemed to suggest that it would be better for Muslims to forge ahead with
political engagement despite theological differences. Given the differences among
Muslims there remains a mountain to climb, and a path strewn with minefields, but it is
one worth climbing.
The consensus among the interviewees seemed to be that Muslims could be
motivated by their faith to engage politics, and indeed are doing so in many instances, but
that they have to articulate a new way of doing things, one that dwells less on religious
differences, and focuses on the very real social issues facing all South Africans. This may
require setting up new formations to take such an agenda forward. The task will be
onerous given that how one gets involved in social issues is influenced by one's beliefs.
Ideology cannot simply be erased. Members will not give up on their ideological loyalties
and we can expect tension as the envisaged formation will not simply be a space
disembodied of social relations.
In the post-apartheid period, Muslims have pushed for many of their demands to
be recognized, such as permission to build mosques in formerly white areas, facilitate
travel for pilgrimage (Ha}}) to Makkah, build Islamic schools, provide Islamic finance,
and see to the needs of Muslim prisoners. This has contributed to an emerging sense of
Muslim identity, notwithstanding the differences. And in the performance of pilgrimage
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(Ha}}), the payment of zakaat, dietary prohibitions, and the rendering of five daily
prayers, the primacy of the ummah prevails.52o The lure of the ummah has a powerful
emotional pull.
The South African constitution allows for Muslim differences and requires others
to respect their rights (and those of others). Muslims have not been under pressure to
assimilate, as is the case in some Western countries where the assertion of Muslim
political agency has led to the emergence of exclusive (national/racist) nationalism on
the part of the majority populations and the questioning of the efficacy of
multiculturalism.521 One way forward, as pointed out, may be to constitute a body to
represent Muslims. It should be inclusive of the variety of Muslim perspectives.
Currently Muslims rely on a myriad of bodies or individual Imams for guidance on
various matters. The envisaged / proposed body should constitute a federation of Muslim
organizations and include persons from the religious fraternity as well as ordinary
persons from the professional and other leadership backgrounds adept at representing the
needs of the community and comfortable in operating in various state and civil society
structures. Working examples that come to mind include the Muslim Reference Group
(MRG) in Australia and Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).522 However, these
organizations are often forced to play the "game" according to the rules of their
respective governments and compromise their independent voice as they seek to show an
acceptable face of Islam in return for recognition. In the South African context, any
organization should be concerned about social redress and service delivery, and this may
require it to question the policies of the government of the day, and even be assertive and
confrontational in its approach.
Conclusion 2 : There is a lack ofpolitical engagement by South African Muslims,
especially around social issues, such as service delivery, poverty and HIV Aids (but
520 Sajoo, "Reimagining the Civil", 212.
521 T. Modood, "Muslims, equality and secularism," in Religion, Spirituality and the Social Sciences.
Challenging Marginalisation, eds. B. Spalek and A. Imtoul, 47 (Bristol: Polity Press, 2008).
522 See Modood, "Muslims, equality and secularism," 47-48, for a discussion of the MCB.
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there was acknowledgment that there are pockets / spaces in the Muslim community
where this engagement is taking place, such as WAMY and MYM)
In recent times, there appears to have been greater movement among Muslims to
try and develop a sustained program of action to address the arena of politics. While the
focus of most political engagement between 1994 and 1999 was primarily around
electoral politics and foreign policy issues, it would appear that the post-2000 phase has
brought about something of a shift in focus towards questions of social justice and
redress. 1999 saw the launch of Muslim Vision 1440 / 2020, which was meant to have
been a national lobbying / advocacy space for Muslims to respond to various issues such
as education, media, dawah, and politics. While the organization continues to exist, it has
faced various challenges in terms of sustainability and outreach, but continues to have a
presence, particularly in Durban.
Similarly, other organizations such as the MYM, Al-Ansaar Foundation, Awqaaf
South Africa, and WAMY continue to engage social and political questions through
various programmes, outreach facilities, seminars and conferences, all geared towards
creating spaces for engagement, debate, discussion and even critique. The question
though is whether these organizations represent a minority within the Muslim community
(given the perception that most Muslims are not engaging politically), or whether they are
actually reaching a broad spectrum of Muslims in order to draw in as many people as
possible to become politically aware and active. There are also groups such as the Islamic
Dawah Movement (IDM) and Islamic Medical Association of South Africa (IMA), which
have not been discussed in any great detail in this thesis, that have also gone beyond their
traditional areas of activity, viz. dawah and medical services, to engage politics at various
levels.523 This does indicate that Muslim organizations at least are engaging, even if the
broader public is not.
523 The IDM has a bookshop and information centre where a variety of literature is available on political
issues. Until recently (2008), it also published a newspaper called Africa Perspectives which focused
heavily on politics. The lMA has always been ready to assist Muslim advocacy groups in providing
medical services during political rallies and marches in support ofcauses such as Palestine and Iraq.
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The point has been made earlier in this chapter that there are sectors of the
Muslim community that do not participate actively in politics, such as the Tabligh
Jamaat, and do not feel compelled to do so. The question this raises then, is whether
political participation is something that Muslims generally feel is necessary I an integral
part of their identity as followers of the Islamic faith? While this thesis did not ask this
specific question, interviews with various individuals pointed to a desire for greater
Muslim involvement in politics as wen as civil society more broadly. The recent
pronouncement by Darul Ifta on Muslims and the vote, quoted earlier in this chapter,
points to tangible recognition that Muslims cannot remain aloof from political
participation.
Despite the apparent lack of active participation by Muslims more broadly, there
have been attempts in the past year to establish lobbying and networking groups to create
spaces wherein Muslims can engage. The Durban Central Islamic Forum (DCIF) and
South African Muslim Network (SAMNET) have been cited as two such bodies.524 Both
seem to represent newly emerging spaces where the project of a Muslim politics is being
re-energised and re-evaluated. The DCIF while being a local eThekwini based forum,
states that it wants to work for the greater good of all South Africans.525 Clearly it
recognizes the link between localized dynamics and the national space. While the project
has been driven by the Chief Whip of the ANC in KZN, Fawzia Peer, the DCIF has
clearly articulated its position as being one that does not support anyone political
party.526 Critics, however may see DCIF as a front for the ANC.
SAMNET also represents the newly evolving face of Muslim politics in recent
times in that it articulates very clearly what the problems are within the South African
Muslim community.527 In so doing, it is able to pin point exactly what the key gaps are in
terms of taking Muslims forward, not just in the arena of politics, but more broadly.
While these problems have been detailed to some degree in Chapter Five, it is useful to
524 See Chapter Five for more detailed discussion.
525 See DCrF Constitution, 3.
526 DCIF Constitution, 3.
527 See Chapter Five.
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reiterate at least a few here to underscore the point that there is an understanding and
recognition of the main issues. Some of the problems that the SAMNET discussion
document points to, include the following:
xiv) Fragmentation and lack of co-ordination of activities among Muslims;
xv) Muslims are REACTIVE rather than PROACTIVE;
xvi) Absence of volunteerism in the community;
xvii) Insufficient political representation;
xviii) Lack of political engagement with the "centres" of power;
xix) Lack ofempowerment and leadership within the community528
These problem areas (amongst others outlined by SAMNET) confirm the key findings
of this study as well as the sentiments expressed by many of the interviewees, and affirm
the importance of creating and entrenching a more pervasive culture of civic engagement
amongst Muslims, and indeed doing so within the framework of a Progressive Islam. It
may however be prudent to ask why it was considered necessary for Muslims for
participate at all in politics and civil society structures.
Social theorists like Comelius Castoriadis and Charles Taylor have utilized the
concept of the "social imaginary" to challenge deterministic structural theories of social
change.529 They argue that it is not only reason but also imagination that is important in
constructing the central social institutions and practices of society. As Sajoo points out,
both "stress the agency of ordinary men and women [in] shap[ing] a social imaginary and
its moral order. ... The imaginary is grounded in the ordinary, rather than belonging to
elites who create theory and doctrine.,,53o Imaginaries are consequently pluralist and it
would appear that interviewees in this study, felt that Muslims should contribute in
shaping the economic, popular sovereignty, and public sphere social imaginaries to
528 See Chapter Five, SAMNET Conceptual Discussion Document, April 2008, 1- 2.
529 See C. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution ofSociety (Boston: MIT University Press, 1987) and C.
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Duke University Press, 2004).
530 Sajoo, "Rcirnagining the Civil", 215.
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reflect some of their values and beliefs, even though they do not expect or advocate
implementation of shariah law.
Some of the interviewees also stressed that Islam places great emphasis on social
justice and that this is emphasized in numerous verses in the Quran and in the example of
the life of the Prophet. Islam implores Muslims to work towards establishing social
justice not only for Muslims but for non-Muslims as well. This means both engaging in
activities towards the attainment of social justice as well as keeping an eye on whether
the state is fulfilling its mandate. Eva Schubert cites Pericles, the fourth century Athenian
orator who said that "a man who takes no interest in politics does not mind his own
business but he has no business", to implore citizens to participate in public activities and
debates. Applying this to Muslims in South Africa, Schubert's point is that citizenship
gives them the rights to certain entitlements but it also places responsibilities on them.
Citizens must ensure that the state is protecting human rights and working for the social
good of its citizens through active engagement in civil society and vigilant perusal of the
actions of the state.53l Given both the obligations of citizenship in the modem world and
Islam's own call for Muslims to strive to achieve social justice, interviewees opined that
civic engagement was an important part of being Muslim.
The xenophobic attacks against foreign African migrants in March 2008, this study
would suggest, further underscores the need for Muslims to emerge from their "enclaves"
and participate in various civil society structures. On closer examination, it emerges that
there was an element of anti-Muslim sentiment in the attacks. To cite one example, the
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc) in the Western
Cape sent letters to Somali traders in Khayelitsha to leave their shops by 21 September
2008 or they would be subject to physical violence. Mandise Njoli, Nafcoc's Western
Cape secretary, said that Somali's "are Arabs and they're in our country illegally. Why
can't they be kept in refugee camps? The Somalis are Arabs and Muslims ...." Another
Nafcoc member, Sydwell Citwa, said that they had "done our research and we know that
531 See E, Schubert, "Modern Citizenship, Multiple Identities," in Muslim Modernities: Etpressions ofthe
Civil Imagination, ed. A. B. Sajoo (London: LB. Taurus Publishers, 2008).
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the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) is helping them be.::ause they're Muslim...." MJC
deputy chairperson Shaikh Achmat Sedick was foreed to issue a denial that they only
helped Muslims. He pointed out that they helped all "victims of xenophobic attacks....
We opened the mosques to everybody. The food parcels have gone to everybody."s32
Similar sentiments have been expressed in other p311S of the country as well and raise the
question of whether SA Muslims could become vulnerable to violence, in a context of
extreme poverty and inadequate service delivery.
Clearly, what is important in charting a way forward is to acknowledge that there
is a dearth of both participation and indeed leadership on political questions. However,
the picture is not entirely bleak and the following discussion will suggest possibilities for
generating and developing leadership to address the emerging challenges.
Conclusion 3 : There is a lack of adequate qualified leadership within the South
African Muslim community to guide Muslims on political questions
This is one of the most significant findings of the study, and it is arguably one of
the key areas that requires urgent attention in terms of strategic methodology that must be
developed to address the failures with regard to how Muslims are engaging politics.
Leadership within the Muslim community, not just locally, but internationally is usually
conceptualized as being religious leadership, that is, the ulema, because of their
understanding of Shariah and Fiqh matters. It is occasionally the case that the community
looks up to Muslim politicians (like Yusuf Bhamjee in KZN) to provide leadership on
certain issues or even academic scholars ofIslam, who are not aalims per se.
While these may be the traditional spaces from which leadership is sought, these
are not necessarily the most effective or ideal, as most religious leaders are often
unfamiliar with political forms of literacy, which would capacitate them to provide
532 P. Joubert, "Nafcoc calls for Somali purge," Mail&Guardian online, September 5, 2008,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-09-05-nafcoc-calls-for-somali-purge.
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adequate guidance to the ummah within the framework of contemporary international
relations. Many are also from an elite socio-economic gmup and in a position to live a
certain kind of life that may not be possible or in the best interests of the majority of
Muslims. What is actually required is the developmer.t of a generation of Muslim leaders
who are trained in the importance of political and civic participation from a young age, as
being central to their Muslim identity.533 Whether this training is imparted within the
madressah environment or within the regular secular curriculum is perhaps a pedagogical
question, but one that must be addressed in order to insure that the educational system
adequately meets this need.
Most of the Muslim political leadership that emerged in the pre and apartheid
period in South Africa, evolved in response to the harsh conditions on the ground, which
forged a Muslim politics of resistance, out of necessity.534 The post-apartheid period has
not necessarily provided the material conditions for Muslims to be involved in politics,
apart from those that have entered government structures, or transitioned into political life
after the demise of apartheid.535 Where Muslims are entering politics post 1994, such
involvement is often limited to electoral politics, such as the formation of Muslim parties
or joining existing parties. More recently there has been the emergence of Muslim
"activist" formations, which are attempting to take on both religious and political issues.
TIP has been cited as one such group. The challenge of training Muslims to respond to
political, economic and social issues, must, as this study stresses, be embraced with
conviction.
533 Ziauddin Sardar in Islamic Futures: The Shape ofIdeas to Come, 323, speaks about a new generation of
Muslim intellectuals who stand apart from the traditionalists and the modernists, and are a group of
Muslims that "are deeply committed to Islam and appreciative of Muslim history and tradition... He is
neither afraid of the West or Marx, nor does he regard them as a panacea for all ills. He is ready to see good
in other systems of thought and action, and even ready to borrow these ideas which he can synthesize
within the world view of Islam. But his main concern is to develop a contemporary, integrated Islamic
system ofthought and action that presents a genuine alternative to the dominant system."
534 See Chapter Three which details the conditions under which Muslim South Africans found themselves
drawn into politics; largely as a consequence of political oppression and social injustice.
535 People such as Kader Asmal, Vallie Moosa and the Pahad brothers are examples of Muslims who were
involved in the anti-apartheid struggle, and were given posts in government in a post-apartheid context.
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The question of Muslim leadership, especially political leadership, remains a
vexed one, and one way to address this is through actively investing in educational
programmes, or outreach schemes where political training is a core focal activity.
"Conclusion 2" above, alluded to the formation of a federal body, notwithstanding that it
will be difficult to accomplish. Not only will Muslims have to overcome differences of
personalities and interpretations of what constitutes "correct" beliefs and practices, there
is also little consensus over the place of Muslims in a minority situation, the relationship
between Islam and the state, and even whether contact between Muslims and non-
Muslims is permissible. Yet, as already pointed out, we can speak of Muslim identity
politics and there are occasions and issues when Muslims do come together. It is however
naIve to seek to bring everyone on board, and this must be accepted. Certain Muslim
organizations will not participate under any conditions. Under these circumstances, the
way forward would be to establish clear minimum principles and bring together those
who are willing to abide by these in order to achieve some form of hegemony.
Conclusion 4 : There is no overt militancy within the South African Muslim
community
While the study has shown that there are conservative spaces within the South
African Muslim public that are resistant to more liberal and constructive ways of
engaging with the broader political community, by no means can one argue that there is
any serious preference for militancy among South African Muslims in a post-apartheid
period. Apart from the brief period between 1996 and 2000, when PAGAD exerted a
reign of terror which was localized primarily in the Western Cape, there has been
minimal if any expression of overt militancy within the broader Muslim community.536
This is clearly an indication that the moderate forces of democratic transition and
pluralism have held sway over this minority community, as it evolved from being part of
an apartheid society to a post-apartheid one.
536 Vahed and Jeppie, "Multiple Communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa", 256 - 260.
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There has however been some controversy around whether there are still pockets
of militancy among South Africa's Muslims post PAGAD, which is important to
mention. Some of this controversy has revolved around arguments by University of
Pretoria academic Hussein Solomon who has come under fire in recent times for his
writings on what he claims are the existence of terrorist and extremist elements within the
South African Muslim community.537 In a paper delivered at the 7th International
Conference of the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (2007), Solomons was
quoted as saying that Muslim schools in South Africa were a breeding ground for
terrorism, and that the Muslim media was psychologically preparing local Muslims for
terrorism. 538 This resulted in considerable debate among South African Muslims around
the veracity of his statements; in fact the broader South African Muslim community
rejected the claims in totality.539
A Pretoria based advocacy group, Media Review Network, has been monitoring
the writings of Solomon (in addition to monitoring literature being produced from other
sources), and challenged the arguments that he was presenting by engaging him directly
as well as disseminating information within the Muslim community, regarding the
statements.540 In addition, an attorney acting on behalf of the Lajnatul Madaarisil
Islamiyyah (Association of Islamic Madressahs), Zehir Omar, instituted legal action
against Solomon and the University of Pretoria, and asked that he either retract the
statements or provide solid evidence of his claims.54 !
Solomon however argued in e-mail correspondence that he had provided sources
in his article to back up his statements, and made the power-point presentation of his
speech available for public distribution.542 The Media Review Network nevertheless felt
537 See a recent paper by H. Solmon, South Africa's Ambiguous Response to Terrorism. CIPS Electronic
Briefing paper 55 (Pretoria: CIPS, 2008).
538 Media Review Network E-mail entitled, Help Stop the Lies ofPro! Hussein Solomon, 24 April 2008
539 See J. Naran, "Muslims unite against claims by professor," Sunday Tribune, March 23, 2008.
540 See E-mail correspondence, I. Jassat, "Solomon's Truth Abuse Reveals Mushrooming Industry in the
Camp of Security Expertise, "25 March 2008.
541 1. Naran, "Muslims unite against claims by professor."
542 See the archives of discussions at the Political Islam online discussion list,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicalislam, where much of the debate around Prof. Solomon's debate
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that these sources were not credible, as they were seen to be advancing a neo-
conservative anti Muslim agenda.543 The legal case against Solomon demanded that the
University of Pretoria take action against him, however the University dealt with the
situation, by claiming that academics have the right to academic freedom, but asked that
there be far more rigorous attention to detail with regard to backing up statements with
concrete evidence, when making such arguments in future.
Brief mention has been made in Chapter Five of various incidences where South
African Muslims have been detained on suspicion of involvement with militancy and
terrorism, and have subsequently been released, as there was no solid evidence against
them.544 However, this dissertation argues that none of these instances make the case for
the presence of any kind of widespread and sustained militancy within the Muslim
community. In fact, the prevailing view is that the US led war on terrorism has been
responsible for much of the unnecessary detention of Muslims globally, who have often
turned out to be completely innocent. While there is considerable anger (seemingly
abating in recent years) at the high-handed approach of the US in its treatment of
Muslims and uneven attitude to foreign policy issues involving Muslim countries, anger
too at what is seen as Western cultural and economic imperialism, there are no signs of
any coordinated militancy against this perceived hostility. With certain exceptions
(Palestine being one), the local ulema have condemned things like suicide bombings and
random killing of civilians. Many have publicly rejected armedjihad and terrorist attacks,
however one chooses to define that term. Instead, their focus has largely been on personal
piety.
It may be argued that the attitude of the South African state has been important in
this respect. Whatever the allegations of the likes of Solomon, it is conspicuous that while
in many parts of the world Muslims are associated with terrorism and through their
unfolded. Many of the contributors to the debate rejected the arguments he was making, but asked to see
evidence that would back up the statements.
543 Media Review Network E-mail, Help Stop the Lies ofPro! Hussein Solomon.
544 See Chapter Five, where references have been made to the recent detention of two South African
Muslims in Uganda on suspicion of terrorism, and a South African academic, Prof. Adam Habib was
deported from the US back to South Africa in 2007.
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"barbaric" acts are seen to threaten the Enlightenment heritage of the West, this
negativity has been largely absent against South African Muslims in public discourse.
Further, while Muslims in many European countries, North America and even Australia,
are seen by other segments of the population as making unreasonable claims on the state,
the South African constitution has been flexible enough to accommodate the needs of
Muslims thus far. This is in spite of the fact that South Africa is largely a Christian
oriented country. This has been important in making Muslims feel that they have a stake
in the country as they are treated as equal and inclusive citizens.
Conclusion 5: There is a preference to engage within the paradigm of progressive
expressions ofIslam, through civic participation andpolitical engagement
The study has shown that in the sectors of the Muslim community where political
engagement is actually taking place it is peaceful, non-militant (perhaps occasionally
politically radical) and largely civic oriented.545 Even where there have been protest
actions, such as in the cases of solidarity rallies, or anti-war demonstrations, where one
may expect expressions of militancy, the participation of Muslims has been within the
confines of the law. In particular the engagement inclines towards the model of
Progressive Islam articulated by the likes of Esack, Moosa, and others.546 In the final
analysis, what becomes evident is that the hypothesis which this study began with, viz,
"Progressive Islam, as an ideology within Political Islam inspired by Quranic
text and Islamic political thought, represents an ideological alternative to
militant post-colonial Islamic movements and provides a viable model for
political engagement within a 2rt century context ",
has in fact been affirmed in the South African context. The qualitative study combined
with an analysis of archival material has revealed that civic modes of participation have
545 See summary of findings in Chapter Four.
546 See Chapter One on Progressive Islam, and Chapter Two on the scholarship produced by Esack and
Moosa.
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been the primary model of political engagement for South African Muslims in the post-
apartheid period.
While this study suggests that there is a perception amongst interviewees that
South African Muslims are not participating actively in politics, this is in fact qualified by
the finding that the nature and form of political engagement exists but is limited to certain
spaces, where Muslims feel compelled to participate as the issues impact on them
directly. They do not however participate actively around issues which they deem to be of
no direct concern to them. This position is, as the thesis has suggested elsewhere, a very
problematic one as it assumes that the nature of Muslim politics in South Africa is
primarily about self-preservation.
Nevertheless, the emergence of groups such as TIP, the ongoing political activism
of the MYM and MSA, and the formation of lobbying spaces such as Muslim Vision
1440/ 2020 and the more recent SAMNET, suggest that the future of Muslim political
engagement in South Africa is sustainable. This is not to say that Muslims should only
engage politically through Muslim organizations. The likes of Ebrahim Rasool, Ismail
Vadi, YusufBhamjee, new Minister of Justice Enver Surtee, Maulana Rafiq Shah, whom
we have already mentioned, and others are excellent examples of practicing Muslims who
have chosen to operate outside of any overt Muslim organization. This study also does
not seek to underestimate the extent of Muslim participation in civil society through
various relief and charitable organisations. But much of it is uncoordinated. What needs
to happen is that more aggressive strategies need to be pursued in order to ensure that the
politics of Muslims evolve and become part of national engagement around the key
questions of the day. Progressive Islam provides the best ideological framework for
Muslims who aspire to be religiously observant while assuming a central role as
responsible citizens advocating for social justice and egalitarian ideals, but who do not
wish to become part of any mainstream political organisation.
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APPENDIX A : SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE
Political Islam in the 21 st Century
Survey Questionnaire
Section A : Biographical Details
Name: (Optional) _
Age: _ Gender: _
Race: Income (pa in $/ ZAR) : _
Level of Education: _
Job Description: _
Organisation: _
Religion: Region (Country / City) : _
How would you categorise your political views?
Conservative Moderate Liberal Socialist _
Section B: Perceotions of Political Islam JMilitant and Progressive Islam
1) What is your understanding of the term "Political Islam ?
2) What is your understanding of the term "Religious Militancy" and / or "Militant Islam" ?
3) What is your understanding of the term "Progressive Islam" ?
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iv) Other (Specify) ego Religious
5)
a) What fonns of political expression do you think are most effective I
prevalent I within the global Muslim community?
Please provide reasons for your answer.
b) b) What fonns of political expression do you think are most effective I
prevalent I within the South African Muslim community?
Please provide reasons for your answer.
6) Do you believe that Islam as a religion preaches violence I militancy to achieve political objectives?
Yes No _
Please provide reasons for your answer.
7) Do you believe that religiously extremist I militant ideas have shaped and impacted on interpretations of
Islam and the way it is practiced globally in a contemporary context? If yes, how, and what have the consequences of
this impact been?
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8) What is your understanding of Jihad ?
9) Do you believe that Progressive Islam as an ideological movement, is compatible with modern democracy
and provides a viable alternative to religious militancy?
yes No _
Please provide reasons for your answer.
10) Do you believe that Progressive Islam as a movement can provide opportunities I a model, for modes of
constructive engagement within the context of a 21 st century democracy?
Yes No _
Please provide reasons for your answer.
11)
a) Which of the following ideologies would you say are most influential
in the Muslim world today?
Neo-fundamentalism (Wahabbism, Tablighi, Salafi, Muslim Brotherhood) _
Progressive Islam _
Other _
Please provide reasons for your answer.
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b) Which of the following ideologies would you say are most influential
in South Africa today?
Neo-fundamentalism (Wahabbism, Tablighi, Salafi, Muslim Brotherhood) _
Progressive Islam _
Other _
Please provide reasons for your answer.
12)
a) What in your opinion, are the most critical challenges facing the
Muslim world today?
b) What in your opinion, are the most critical challenges facing the
South African Muslim community today?
Please feel free to add anything else you would like to, on an attached sheet.
Thank you I Shukran for taking the time to complete this survey. Your participation is very much appreciated.
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Appendix B : List of Interviewees
Name Organisation Date of Interview
-
Mohammed Amra (Director) WAMY 8 November 2006
Mymoena Arnold (Media activist) Independent! Media 13 June 2007
Ebrahim Bofelo (Secretary General) MYM I AMYC 16 November 2006
Masood Boomgaard (Editor) AI-Ummah 16 March 2007
Imraan Buccus (Editor I Researcher) AI-Qalam I CPP 3 November 2006
Suleman Dangor (Academic) UKZN 17 November 2006
Abie Dawjee (Media Activist) RAIN I Independent Media 8 November 2006
Mohammed Groenewald MYM 13 June 2007
(Deputy President)
Fuad Hendricks (Director) Muslim Vision 1440 I 2020 24 April 2007
Rafeek Hassan (Former Director) IPCI 17 November 2006
Riaz Jamal (Director) AI-Ansaar Foundation 7 November 2006
Iqbal Jhazbhai (Academic) UNISA 27 July 2007
Zeinoul Kajee (Director) AwqafSA 25 July 2007
Ayesha Mall (Editor I Lecturer) Africa Perspectives I DUT 13 November 2006
Don Matterra (poet I Activist) Independent 26 July 2007
Fathima Meer (Academic I Activist) IBR I Independent 17 November 2006
Yasien Mohamed (Academic) UWC 28 February 2007
Maryam Patel (Student Activist) MSA 8 December 2006
Tahir Sitoto (Academic) UKZN 14 November 2006
Rassool Snyman PSC I TIP 6 November 2006
(Activist and Businessman)
Imtiaaz Sooliman (Chairperson) Gift of the Givers 14 November 2006
Fuzail Sufi Soofie Mosque Westville 17 November 2006
(lmam and religious leader)
Solly Suleman (Businessman) Minara 13 November 2006
Abdulkader Tayob (Academic) UCT 12 June 2006
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